233 F. 194 | 4th Cir. | 1916
Lead Opinion
(after stating the facts as above). In order to dispose of the case, it will be necessary in our opinion to consider only the first assignment of error, which is as follows:
“It was an error to dismiss the writ of habeas corpus, as the petitioner is entitled to his liberty.”
This brings us at once to the consideration of the proposition as to whether or not there was any evidence to sustain the action of the executive department in ordering the deportation of Toon. Referring to the facts in addition to those found upon the admission of Toon, the learned judge who heard the writ of habeas corpus made this statement :
“All that was really new in the case made at Baltimore is that, very shortly after the boy arrived in California, the alleged father sent him clear across the continent to a laundryman here. The latter’s relationship, if any, to either the father or son, is, by petitioner’s witnesses, variously and vaguely stated. The statements of the man in question are of such a character as to lead the immigration officials to a conclusion that he is unworthy of belief. No letters have passed between the alleged father and the petitioner, and the former does not claim to have sent for the latter’s support during an entire year more than $60. At the conclusion of the hearing, the local immigration authorities decided that he should be deported.”
In the investigation upon the arrival of Toon in this country, Wong, the father, and Gooey, the brother, together with Toon himself, testified that he was the son of Wong, the Oakland merchant. The inspector reported against admission on the ground that there were some inconsistencies in the statements of these three witnesses, not as to the paternity of Toon, but as to other matters, pertaining more particularly to the dwellings and locations of houses in the town in China in which these witnesses claimed to have lived; but upon a review of the case, the Department of Babor held that Toon’s claim had been established, that he was the minor son of Wong, and was entitled to admission, and a certificate of identity as heretofore stated was issued. The executive authorities now claim that the admission was procured by fraud, in that Toon is not the minor son of a member of one of the exempt classes.
It is true that the inspector states that the laundryman, Lee, told him, when lie went into the laundry, that Toon was his son; but when Lee came to testify on oath he stated that the youth was the son of Wong, the Oakland merchant, and he also denied that he had told the inspector that Toon was his son. But, take it to be true that Lee made this statement to the inspector, so far as it appears here, it was only hearsay, for there is no suggestion that Toon, or rmy one who would feel called upon to contradict such statement, heard it. Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U. S. (7 Cranch) 290, 3 L. Ed. 348, laid down the rule with regard to hearsay evidence which is generally accepted in this country, to the effect that hearsay evidence is incompetent to establish any specific fact which is susceptible of proof by witnesses who speak from their own knowledge. In commenting upon this character of testimony the Chief Justice said:
“One of these rules is that ‘hearsay’ evidence is in its own nature inadmissible. That this species of testimony supposes some better testimony which might be adduced in the particular case is not the sole ground of its exclusion. Its intrinsic weakness, its incompetency to satisfy the mind of the existence of the fact, and the frauds which might be practiced under its cover combine to support the rule that hearsay evidence is totally inadmissible.”
There was some testimony to the effect that Toon had been at work in a laundry. Toon himself denied this, as did also Lee and the colored washerwoman who worked for Lee; but, if it be a fact that
There was some testimony in the investigation relative to the allegation that Toon had been sent to Baltimore to go to school, and that he had not attended any save the Sunday school. Wong testified that the reason that he had sent him to Baltimore to go to school was that the prejudice in California against the Chinese was such that it was not pleasant for a Chinese youth to go to school there, and it was further testified that the reaTson he had not attended school whilst in Baltimore was that he was not in good health. The learned judge who heard the case seems to have treated this circumstance as of no. importance, because he did not mention it as constituting any part of the new matter. To this view of it we readily agree.
Brushing away, therefore, the irrelevant and inadmissible circumstances which were admitted in the case, and taking the only facts which remain, being those stated by his honor who tried the case, save the reference to Lee, the laundryman, we have as the sole basis of the Department’s action three facts, to wit: That a short time after Toon’s arrival in California, the alleged father sent him clear across the continent to the laundryman here (at Baltimore); that no letters have passed between the alleged father and Toon; and that the alleged father does not claim to have sent for Toon’s support during the entire year more than $60.
We are not intending to hold that the weight of the evidence should govern in a case like this, for we fully recognize the law to be that the administrative officers aré authorized to deport an alien whenever there is evidence to warrant such action, and the courts have not jurisdiction to interfere in such case; but it is settled by numerous decisions that the courts may supervise the action of the executive authorities in these matters and reverse their rulings when there is no evidence to sustain them.
