105 Ga. 153 | Ga. | 1898
The circumstances surrounding the sale of the goods by plaintiffs’ agent were of such a nature, to say the least, as to leave the creditor in honest doubt whether the wife had purchased on her own account, or as agent for her husband. There was, in fact, nothing in the transaction to indicate any agency in the wife. She ahd her husband were occupying different stores in the same city, she apparently having as absolute dominion and control over one store as the husband had over the other. When the husband was asked by plaintiffs’ agent about selling to the wife, the agent was referred to her. He accordingly sold to her at her place of business, and nothings occurred to indicate that she was not buying on her own account. The agent thought he was extending credit to her, and such an infer?, ence was certainly legitimate under the circumstances. It is' true the bills were made out against the husband. This was merely a circumstance to show to whom the credit was extended, and was open to examination. It appears that this was the result of the -bills being entered against the husband by the bookkeeper, who was not made aware of the. nature of the transaction. When the husband was in failing circumstances, evidently to put the matter beyond all question, plaintiffs’ agent called upon the wife to know definitely to whom he should look for the payment of the claim. He was then assured by her that her husband had nothing to do with the debt, and that it was hers and would be paid. At that time some of the goods bought were in the store occupied by the wife. Plaintiffs acted upon, these representations; took no steps to seize the goods or to otherwise enforce their claim against the husband; relied upon her for payment, and she failing to pay, acting upon her representations, brought this suit. These facts were not even denied by the defendant. It seems to us that if there ever was a case in which the doctrine of estoppel in pais should apply, it is made out by this record. Section 5150.of.the Civil Code declares, as ■one of the grounds of an estoppel, “ admissions upon which other parties have acted, either to their own injury or the benefit of the persons making the admissions.” Here plaintiffs acted
Judgment reversed.