In re Wood
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Randall M. Howe, Jennifer M. Perkins, Daniel J. Kiley
Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the opinion of the court, in which Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.
H O W E, Judge:
¶1 Annette Wood appeals the trial court‘s order finding her incapacitated and placing her under a general guardianship, making her ineligible to vote under
¶2 We agree that the guardianship statutes on their face violate due process in two ways. First, they terminate a person‘s right to vote upon establishment of a general guardianship without a determination of the person‘s voting capacity. Second, they impose the burden of showing voting cаpacity on the ward. Because the statutes violate due process, we need not consider Wood‘s equal protection argument. See State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Phoenix, 249 Ariz. 239, 247 ¶ 31 (2020) (resolving a constitutional challenge on one ground obviates the need to consider other grounds). We therefore vacate the trial court‘s order and remand for further proceedings in accordance with our decision.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶3 Sixty-three-year-old Wood lives in an assisted living facility in Flagstaff. She uses a wheelchair and needs assistance with most of her daily activities. In May 2022, the Coconino County Public Fiduciary (“CCPF“) petitioned to appoint a guardian for Wood because of a report
¶4 The CCPF alleged that Wood needed a guardian to make financial and medical decisions for her based on a health professional‘s report and its case administrator‘s interviews with Wood and the assisted living facility‘s staff. The health professional diagnosed Wood with unspecified dementia without behavioral disturbance, severe intellectual disabilities, and a cognitive communication deficit. The health professional noted that Wood‘s impairments nevertheless do not “affect [her] ability to receive or evaluate information needed in making or communicating persоnal and financial decision[s].” The report also listed Wood‘s many medications.
¶5 During the interviews with the CCPF‘s case administrator, Wood said that she was not currently taking any medication, even though she was. After the interviews, the case administrator concluded that Wood suffers from memory loss, impaired judgment, severe symptoms of anxiety and depression, and lacks insight into her medical condition and treatment. The CCPF requested that the court place Wood under a gеneral guardianship because other alternatives, such as a limited guardianship or obtaining a power of attorney, were inappropriate. It did not, however, explain why a limited guardianship would be inappropriate.
¶6 The court appointed an investigator who interviewed Wood, the manager of the assisted living facility, and Wood‘s case manager. Wood was unable to remember her address or whether she had lunch that day. The investigatоr also reviewed the health professional‘s report and accompanying documents. The investigator then reported that “Wood is incapacitated by reason of unspecified dementia without behavioral disturbance.” The investigator also reported that she suffers “severe intellectual disabilities” and a “communication deficit to the extent that she lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate resрonsible decisions concerning her person.” She concluded that Wood would benefit from having a guardian.
¶7 Wood agreed that she needed a guardian but requested a limited guardianship, instead of a general guardianship, so that she could retain her right to vote. The trial court set a hearing under
¶9 Wood then testified that she wanted to vote. When asked about how she decided whom to vote for, she responded “I pay attention . . . as to how they are on TV and everything and I decide.” She added that although she talks to other people when deciding whom to vote for, she makes her decision independently. The court asked whether she could identify the current president and vice president. She wаs initially unable to recall the president‘s name but remembered his name later during the hearing. When asked when she intended to vote next, she stated, “Probably around the 6th, I think. I‘m not actually sure.” Finally, the court asked her to describe the process that she went through to vote by mail. She said, “Oh, they just send it to me and I fill it out and put it in the mailbox.” Wood presented no other evidence. The CCPF presented no new evidence and relied on the evidence submitted with its petition.
