MEMORANDUM OPINION
This Memorandum Opinion addresses and disposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment and accompanying Memorandum that Defendants Danita Nias and the University of Maryland Alumni Association (“UMAA”) filed, ECF Nos. 64 & 64-1. Plaintiff Sylvia Wonasue has not filed a response, and the time for doing so has passed. See Loe. R. 105.2.a; ECF No. 71 (denying Plaintiffs Motion to Extend Time for Response and to Accept Response Filed Out of Time, ECF No. 65); ECF No.
I. BACKGROUND
On Wednesday, January 13, 2010, Ms. Wonasue felt weak, “almost faint,” and nauseous, and she was vomiting and bleeding “a little.” Wonasue Dep. 150:15-151:6, 152:19-153:1.
Dr. Czarnecki prescribed a “potassium medication because [Ms. Wonasue] needed that to help with the baby[,] [a]nd he may have given [her] pills to help with the nausea.” Wonasue Dep. at 154:12-14. Plaintiff testified that the physician “just thought that [she] needed to regulate the potassium” and “other than that, he didn’t think it was a big deal.” Id. at 155:4-6. She said that Dr. Czarnecki did not recommend “any major change regarding ... food.” Id. at 156:3-11. Plaintiff testified that the physician told her that her health “could create a problem with the pregnancy,” and therefore he “wanted [her] to stay calm, take bed rest, drink lots of water .... don’t do any heavy work or heavy lifting, stride slowly, things like that.” Id. at 157:2-10.
Plaintiffs discharge papers from Bowie Health Center included Discharge Instructions and a Work Release Form. The instructions indicated that she had hypokalemia, “a low level of potassium in the blood,” for which she was directed to “[t]ake any potassium supplements pre
At the time, Plaintiff was working as executive manager of UMAA. Compl. ¶ 9. The Work Release Form stated that Ms. Wonasue “may return to work on 01/15/2010 with the following restrictions: None.” Work Release 1; see Wonasue Dep. 164:10-12 (Work Release Form said that Plaintiff could “return to duty on January 15, 2010”). Plaintiff testified that her January 13, 2010 emergency room visit was her “only medical visit ... prior to leaving the Alumni Association,” and that she only received one “work release form ... related to [her] pregnancy before [she] left the Alumni Association.” Wonasue Dep. 163:9-16.
Plaintiff “thought” she was supposed to be on bed rest “for two weeks initially.” Id. at 167:17-18. During her deposition, Plaintiff could not identify where in her discharge papers the physician ordered bed rest after January 15, 2010, but she said that “he talked to [her] about it that day at the hospital.” Id. at 177:12-20. She insisted that the physician “did tell [her] specifically that [she] needed to get bed rest,” and that “[h]e was worried because the vomiting was severe” and Plaintiff “was so faint.” Id. at 178:9-12. Plaintiff insists that she “had a paper” from her January 13, 2010 emergency room visit that “said on it have bed rest, drink a lot water, all the specific instructions,” but at her deposition, Plaintiff did not “know where it is.” Id. at 164:13-21. Yet, she also testified that the physician “didn’t say [she] couldn’t work,” id. at 165:10-12, and did not “tell [her] that [she] had to stop work temporarily,” although “he told [her that she] had to get bed rest,” id. at 166:3-6.
Plaintiff testified that, two days later, on Friday, January 15, 2010, she told her supervisor, Defendant Nias, that she was pregnant, that she had “been feeling sick the past weekend,” that she experienced “vomiting and weakness,” that she went to the hospital, and that “the doctor had advised [her] to take bed rest.” Wonasue Dep. 173:7-174:12. Plaintiff also testified that she told Ms. Nias that the physician gave her “specific instructions to take bed rest, drink water, ... not to do any heavy lifting, and stride slowly.” Id. at 174:18-21. Yet, in the “Fact-Finding Statement” Plaintiff provided for the Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation’s Office of Unemployment Insurance’s Fact Finding Report, Plaintiff stated that, when she asked to “work from home two days per week” so that she “would not have to be on [her] feet all day,” she “did not indicate any medical restrictions, because at that time [she] did not have any.” Fact Finding Report, Defs.’ Request for Admissions Ex. 1, Defs.’ Mem. Ex. E, EOF No. 64-6. In their Memorandum, Defendants agree with Ms. Wonasue’s testimony, but only insofar as she testified that she “told Nias that she had ‘not been feeling well’ and that she had gone to the hospital and learned that she was pregnant.” Defs.’ Mem. 4.
