37 Wash. 9 | Wash. | 1905
This suit involves a controversy between the claimants of two fish trap locations. In the year 1900 the plaintiff, Womer, established a pound net fishing location in the waters of Puget Sound, near the entry into Lopez Pass, in San Juan county. The location extended in an easterly direction from the shore line, and was held under license No. 2565, issued to appellant by the fish commis
During the season of 1901 the plaintiff operated his trap at said location, at the point to which the same was removed under the mandatory injunction of the court. Plaintiff alleges that, during all of said time and down to the present, hé has substantially maintained a pile at the outer end of his said location, at practically the same point where it was originally driven in the year 1900; that the said No. 2565 was continuously maintained upon said outer pile, until just prior to the expiration of said license, when the number of a new license held by plaintiff was posted thereon.
The above mentioned action of the Fidalgo Island Canning Company and others, against the plaintiff, was instituted upon the ground that said location 2565 infringed upon a location lying to the northeasterly of the outer end of location 2565, said northeasterly location being then identified by a pound net license No. 1766. At the time of the trial of that case, it was found by the court that the six hundred feet end passageway between 2565 and 1766 was infringed upon, and partially closed, by 2565, and that 1766 was the older location in point of time. For said reason the plaintiff was enjoined and required to cut off a portion of his location as aforesaid. On appeal to this court, that holding of the trial court was affirmed. See Fidalgo
By that decision, location 1766 was determined to he a valid one, upon which the plaintiff here was then encroaching by the outer end of his location 2565. But he alleges in this action, that afterwards the holder of 1766 abandoned that location; that no fishing appliances were constructed thereon during the fishing season covered by the license numbered 1766. That license expired August 4, 1901, and the plaintiff alleges that on July 20, 1901, he had knowledge that said location had been abandoned by its holder, and that plaintiff thereupon extended his location, identified by license No. 2565, outward from the shore toward the east, a distance of about four hundred and fifty feet, and established a location thereon as a part of his existing one, and posted his license No. 2565 upon the outer pile of his extended location. He further alleges, that he is engaged in the construction of a pound net or fish trap
This action was brought by plaintiff to enjoin the respondent from constructing a trap upon the location which was formerly identified by number 1766, but which is now claimed by respondent under a later license number. The cause was tried by the court, and resulted in a judgment denying the injunction, and dismissing the action. The plaintiff has appealed.
It will be observed from the foregoing statement that
Assuming, however, that it may be true that appellant, when he extended his location notice to the outer point, on July 20, 1901, did not intend his act as a mere preservation of rights under the first location, but did intend it as a new and independent location, what then are his rights ? It will be remembered that the license under which number 1766 was held did not expire until August 4, 1901, fifteen days after appellant’s attempted extension of his location. Number 1766 was still a live location. The court found that it was not abandoned, and we think the finding was justified. It is true, the holder had a short time before ceased driving toap piles at the location, but there yet
It is assigned that the court erred in refusing to admit evidence to show that the Hidalgo Island Canning Company was the real owner of the location sought to be enjoined. We think the evidence was properly refused. Appellant had sued respondent, and not the Canning Company, as the holder of the location.
The judgment is affirmed.
Mount, C. J., Fullerton, and Dunbar, JJ., concur.
Rudkin, Root, and Crow, JJ., took no part.