¶10 The triаl court found that Wood‘s needs made a limited guardianship inappropriate and placed her under a general guardianship. The court alternatively ruled that “even if the [c]ourt had considered a limited [g]uardianship based on her need level, the [c]ourt does not find by clear and convincing evidence that she has—that she retains sufficient understanding to be able to vote.” The court applied its own understanding of the phrase “sufficient understanding to exercise the right to vote,” acknowledging that it lacked appellate court guidance on the phrase‘s meaning. Wood timely appealed. This court has jurisdiction under
DISCUSSION
¶11 Wood challenges the general guardianship order only to the extent that it terminated her right to vote. She argues that Arizona‘s disenfranchisement of those under a general guardianship violates the Due
I. General Principles
¶12 Arizona‘s Probate Code establishes the procedures to determine whether an individual is incapacitated and needs a guardian. A court may appoint a generаl or limited guardian if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) “[t]he person for whom a guardian is sought is incapacitated“; (2) “[t]he appointment is necessary to provide for the demonstrated needs of the incapacitated person“; and (3) “[t]he person‘s needs cannot be met by less restrictive means, including the use of appropriate technological assistance.”
¶13 Arizona law does not define “general guardianship” or “limited guardianship.” But it defines “[i]ncapacitated person” as
any person who is impaired by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, mental disorder, physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication or other cause, except minоrity, to the extent that he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his person. In cases of limited guardianship only, a person is not deemed an incapacitated person for purposes of voting if the person files
a petition and has a hearing and the judge determines by clear and convincing evidence that the person retains sufficient understanding to exercise thе right to vote pursuant to § 14-5304.02 .
¶14 The court‘s finding that a person is incapacitated terminates that person‘s right to vote. The Arizona Constitution provides that “[n]o person who is adjudicated an incapacitated person shall be qualified to vote at any election . . . .”
II. The Right to Vote
¶15 Wood argues that her procedural due process rights were violated because the guardianship statutes terminate the right to vote of a person under a general guardianship without first determining the person‘s voting capacity. This сourt evaluates procedural due process challenges to a voting restriction under the framework articulated in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992), known as the “Anderson/Burdick framework.” See Acevedo v. Cook Cnty. Officers Electoral Bd., 925 F.3d 944, 948 (7th Cir. 2019) (concluding that the Anderson/Burdick framework “applies to all First and Fourteenth
¶16 Under the Anderson/Burdick framework, this court determines whether a person‘s due process rights have been violated by “weigh[ing] ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff‘s rights.‘” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789). Laws that impose a “severe” burden on voting rights must meet strict scrutiny. Id. “Lesser burdens, however, trigger less exacting review, and a State‘s ‘important regulatory interests’ will usually be enough to justify ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.‘” Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997) (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434).
¶17 Terminating the right to vote is the most severe burden on that right. The process required to place a person under a guardianship does not involve an individualized inquiry into the person‘s voting capacity. By denying the right to vote to persons under a general guardianship, the statutes impose a severe burden on their right to vote. The guardianship statutes are therefore subject to strict scrutiny under the Anderson/Burdick framework.
¶18 To satisfy strict scrutiny, the State must establish both that the law is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest and that it employs the “least restrictive means practically available.” Arizonans for Second Chances, Rehab. & Pub. Safety v. Hobbs, 249 Ariz. 396, 409 ¶ 42, 417 ¶ 82 (2020) (quoting Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 227 (1984)). A statute is not “narrowly tailored” unless it “targets” the “exact source of the evil it seeks to remedy” without “eliminat[ing] . . . more than” necessary to achieve that goal. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) (quoting City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808–10 (1984)). If, in other words, “there are other, reasonable ways to achieve” the State‘s legitimate goals “with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choоse the way of greater interference.” Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); see also Second Chances, 249 Ariz. at 417 ¶ 82 (“[S]trict scrutiny requires the least restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.” (citation omitted)).