Plaintiff claims that Ms. Nias denied her requests, Wonasue Dep. 180:17-19, and instead tried “to force her out of her position by, among other examples, changing her work schedule to make it less accommodating, giving her [an] impossible set of tasks and timeframe to perform them in, [and] specifying duties that she clearly could not perform given her medical condition.... ” Compl. ¶¶ 21, 23. According to Plaintiff, she “attempted to perform according to Defendants’ demands, ... and this further jeopardized her baby’s and her own health and lives,” as she “experienced such severe medical complications, that she was rushed by ambulance to the emergency room” and then “her physicians altered her medical status and required her to go on bed rest .... ” Id. ¶¶ 24-26. Plaintiff submitted her resignation letter on January 19, 2010. Wonasue Dep. Ex. 14. Plaintiff insists that she was constructively discharged from her position. Id. ¶ 27. Yet, in her statement to the Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation’s Office of Unemployment Insurance, Plaintiff declared that her decision to resign “was a personal choice.” Fact Finding Report. Her employer noted that, “[h]ad she indicated any medical restrictions, she could have filed for an FMLA leave of absence, as she would have been eligible.” Id.
Plaintiff said that she saw her obstetrician “[l]ater, after [she] left the alumni,” and “he said that [she] needed rest, too.” Wonasue Dep. 163:5-8. She testified that “after [she] left the Alumni Association, [she] almost had a miscarriage,” so she “went to Bowie Hospital, and then they took [her] by ambulance to PG and gave [her] lots of treatments and stuff for that.” Id. at 158:11-15. On February 2, 2010, her obstetrician put her on bed rest through October 29, 2010 due to “pregnancy bleeding.” Fact Finding Report. Plaintiff stated that, at that time, she “had already made the decision to quit.” Id. After that, she “was sick a lot during most of the pregnancy,” which her doctor “thought ... was stress related.” Wonasue Dep. 158:16-159:2. Plaintiff had to take stress tests every week toward the end of her pregnancy. Id. at 159:3-11.
Plaintiff filed a nine-count complaint against UMAA and Ms. Nias. She voluntarily dismissed three counts alleging due process claims (Counts V, VI, and VII), Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 1, ECF No. 7, and this Court dismissed Count IX, “Violation of Maryland Common Law Implementing the Family and Medical Leave Act Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq and Unlawful Termination,” June 1, 2012 Order,
II. DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is proper when the moving party demonstrates, through “particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,” that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(a), (c)(1)(A); see Baldwin v. City of Greensboro,
A. Proof of Disability
Preliminarily, I note that courts construe the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, and Maryland Employment Discrimination Law together, such that disability discrimination claims brought under these three statutes share elements. See Works v. Colvin,
Thus, to survive Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on her claims for discriminatory constructive discharge and failure to accommodate under the ADA and Maryland Employment Discrimination Law, as well as disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act and Maryland Employment Discrimination Law, Plaintiff must prove that she has a disability. See Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp.,
For purposes of these three statutes, a disability is any one of the following: “ ‘(A) a physical ... impairment that substantially limits one or more ... major life activities ...; (B) ... a record of such an impairment; or (C) [when an individual is] regarded as having such impairment.’ ”
The ADA identifies the following “major life activities”: “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); see Pisani v. Baltimore City Police, No. WDQ-12-1654,
Significantly, a plaintiff “cannot state a claim under the ADA” by alleging that she was discriminated against due to her pregnancy alone, because “pregnancy is not a disability under the ADA.” Genovese v. Harford Health and Fitnes Club, Inc., No. WMN-13-217,
Defendants assert that ‘Wonasue was not ‘disabled’ within the meaning of the
Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants regarded her as having a substantially-limiting impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). To the extent that she claims that she had a substantially-limiting impairment or a record of such an impairment, see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A, B); Compl. ¶44 (Plaintiff had a “pregnant and medical condition” of which Defendants were aware), Brockman,
Here, Plaintiff alleges that she was pregnant. Compl. ¶ 17. This alone is not enough for Plaintiff to have a “disability” under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act or Maryland Employment Discrimination Law, which share the ADA definition. See Young,
Even if Plaintiff claimed sufficient complications to constitute a disability, the evidence belies Plaintiffs assertion. It is true that Plaintiff experienced more than typical morning sickness; she was diagnosed with hyperemesis of pregnancy, “a severe form of ‘morning sickness’, where the vomiting is excessive and may cause dehydration and chemical imbalances in the body.” Discharge Instructions 4. Nonetheless, even with this diagnosis, the emergency room physician stated that Plaintiff could go back to work on January 15, 2010 with no restrictions. Work Release 1; see Wonasue Dep. 164:10-12; Discharge Instructions 4. Indeed, Plaintiff testified that the emergency room physician “just thought that [she] needed to regulate the potassium” and “other than that, he didn’t think it was a big deal.” Wonasue Dep. 155:4-6. She also testified that the physician “didn’t say [she] couldn’t work,” id. at 165:10-12, and did not “tell [her] that [she] had to stop work temporarily,” id. at 166:3-6. Additionally, she stated that she “did not have any” medical restrictions at the time she asked to work from home. Fact Finding Report. Although Plaintiff “thought” she was supposed to be on bed rest “for two weeks initially,” id. at 167:17-18, she did not identify any evidence to that effect. See id. at 164:13-21, 177:12— 20. Thus, the “complications” that Plaintiff experienced were less severe than in Brockman,
Plaintiff may have had other complications with her pregnancy after her employment with UMAA ended. See Wonasue Dep. 158:11-159:11, 163:5-8; Fact Finding Report. But, Plaintiff must show that she had a disability when she sought accommodations or when she felt she had to resign, as the alleged disability must have existed at the time of the purported discrimination for the discrimination to have been due to the disability. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp.,
B. Retaliation in Violation of the Rehabilitation Act (Count IV)
The Rehabilitation Act proscribes discrimination against an “otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... solely by reason of her or his disability.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). It does not proscribe retaliation per se, but “it incorporates the remedies applicable under the ADA including 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) which makes it unlawful to retaliate against individuals for making a charge, testifying, assisting, or participating in an investigation, proceeding or hearing regarding charges of disability discrimination.” Berkner v. Blank, No. DKC-12-1390,
Thus, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must show that “(1) she engaged in á protected activity; (2) the [employer] took an adverse employment action against her; and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Works v. Colvin,
Defendants do not challenge the first or third element. Rather, arguing that Ms. Wonasue “voluntarily resigned, and' cannot prove that she was constructively discharged,” Defendants insist that “[t]he Alumni Association ... never took an ‘adverse employment action’ against [Plaintiff].” Defs.’ Mem. 17. Defendants do not cite any authority for their assertion. Defendants also contend that, “while Nias may have denied Wonasue’s request to work from home, the Alumni Association did not foreclose considering other appropriate accommodations.” Id. at 17-18.
To establish an adverse employment action in a retaliation claim,
“a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, ‘which ... means it well might have dissuadeda reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’ ” To illustrate, the Supreme Court has described “[a] supervisor’s refusal to invite an employee to lunch” as a trivial, non-materially adverse action, but has said that “excluding an employee from a weekly training lunch that contributes significantly to the employee’s professional advancement,” is conduct that “might well” be materially adverse.
