195 S.E. 528 | W. Va. | 1938
November 8, 1930, the Compensation Commissioner fixed the disability of Rex Hull, an injured claimant of compensation, at 25%, payments on which expired December 30, 1930. Hull made timely objection and asked further consideration. February 27, 1931, the commissioner refused to reopen the claim. Thereafter, from time to time, Hull importuned the commissioner, without success, until September 21, 1933, when the claim was reopened as of July 9, 1933, on the basis of a temporary disability to be carried "for a reasonable length of time." Hull died April 3, 1934, without change in his last rating. April 22, 1934, his widow and children (under eleven years of age) represented to the commissioner that Hull had been totally disabled from the date of his injury to his death, and that they were entitled to the compensation which he should have had but did not receive, between December 30, 1930, and July 9, 1933. May 3, 1934, this claim was refused. May 7, 1934, the claimants protested and demanded a hearing. May 18, 1934, a hearing was refused. Nothing more was done until July 5, 1935, when the claim was re-presented. It was refused initially by the commissioner, but on appeal to the Board a hearing was directed, upon which the commissioner awarded Mrs. Hull "accrued compensation for the periods December 17, 1930, through July 8, 1933, and March 1, 1934, through April 2, 1934, upon a finding of fact that the claimant, Rex Hull, was totally disabled for the periods." On appeal to the Board, it held that Mrs. Hull was barred from participation in the amount found due under the claim of Rex Hull "as accrued compensation", *583 but that it be paid to her for the benefit of the children.
This proceeding involves two questions of law, viz: (1) Did the claimants ever have any lawful right to what they demand; and (2) if so, have they lost that right?
1. The statute relating to the first question is Code,
The word "accrued" when employed in connection with payment of money is commonly understood to designate *584
money, the right to which has vested. "The technical meaning of the word 'accrued', as defined in the dictionary, is the possession of a present, enforceable right. A note is said to accrue when it becomes due and payable." Allen v. Armstrong,
Under the West Virginia plan, the right to compensation becomes present and enforceable only when and as payment is authorized by the commissioner or a supervisory body. Compensation was denied Hull during the period between December 30, 1930, and July 9, 1933; so, no matter how well grounded his claim of compensation therefor, his right to such compensation never became vested — it never accrued. On the other hand, subsequently, the commissioner made to Hull in his lifetime an award of temporary disability which extended through the period between March 1, 1934, and April 2, 1934, inclusive. Compensation for that period was due and unpaid when he died. This compensation had therefore accrued, and after his death, became payable to his dependents.
2. In Sudraski v. Commissioner,
The order of the Board is reversed and the proceeding remanded.
Reversed and remanded.