¶19 Neither the CCPF nor Amicus Curiae the Arizona Attorney General identify any interest, compelling or otherwise, served by
¶20 The Legislature has recognized that placing a person in a guardianship does not necessarily deprive the person of all capacities. Under
III. Placement of the Burden of Proof
¶21 Although the court held a hearing before terminating Wood‘s right to vote, her due process rights were still violated because the statutes placed the burden on her to show voting capacity. Under
¶23 Generally, the party seeking to interfere with a fundamental right carries the burden of showing that the interference is warranted. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69–70 (2000) (ruling that placing on parents the burden “of disproving” that grandparent visitation would be in the children‘s best interests violated due process). Here, placing the burden on the petitioner seeking the guardianship to show that a person subject to guardianship proceedings lacks the capacity to vоte comports with due process and serves the State‘s interest by ensuring that the State is preventing from voting only those who lack the capacity to vote. Thus, the petitioner must show that the alleged incapacitated person lacks the capacity to vote. See id. And because the right to vote is a fundamental right, Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 16 (1964), the petitioner must show that the alleged incapacitated person lacks the capacity to vote by clear and convincing evidence, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (holding that a clear and convincing standard of proof satisfied due process in terminating parental rights). See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979) (holding that a clear and convincing standard of proof satisfied due process in civil commitments to mental hospital for an indefinite period).
¶24 The Attorney General argues that placing the burden on the ward is nonetheless constitutional because only a “modest quantum of evidence” is necessary to show a sufficient understanding to exercise the right to vote. This argumеnt misses the point. The degree of proof is irrelevant because the issue here is whether the ward should bear any evidentiary burden. As explained supra ¶ 23, due process requires that, before terminating a person‘s fundamental right to vote, the petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that the person lacks the capacity to vote. Wood was denied due process because
IV. Sufficient Understanding to Exercise the Right to Vote
¶25 Wood argues finally that she was denied due process because, regardless who bears the burden of proof, the standard she had to meet to regain her right to vote is vague. A person under a limited guardianship “shall retain the right to vote” if that person “retains sufficient understanding to exercise the right to vote.”
¶26 This court reviews the interpretation of statutes de novo. City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm‘n, 246 Ariz. 206, 210 ¶ 10 (2019). “[T]he best and most reliable index of a statute‘s meaning is its language and, when the language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute‘s construction.” State v. Hansen, 215 Ariz. 287, 289 ¶ 7 (2007) (quoting Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 97 v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296 ¶ 8 (2007)). Statutory phrases must be interpreted “in accordance with their commonly accepted meanings, ‘unless the legislature has offered its own definition of the words or it appears from the context that a special meaning was intended.‘” State v. Reynolds, 170 Ariz. 233, 234 (1992) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Mid Kan. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass‘n of Wichita v. Dynamic Dev. Corp., 167 Ariz. 122, 128 (1991)). In determining “commonly accepted meanings,” id., “we may refer to established and widely used dictionaries,” Special Fund Div. v. Indus. Comm‘n, 232 Ariz. 110, 113 ¶ 12 (App. 2013).
¶27 Althоugh the parties and amici curiae believe the phrase “sufficient understanding to exercise the right to vote” may have multiple meanings, the critical words are ordinary and have commonly understood meanings that lead to a single meaning of the phrase. “Voting” means “[t]he expression of one‘s preference or opinion in . . . [an] election by ballot.” Vote, Black‘s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). “Sufficient” means “enough to meet the needs of a situation or a proposed end.” Sufficient, Merriam-Webster‘s Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sufficient (last visited May 16, 2024). And finally, “understanding” means “a mental grasp,” or “the power of comprehending.” Understanding, Merriam
¶28 Admittedly, wisely exercising that right is often difficult and complex. But the wisdom of a particular vote (or a particular voter) is subjective and not a condition of the right to vote. If a citizen understands that by voting he or she is choosing a particular candidate for a particular office or making a choice on a particular ballot measure, the citizen has the capacity to vote. This is true even when the citizen is under a guardianship. Thus, before terminating the right to vote, the petitioner must show and the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged incapacitated person cannot express his or her preference on a ballot.
CONCLUSION
¶29 We vacate and remand for further proceedings consistent with this oрinion. The trial court must reconsider whether Wood can express her preference on a ballot. The burden of proof lies with the CCPF, not Wood. The court may hold an additional evidentiary hearing if it finds it necessary in resolving this question.
AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: TM