Madock v. McHugh, No. ELH-10-2706,
Even with this lower bar, none of the following constitutes an adverse employment action in a retaliation claim: failing to issue a performance appraisal; moving an employee to an inferior office or eliminating the employee’s work station; considering the employee “AWOL”; or issuing a personal improvement plan, “an ‘Attendance Warning,’” a verbal reprimand, “a formal letter of reprimand,” or “a proposed termination.” Rock v. McHugh,
Plaintiff alleges that she suffered a litany of what she views as adverse employment actions:
The Defendants have failed to accept Plaintiffs medical evaluation and request from her physician, failed to accommodate Plaintiffs disability, violated Plaintiffs statutory rights against discrimination, failed to follow accepted and lawful employment standards, procedures and policies, forced Plaintiff to expend enormous sums of money in attorneys’ fees to protect her statutory, contractual and constitutional rights, caused physical harm to Plaintiff and her baby, terminated Plaintiffs employment, failed to ameliorate and correct Defendant’s wrongful acts upon receiving notice, and failed to provide Plaintiff the opportunity to seek reconsideration of any request for accommodation or termination decision.
Compl. ¶ 75.
In the light most favorable to Ms. Wonasue, the evidence shows that, on January 15, 2010, Ms. Nias met with Ms. Wonasue, who informed her that she was “ ‘expecting’ and would like to work from home on occasion.” Jan. 15, 2010 Email from Nias
Ms. Nias would not look at the paperwork Ms. Wonasue had from her emergency room physician. Wonasue Dep. 175:8-17, 179:19-20, 181:4-8. She “denied the requests] and used [the meeting] as an opportunity to reinforce what type of support [she] need[ed].” Jan. 15, 2010 Email from Nias to Beth Morgen. Specifically, Ms. Nias told Ms. Wonasue that she needed “[a] full-time, committed assistant”; “[s]omeone that can help [her] advance projects and respond in a timely manner to a number of issues”; and someone who will be in the office “from 8:30 to 5:00[ ] to provide the type of support [Ms. Nias] need[s].” Id. Additionally, Ms. Nias “asked [Plaintiff] to think about whether or not she could commit herself fully to being [her] assistant,” and told her that “[i]f she could not, she would have to think about what she wanted to do.” Id. Plaintiff resigned at the end of the next workday. Wonasue Dep. Ex. 14.
As noted, Plaintiff characterizes her resignation as constructive discharge. “Constructive discharge occurs when an employee resigns because the ‘employer deliberately makes the working conditions intolerable in an effort to induce the employee to quit.’ ” Banhi,
her supervisors yelled at her, told her she was a poor manager and gave her poor evaluations, chastised her in front of customers, and once required her to work with an injured back ..., even if true, do not establish the objectively intolerable working conditions necessary to prove a constructive discharge.
Williams v. Giant Food Inc.,
Plaintiff has not shown that Ms. Nias was “motivated by ... bias” or that her working conditions were intolerable. See Honor,
Still, the Fourth Circuit has stated that the denial of a request to work from home, made by an employee experiencing pregnancy complications, may constitute an adverse employment action. See Brockman,
Here, Plaintiff made her request •without “indicat[ing] any medical restrictions”; indeed, “at that time [she] did not have any.” Fact Finding Report. Yet she did tell Ms. Nias that she was pregnant, that she had “been feeling sick the past weekend,” that she experienced “vomiting and weakness,” that she went to the hospital, and that “the doctor had advised [her] to take bed rest.” Wonasue Dep. 173:7-174:12. Additionally, she offered her discharge papers to Ms. Nias. Id. at 179:19-20, 181:4-8. Although the evidence is slight, a reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff was asking to work from home or take leave to accommodate pregnancy complications that she thought she was experiencing.
