14 Mass. App. Ct. 923 | Mass. App. Ct. | 1982
It is settled that acceptance and deposit of a check offered in full payment of a disputed claim constituted an accord and satisfaction and bars an attempt to collect any balance outstanding under a contract. Worcester Color Co. v. Henry Wood’s Sons, 209 Mass. 105, 109 (1911). Whittaker Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto Supply Co., 216 Mass. 204, 206 (1913). Whether an accord and satisfaction has been proved is a question of fact on which the defendant has the burden of proof. Worcester Color Co. v. Henry Wood’s Sons, supra at 110. Rosenblatt v. Holstein Rubber Co., 281 Mass. 297, 300 (1933). There was evidence that the parties had a disagreement as to the amount owed by the defendant and that the dispute arose before the defendant sent the $1,000 check. See Rust Engr. Co. v. Lawrence Pumps, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 328, 333 (D. Mass. 1975). The notation on the check and the contents of the letter were evidence that the check was being offered in full settlement of the disputed claim. See Sherman v. Sidman, 300 Mass. 102, 106 (1938). The additional payment of $500 could have been found to constitute consideration supporting the condition imposed by the defendant; i.e. that the plaintiff’s acceptance of the payment fully discharged the debt. Worcester Color Co. v. Henry Wood’s Sons, supra at 109. Whittaker Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto Supply Co., supra at 206. The action of the plaintiff in deleting the words, “payment in full” did not establish, as a matter of law, that there was no accord and satisfaction. See 15 Williston, Contracts § 1854 (3d ed. 1972). Therefore the defendant adequately raised
2. The defendant raises other issues that may reoccur at the new trial. The judge was correct in excluding certain testimony of the defendant and a letter sent by the plaintiff s attorney offered in regard to whether the defendant entered into the contract as an individual or as a corporate officer as such testimony was hearsay and the letter was irrelevant. The defendant’s motion for a directed verdict was correctly denied. The judge’s instruction to the jury in regard to the effect of the judgment entered in the District Court was adequate.
Judgment reversed.