285 Mass. 181 | Mass. | 1934
This is an appeal by the dependent widow of a deceased employee from a final decree of the Superior Court dismissing a claim ..under the workmen’s compensation act entered in conformity to a decision of the Industrial Accident Board, whereby were affirmed the findings and decision of the single member to the effect that all the work of the deceased employee was performed on navigable waters, was maritime in its nature, and was not within the jurisdiction of the board. So far as this is a finding of fact, it must stand and be accepted as true if there is any evidence to support it.
There was evidence tending to show these facts: The deceased employee, a resident of Taunton in this Commonwealth, was employed by the Staples Coal Company, which was insured under the workmen’s compensation act. He was captain and a “one-man crew” of a double end barge or scow used in carrying coal between Fall River and Taunton in this Commonwealth and several ports in the State of Rhode Island. The barge did not go outside of Narragansett Bay. The barge had no motive power of its own, but was towed by a tug. It was equipped with a small pilot house, living quarters for the captain, and a gasoline pump to take care of leakage. The duties of the employee are not minutely set forth in the evidence. He had to.load his own boat, and occasionally would do extra work when there was no regular work to do. He lived on the barge, except that when in Taunton he lived at home. Manifestly his work was chiefly, if not exclusively, on the barge. It is stated in the dependent’s brief that the employee’s “only duty was to steer the barge as it was towed up the river by a tug.” On the morning.of November 30, 1928, the barge left the wharf of the employer in Fall River at six o’clock with a cargo of coal and was towed up the
The words of the workmen’s compensation act are broad enough to include the case at bar. The only question is whether there was error in the decision that relief could not be granted because the case falls within the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal courts. Gillard’s Case, 244 Mass. 47. Toland’s Case, 258 Mass. 470. The determination of that question depends upon the principles declared by the Su
The accident had a maritime locality. It happened on board a vessel lying in navigable waters and moored to a wharf. Nogueira v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, 281 U. S. 128, and cases reviewed. The contract of employment of the employer with the decedent related to maritime affairs. To be the captain and one-man crew of a barge used exclusively in commerce in navigable waters pertains to maritime matters. The work of the employee was on the barge and was concerned directly with navigation and commerce. The circumstance that the employee had gone upon the wharf and returned to the barge is of no consequence in this connection. The jurisdiction of admiralty over a tort or inj ury depends upon its having been committed or having occurred on navigable waters. London Guarantee & Accident Co. Ltd. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 279 U. S. 109, 123, and cases reviewed. A wharf, or staging resting on a wharf, is considered an extension of land. An accident having its causative origin there is not maritime in nature. Where the cause of action arises on land maritime law does not govern. T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U. S. 179, and cases cited. A movable ladder resting upon but not fastened to a wharf and partly on a vessel is not considered an extension of the land. Admiralty law governs jurisdiction and liability where a person leaving the vessel by such a ladder falls therefrom into the water. The Strabo, 98 Fed. Rep. 998. The employee’s occupation was directly connected with navigation and commerce. That conclusion necessarily follows from the circumstance that he alone was in charge of the barge as she was being towed through navigable waters. The barge was engaged in commerce. The moving of the barge while being unloaded forward and backward at the wharf was a part of commerce and navigation. Northern Coal & Dock Co. v. Strand, 278 U. S. 142, 144. Employers’ Liability Assurance Corp. Ltd. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 233, 236. Admiralty jurisdiction attaches although the commerce in question may be wholly intrastate. London Guarantee & Accident Co. Ltd. v. Industrial Accident
The fact that the workmen’s compensation law of this Commonwealth is elective does not affect the question whether admiralty law governs the rights of the parties. The same is true where the injury arose from pure accident and not through the fault of anyone. Employers’ Liability Assurance Corp. Ltd. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 233, 236. The circumstance that the deceased was leaving the barge at the end of work for the day has no relevancy to the question whether the proximate cause of his death was maritime in nature.
The case at bar does not present a matter of mere local concern offering no conflict with the characteristic features of general maritime law within the doctrine of Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469, Millers’ Indemnity Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U. S. 59, and Sultan Railway & Timber Co. v. Department of Labor & Industries, 277 U. S.
The dependent relies upon Rickert v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 122 Ore. 565, which held that an injury sustained by a longshoreman engaged on shipboard in unloading a vessel lying in navigable waters through accident fell within the State workmen’s compensation act and was not maritime in nature. We are unable to follow that decision because it seems contrary to binding adjudications of the United States Supreme Court. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149. Nogueira v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, 281 U. S. 128. Employers’ Liability Assurance Corp. Ltd. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 233. The facts in the case at bar, in our opinion, distinguish it from Lermond’s Case, 122 Maine, 319, and other aspects of that case need not be considered.
It follows from the principles declared and the points decided in the cited cases that, since the locality of this accident in its origin and ending was maritime and the employment of the deceased was maritime and directly connected with navigation and commerce, admiralty jurisprudence governs the rights of the parties and the operation’ of the workmen’s compensation act is barred. The reason given is that to hold otherwise would be prejudicial to the characteristic features of maritime law and a violation of the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction conferred upon
Decree affirmed.