Defendants argue that the denial in this case was not an adverse employment action because it “did not foreclose considering other appropriate accommodations.” Defs.’ Mem. 18. Yet, the denial was accompanied by a reminder of Plaintiffs job duties, with an emphasis on being in the office “full-time ... from 8:30 to 5:00,” and a warning that Plaintiff “would have to think about what she wanted to do” if she could not “commit herself fully.” Jan. 15, 2010 Email from Nias to Beth Morgen. A reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff might not have felt comfortable requesting other accommodations after listening to that warning. The warning could be considered “an ‘Attendance Warning,’ ” or perhaps even a verbal reprimand, neither of which on its own constitutes an adverse employment action. See Rock v. McHugh,
The burden shifts to Defendants to “proffer[ ] a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason” for the adverse employment action. Id. Defendants do not provide any reason whatsoever for denying Plaintiffs request to work from home while using the same conversation “as an opportunity to reinforce what type of support [Ms. Nias] need[ed]” and to alert Ms. Wonasue that if she could not be in the office regularly from 8:30 to 5:00, “she would have to think about what she wanted to do.” Jan. 15, 2010 Email from Nias to Beth Morgen. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Count IV is DENIED.
C. Interference with Plaintiffs FMLA Rights (Count VIII)
The FMLA was enacted, in part, “to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons.” 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(l, 2). Pursuant to the FMLA, “an eligible employee is entitled to a total of twelve workweeks of leave during any twelve-month period and, upon return to work, restoration to the position held when the leave commenced or to an equivalent position.” Rodriguez v. Smithfield Packing Co.,
To establish unlawful interference with an entitlement to FMLA benefits, an employee must prove that: (1) she was an eligible employee; (2) her employer was covered by the statute; (3) she was entitled to leave under the FMLA; (4) she gave her employer adequate notice of her intention to take leave; and (5) the employer denied her FMLA benefits to which she was entitled.
Id. at 516 (citations omitted). The employee also must prove “that the violation prejudiced her in some way.” Anderson v. Discovery Commc’ns, LLC,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “interfered with Plaintiffs exercise of her FMLA rights.” Compl. ¶ 111. Defendants assert that Plaintiff “cannot satisfy any of the requirements of an interference claim,” Defs.’ Mem. 18, but they do not argue that Plaintiff did not give adequate notice or that UMAA did not deny Plaintiff benefits. They contend that UMAA “employed less than 50 employees at any one time,” such that “it is not a ‘covered’ employer, and Wonasue was not an eligible
1. Qualifying for FMLA leave
An eligible employee may take FMLA leave for a “serious health condition,” that is, “an illness, injury, impairment or physical or mental condition that involves inpatient care ... or continuing treatment by a health care provider .... ” 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(a); see 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11) (same). “Any period of incapacity due to pregnancy, or for prenatal care” is included in the definition of “[a] serious health condition involving continuing treatment by a health care provider.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(b). Thus, “[a]n employee who is pregnant may be unable to report to work because of severe morning sickness,” and need not “receive treatment from a health care provider during the absence” or be absent “more than three consecutive, full calendar days” to qualify for FMLA leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(f); see 29 C.F.R. § 825.120(a)(4) (same). Additionally, “[a] pregnant employee may take leave intermittently for ... periods of severe morning sickness.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.202(b)(1).
The emergency room physician diagnosed Plaintiff with hyperemesis of pregnancy, “a severe form of ‘morning sickness.’ ” Discharge Instructions 4. Therefore, Plaintiff qualified for FMLA leave. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11); 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(a); 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(b); 29 C.F.R. § 825.202(b)(1). Summary judgment is not appropriate on this ground.
