204 Pa. Super. 387 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1964
Lead Opinion
Opinion by
Mrs. Lavona E. Dohl, now Wood, was last employed as a cigar maker by the Consolidated Cigar Corporation in Berwick, Pennsylvania. Her application for benefits was disallowed by the Bureau of Employment Security, the Referee, and the Board of Review on the ground that she had voluntarily terminated her employment without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature, and was disqualified under the provisions of Section 402(b) (1) of the Unemployment Compensation Law. Act of December 5, 1936, P. L. (1937), 2897, 402(b) (1), 43 P.S. 802(b) (1). This appeal followed.
The record discloses that claimant, now Mrs. Wood, then Mrs. Dohl, commenced work for the Consolidated Cigar Corporation on November 13, 1961. Living with her at the time in Berwick were her two daughters, Sandra and Jean Dohl, aged sixteen and eleven years
The Board of Review found as a fact claimant voluntarily terminated her employment to be married, and properly concluded that this did not constitute cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. In Dames Unemployment Compensation Case, 158 Pa. Superior Ct. 564, 45 A. 2d 909, this court held that a claimant who voluntarily resigned her position to marry a member of the armed forces did not have good cause for terminating her employment. Similarly, in Drahnak Unemployment Compensation Case, 198 Pa. Superior Ct. 35, 179 A. 2d 659, benefits were denied where claimant voluntarily quit work to marry and join her husband in another state. While our opinion might well end at this point, we will briefly discuss the contention advanced by counsel for claimant on this appeal.
The argument is made that claimant is eligible for benefits by reason of the proviso in Section 402(b) (2) of the statute which reads as follows: “An employe shall be ineligible for compensation for any week . . . (b) ... (2) In which his or her unemployment is due to leaving work (I) to accompany or to join his or her spouse in a new locality, or (II) because of a
It should be noted that Mrs. Dohl was not married to Wood on June 27, 1963, the date she voluntarily terminated her employment. Interpreting the statutory proviso literally, claimant did not leave work to accompany or join her spouse, because Wood was not yet her husband. At the time of filing her interstate claim, Mrs. Dohl stated: “I quit my job to come to Cleveland, Ohio, to get married”. The family referred to by the legislature in the statutory proviso is the family of claimant and his or her spouse. So far as the instant factual situation is concerned, this family did not come into being until July 7, 1963. Assuming arguendo that claimant was the sole support of her two daughters after her divorce from Dohl, she was not the sole or major support of the family after her marriage to Wood.
As a matter of fact, it appears that, upon his marriage to Mrs. Dohl, Wood assumed Jean’s support. At the initial hearing before the Referee, claimant testified as follows: “Q. You could have, but it would have been a hardship on your part. A. On my part, that’s right. Because I was sole support of two children until April of this past year. And one daughter reached 18 and then I was sole support of another one which was just 14 yesterday . . . And I supported them for two years solid until this marriage July 6th. Q. All
In brief, it is clear that claimant does not fall within the exception provided for in Section 402(b) (2) of the statute. She is therefore ineligible for benefits. Cf. Cochran Unemployment Compensation Case, 197 Pa. Superior Ct. 149, 177 A. 2d 26.
Decision affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
I respectfully dissent. Under the evidence, the claimant was the sole support of her family for the six months’ period prior to the date when she left to be married ten days later and live with her new husband in Cleveland. Therefore, in my opinion, she comes within the proviso of §402(b) (2), 43 PS §802(b) (2). Since the board of review apparently did not consider the evidence in the light of this proviso, I would remit the case to the board for proper disposition of the matter.
