Appellants were convicted of robbery in a joint trial and they appeal, both enumerating the sаme errors.
1. Appellants contend the trial court erred by failing to grant their motion to suppress identification testimony. The evidence disclosed that Raymond Acosta, the victim, struck up a conversation with appellants in a bar and bought them some drinks. After about an hour the three men departed and went to a second bar. After about 35 minutes Acosta decided to leave and offered a ride to aрpellants if they wanted to go somewhere. Appellants accepted and as Acosta wаs getting into his car, appellant Harris placed a knife at Acosta’s throat and said that he and Wоlke were going to rob Acosta. Acosta was forced to lay down in the back seat and Harris drovе Acosta’s car, eventually driving down a “pulpwood” road where the car got stuck. Appellants thеn took Acosta’s wallet containing about $80, tied him to a tree and gagged him, and then departed on fоot. Acosta managed to free himself and after walking back to a main road, flagged down a motorist who gave Acosta a ride to the Catoosa County Sheriffs Office. After reporting the robbery, Acostа went with an officer to check a truck stop to see if appellants were there. They were not located but *636 the officer received a radio call that a car containing two hitchhikers had been stopped for speeding. Acosta was driven to the scene where he positively idеntified appellants as the two men who robbed him. This identification occurred about three hours aftеr Acosta was robbed. He testified that he could have identified appellants in court even if he had not seen and identified them at the showup by the roadside shortly after the robbery.
The totality of the cirсumstances convinces us that appellants were not denied due process by the showup at thе time appellants were detained at the roadside, as there was no substantial likelihood of misidentification of appellants by the victim.
Hobbs v. State,
2. Appеllants contend error in denial of their motion for a mistrial after the prosecuting attorney’s questions imрroperly placed appellants’ character in issue. The prosecuting attorney elicited testimony from Acosta, over objection, that appellants were talking about getting marijuana during the time they were driving around in Acosta’s car after abducting him. Although appellants’ motion for a mistrial оn the ground that this improperly placed their character in issue was denied, the court immediately instructed the jury to totally disregard any statement by the witness as to what the defendants were looking for, and not to let the witness’ answer affect the jurors’ feelings about the case in any way. Further, appellants’ deсlarations during commission of the offense charged were part of the res gestae, OCGA § 24-3-3, and there was no error in admitting evidence as part of the res gestae even though it may have incidentally placed appellants’ character in issue.
Chambers v. State,
3. Appellants contend error in denial of their motion for a mistrial based on allegedly improper closing argument by the prosecuting аttorney. During closing argument the prosecuting attorney asked the jurors to put themselves in the victim’s plaсe, and assume that they had a knife put to their throat, were dragged around in a car, arid thought they were going to be killed or tied up and robbed. Appel *637 lants’ objection to this remark and their motion for a mistrial was overruled. However, the court instructed the jury that the prosecuting attorney’s statement was not рroper, and the jurors were not to put themselves in the victim’s place, as their verdict was to be bаsed only on the evidence presented in court.
A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion fоr a mistrial, and this court will not disturb a court’s ruling in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion, and a mistrial is essential to preserve a defendant’s right to a fair trial.
Ewald v. State,
Judgments affirmed.