204 Pa. Super. 492 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1964
Opinion bx
On the afternoon of December 14, 1963, at the intersection of Eidge Eoad and State Eoad in Middlesex Township, Butler County, there was a collision between automobiles operated, respectively, by Mrs. Mina L. Socash and Eaymond H. Wolfe (spelled Wolff in the briefs). A trespass action was instituted by Wolfe and his wife against Mrs. Socash before a justice of the peace in Callery Borough, Butler County. Mrs. So-cash resided in Butler County, and process was served on her in that county. After a hearing at which both parties appeared, a judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs in amount of $410.85. There was no appeal or certiorari. The judgment was later certified to the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County, whereupon Mrs. Socash filed a motion to strike. The court below granted a rule to show cause, and subsequently entered an order discharging this rule. Mrs. Socash has appealed.
Appellant’s contention is based on the fact that proof of the damage to the Wolfe automobile was accomplished before the justice of the peace by the submission of two estimates, together with photographs, and that a sworn receipted repair bill was not produced. The precise question thus presented has not previously received appellate consideration, although it has been frequently treated by the lower courts with conflicting results.
The jurisdiction of justices of the peace and other inferior magistrates is purely of statutory origin: Neel v. Cann, 158 Pa. Superior Ct. 426, 45 A. 2d 415. The history of the general statutory provision conferring jurisdiction on justices of the peace commences with the Act of March 22, 1814, P. L. 190, 6 Sm. L. 182. This early statute was the source of the Act of July 7, 1879, P. L. 194, 42 P.S. 241, which was amended by the Act of December 9, 1955, P. L. 817, to read as fol
Appellant’s argument is based on the existence of another statutory provision contained in Section 1303 of The Vehicle Code,
It should perhaps be noted that a provision authorizing deputized service in actions brought in the court
We fail to perceive that any problem is created by the co-existence of these two statutory provisions. In a case interpreting the provision in The Vehicle Code our Supreme Court stated that it was not a restricting act: Orlosky v. Haskell, 304 Pa. 57, 155 A. 112. It is procedural in nature, and its effect is to authorize deputized service outside the county for vehicle accidents -occurring within the county: Paulson v. Eisenberg, 134 Pa. Superior Ct. 503, 4 A. 2d 585. As pointed out by Honor-' able George P. Exester in his opinion for the court be-, low: “The ‘receipted bill’ requirement is applicable only, to such cases. The general jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace granted by the Act of 1955 is riot reduced by the Act of 1959”. A siinilar coriclusion whs reached by Honorable Bobert. Lee Jacobs of Cumbexland County, soon to be a member of this court, in Tosten v. Stum, 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 188.
In brief, it is our view, and we expressly, so rule, that it is not necessary for the plaintiff in a trespass action before a justice of the peace to produce a sworn receipted repair bill if service on the defendant is made in the county wherein the suit is instituted.
Order affirmed.
Act of April 29, 1959, P. h. 58, §1303, as amended, 75 P.S. 1303.