193 Misc. 289 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1948
This is an application pursuant to article 78 of the Civil Practice Act to review the action of respondents who have refused to grant a certificate of eviction to the petitioner.,
Respondents constitute the temporary city housing rent commission of the city of New York. Petitioner is the owner of a two-family house, situated in Queens County, New York City. A statutory tenant occupies part of that house contrary to petitioner’s wishes, but perforce of law. In her application petitioner bases her request for a certificate solely on the ground that she desires in good faith to withdraw from the rental market the housing accommodations which her tenant occupies. In their refusal to issue a certificate, respondents indicated that they lacked the power to do so as follows: ‘6 Application is not based upon a ground for which a Certificate may be issued under the regulations.” Petitioner’s application is fashioned upon the Housing and Rent Act of 1948 (Public Law 464, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 161) which permits a landlord to withdraw housing accommodations from the rental market (§ 204, subd. [d]).
There is no dispute as to the facts. In order to present a pure question of law, respondents, in a letter to the court dated October 29, 1948, have stipulated that the allegations of the application filed with the commission may, for the purpose of this proceeding, be taken as true. We thus have a situation in which a property owner desires in good faith to withdraw her property from the rental market. Such action is permitted by the Federal statute, but not by the local law.
The enactment of Congress provides: “No action or proceeding to recover possession of any controlled housing accommodations with respect to which a maximum rent is in effect
Section 302 of the Housing and Bent Act of 1948 further provides: “ Nothing in this Act or in the Housing and Bent Act of 1947, as amended, shall be construed to require any person to offer any housing accommodations for rent.”
New York City Local Law No. 66 of 1947 (Administrative Code, § TJ41-7.0) declares that except for nonpayment of rent, no tenant shall be evicted unless respondents shall certify the existence of at least one of four grounds specified in the ordinance. It is conceded that the withdrawal of housing accommodations is not one of these grounds. Institution of an eviction proceeding, without first obtaining a certificate pursuant to the local ordinance, is a misdemeanor.
A comparison of these statutes indicates that the Federal law permits withdrawal of housing accommodations from the rental market, while the city ordinance forbids it. Does this difference constitute a conflict? Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution (art. VI) if the local law interferes with or is contrary to a law of Congress, the Federal law is paramount and the local law must yield, even though it was enacted in the exercise of uncontroverted powers (Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. [U. S.] 1, 211; M’Culloch v. State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. [U. S.] 405-406).
This general proposition is not disputed. In fact, respondents concede that “ If there is a conflict between Local Law 66 * * * and the Housing and Bent Act •* * * then the latter, being the supreme law, must prevail, and the former, insofar as it is inconsistent, is unconstitutional.” While the general principle is quite clear its application to specific facts is not always easy.
Bespondents contend that there is no conflict between the local and the Federal law. They argue that the local law merely assists in enforcing the Federal law. Their position is that the Federal law does not deny to local authorities the power to
On the other hand, in Hill v. Florida (325 U. S. 538) the Supreme Court declared invalid a Florida statute requiring a business agent of a labor union to be licensed. • The court held that this act circumscribed the full freedom of choice which Congress said employees should possess. The court stated (p. 541): “To the extent that § 4 limits a union’s choice of such an 6 agent ’ or bargaining representative, it substitutes Florida’s judgment for the workers’ judgment.”
Some norms helpful to a decision herein may be' gleaned from some of the other decisions made by the Supreme Court and by our own Court of Appeals. In People v. Lewis (295 N. Y. 42) the Court of Appeals in holding that New York City Local Law No. 35 -of 1945 did not conflict with the State War Emergency Act (L. 1942, ch. 445, as amd.) said (p. 51): “ The local law prohibits nothing that the State law permits ”. If this be a fair test of conflict, it is apparent that in the case at bar the local law conflicts with the Federal statute. It prohibits something which the Federal law permits, to wit: the right of an owner to withdraw his property from the rental market.
The Supreme Court has held that Congress will be deemed to have intended to supersede a local law when the local law
Matter of Molnar v. Curtin (273 App. Div. 322, affd. 297 N. Y. 967) is not to the contrary. It was there held that Local Law No. 66 did not conflict with the Housing and Bent Act of 1947. The act of 1947, however, did not provide for evictions for the purpose of withdrawing property from the rental market as does the act of 1948. Nor did it contain a declaration of the intent of Congress not to require anyone to remain in the rental market.
Some point is made of the fact that the 1946 amendment to the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, prohibiting any State or local Government from legislating with respect to rent control of housing accommodations in defense rental areas, was omitted from the Housing and Bent Acts of 1947 and 1948. This does not solve the problem of conflict. While that provision was in force, there could be no conflict, because there could be no local legislation. It was only after its repeal that local governments could legislate on rent control at all. Such
Respondents raise the further point that the Federal Government intends gradually to decontrol evictions which may eventually be permitted in all but one or two cases. They argue that local authorities should be permitted to re-enact such restrictions as the Federal government from time to time omits and they pose the question, “ Would the retention of one or two federal controls preclude the state from imposing controls on dozens of other situations? ” The question misses the point. We have here something more than mere omission of a right permitted by Federal law. The particular exception which the local law omits conflicts with the express policy of Congress set forth independently in section 302 of the act. No other exception to the prohibition against evictions is so buttressed by another separate section affirmatively expressing the policy of Congress. When these sections are read together, as they must be, the conflict between Federal and local laws is quite apparent and very direct. The local law compels landlords to rent against their will, while the Federal law says they need not do so.
It has been suggested that if the right to withdraw property from the rental market is upheld, wholesale evictions will ensue. This is improper argument. In the first place, it is pure conjecture on the part of the respondents, but even assuming that respondents are correct in their surmise, it is an argument which must.be addressed to Congress, not to the court. The social and economic consequences which may flow from legislation may be considered only in interpreting a statute of doubtful meaning. Where the language is clear and unambiguous, the wisdom of the law is not within the province of the court. Nor may local authorities assume to nullify an act of Congress because they disagree with its policy or its possible effects.
If it be thought that the Federal statute will be utilized as a subterfuge, we need only refer to the language of the law
The decision of Mr. Justice Powers in Matter of Recknagel v. Finkelstein (193 Misc. 31) and of Mr. Justice Livingston in Matter of Batterman v. Finkelstein (193 Misc. 236) have been considered by this court although we have reached a different conclusion. The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Woods v. Durr (170 F. 2d 976, decided Nov. 8, 1948) has also been called to the attention of this court. The right to evict in order to withdraw property from the rental market was there upheld, but, in that case, the Federal statute alone was under consideration. There was no question of conflict with any local law.
After careful consideration, the court is of the opinion that the clear intent and plain direction of Congress that property may be withdrawn from the rental market, may not be nullified by the local authorities. The act of Congress (Housing and Rent Act of 1948) is the law of the land and must be recognized by respondents. The application is granted.
Settle final order on notice.