2. Covered employer
For purposes of the FMLA, “[t]he term ‘employer’ ... means any person engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or more employees for each working day” and “includes ... any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer to any of the employees of such employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (4)(A)(ii)(I); see 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(a). Notably, “[a] plaintiff may bring a Title VII claim against an employer with fewer than fifteen employees where that employer is ‘integrated’ with another employer/s with a sufficient number of employees.” Tasciyan v. Med. Numerics, No. AW-11-1467,
To determine “whether two or more entities are an integrated employer,” the Court considers (1) whether the entities share management; (2) whether their operations are interrelated; (3) whether there is “[centralized control of labor relations”; and (4) the “[d]egree of common ownership/financial control.” Id. The Court specifically considers whether “one company’s employees hired and fired the other’s employees,” made employment decisions for the other company, and/or “handled the other’s payroll,” and well as whether “one company routinely transferred employees between it and the other company, used the same work force, and/or ... exereise[d] more than general oversight of the other’s operations.” Tasciyan,
According to Defendants, the mission of UMAA “is to support and promote the University of Maryland College Park.” Defs.’ Mem. 2. Nonetheless, they insist that UMAA is a non-profit, independent 501(c)(3) organization with “no corporate relationship to the University, which is a state run public institution.” Id. Defendants allege that UMAA “ha[s] a staff of about 14 full-time employees and four to five part-time employees,” id., such that UMAA “is not a ‘covered’ employer” for purposes of the FMLA, id. at 18. Yet, Janice McMillan, UMAA’s Chief Financial Officer, provided an organizational chart for UMAA that lists forty-four positions, staffed by thirty-seven named individuals, in addition to the Alumni Association President and the Vice President of University Relations, to whom the Assistant Vice President for Development and Alumni Relations (Ms. Nias) reports. McMillan Dep. Ex. 1, Defs.’ Mem. Ex. C, ECF No. 64-4. The chart also includes an undefined number of “MFE Admin Assts.,” an undefined number of “MFE students,” and “90 Student Callers.”
Defendants explain that not all of the individuals on the chart are UMAA employees, as a number of them are employed by the University of Maryland College Park (“UMCP”). Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s Am. Mot. for Leave to File 1st Am. Compl. 6 (“Defs.’ Opp’n to Mot. to Am.”), ECF No. 50. This explanation does not confirm that UMAA is not an employer for purposes of the FMLA by virtue of its small number of employees. Rather, it calls into question whether UMAA and UMCP should be considered a part of one entity under the integrated employer test. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(c)(2); Tasciyan,
3. Proof of harm
Defendants insist that Plaintiff “was never harmed” because she “voluntarily quit her job the day after she allegedly requested leave.” Defs.’ Mem. 20. It is true that, where a “violation caused no harm,” there can be no relief. Rodriguez,
III. CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART as to Counts I, II, III, and VIII and DENIED IN PART as to Count IV.
A status call with regard to the one remaining count, Count IV, is scheduled for Monday, December 9, 2013, at 10:30 a.m. Plaintiffs Counsel will initiate the call.
A separate order shall issue.
Notes
. In reviewing the evidence related to a motion for summary judgment, the Court considers undisputed facts, as well as the disputed facts viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Ricci v. DeStefano,
. Plaintiff's November 1, 2012 deposition testimony cited here appears in three separate exhibits. Pages 148-60 appear in Exhibit 5 to Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint, ECF No. 50-5; pages 173-81 appear in Exhibit 6 to the same, ECF No. 50-4; and pages 163-67 appear in Exhibit A to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 64-2. The discharge papers from Plaintiff's January 13, 2010 emergency room visit, Exhibit 10 from Ms. Wonasue’s deposition, also appear in Exhibit A to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Although the exhibits to Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint are not cited in Defendants’ Memorandum in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, they are a part of the record and I may consider them. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3).
. Cf. Carrier,
. Beth Morgen was the Interim Executive Director of UMAA. PL’s Reply to Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s Am. Mot. for Leave to File First Am. Compl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 58-1.
. Of course, “the Rehabilitation Act does not require an employer to eliminate essential job functions in order to accommodate a disabled employee.” Mitchell v. Astrue, No. CCB-08-1873,