When a Chinaman of an exempt class enters this country, intending to remain, he is not indulging a mere privilege accorded him by us, but he is exercising a right which is guaranteed to him by international treaty and the laws of the United States. He cannot be divested of this right upon a charge of fraud unsustained by competent and relevant evidence. We reiterate that we do not find evidence of that character in this record.
Reversed.
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Dissenting Opinion
I dissent. The appellant, Wong Yee Toon, a native of China, arrived in San Francisco in October, 1913. He claimed admission as the minor son of Wong Que Teung, a Chinese merchant of Oakland, Cal. The inspector upon investigation reported against his admission; one of his reasons being that in his opinion Toon had not proved the relationship to Teung. The law section of the Department of Labor disagreed with the inspector, and Toon was admitted in November, 1913. About two months after-wards Toon went to Baltimore to live with Won Jim Lee. In January, 1915, a warrant was issued charging Toon with being in the United States in violation of the immigration laws against admission of Chinese. Upon his arrest in Baltimore, Inspector Archibald gave him a full hearing, his counsel participating, and found the evidence sustained the charges made in the warrant. The proceedings before the inspector were first reviewed by Mr. Stump, Commissioner of Immigration, then by Hon. A. Caminetti, Commissioner General of Immigration, then by the Secretary of Labor. All agreed in the conclusion that Toon had obtained admission on the false and fraudulent pretense that he was the minor son of Teung, and that he should be deported. The entire record was then brought before Hon. J. C. Rose, District Judge, under a writ of habeas corpus. Holding that there was in the evidence abundant reason to doubt whether Toon was the son of Teung, Judge Rose dismissed the writ.
The admission of petitioner as a son of Teung, I agree, ought to be regarded prima facie evidence of his right to enter. Liu Hop Fong v. United States, 209 U. S. 453, 28 Sup. Ct. 576, 52 L. Ed. 888; Ex parte Lam Pui (D. C.) 217 Fed. 456. But the right to enter may be afterwards re-examined by the immigration officers, and their conclusion after a fair hearing, when approved by the Secretary of Labor, is final as to all issues of fact. The weight to be given to the fact of admission and all other evidence is for the executive department concerned, and not for the courts. The immigrant may, however, invoke judicial interference in his behalf on the questions of law, whether he has had a fair hearing, and whether the findings of the immigration officers against his right to remain in this country are supported by any substantial evidence. Lewis v. Frick, 233 U. S. 291, 34 Stip. Ct. 488, 58 L. Ed. 967.
It is not denied in the case before us that the hearing was fairly conducted, but it is earnestly contended that there is no substantial evidence supporting the finding that petitioner was not the son of Teung, the Chinese merchant. The evidence should be weighed by the court in view of the difficulty confronting immigration officers in the enforcement of the Exclusion Laws. Evidently the immigrant, especially a Chinaman, has great advantage of the government with respect to direct evidence. If he wishes to come in under false claims, his oath and that of his relations or friends can rarely, if ever, be
Here the petitioner relies on his.own oath and that of his alleged father and brothers that he is the .son of Teung, coupled with thq fact that Teung sent $60 for his support while he was in Baltimore. On the part of the government it appears that Toon remained with the man who claimed him as a son but two months after he was admitted. Although he was a mere lad, unacquainted with conditions in this country, and suffering from chills, Teung sent him across the continent to Baltimore tp be sent to school by Won Jim Lee, for the alleged reason that the climate would be better for him in his illness. Lee, according to Teung, was a distant relative. Lee represented himself at one time as Toon’s father, at another as his uncle, and at another as a distant relative, and he testified that he did not know what was the relationship. No reason is given for expecting the climate of Baltimore to be better for the boy. At the time of the hearing he had been separated from his alleged father and brothers more than a year, and had had no letter or other communication from any of them.
In the application of another son, Yee Gooey, for admission, Teung gave tire date of birth of his youngest son, alleged to be the petitioner, as 1897, and his name as Won Yee Chin. In this case he gave the date of Toon’s birth as 1896, and his name as Won Yee Toon. There are other circumstances relied on by the inspector and commissioners, but what we have set out seems to be substantial evidence tending to disprove the claim that petitioner is a son of Teung. It is not for the court to say that the finding of the executive officers on the evidence should have been different.