61 W. Va. 287 | W. Va. | 1907
S. D. Morgan qualified as administrator of C. P. Wolfe. Sallie J. Wolfe, the widow of decedent, in her own right and as guardian of her children, filed a bill in equity in the circuit court of Randolph county against Morgan to obtain a settlement of his accounts as administrator. The case was referred to a commissioner to settle said accounts, and he reported an account finding a balance due the estate of $7,131.-22, which the court decreed against Morgan and he has appealed.
Morgan complains that the commissioner’s report charges him with $1,070.10 advance in lumber. Before Wolfe’s death he bought standing timber of Pickens and Roberts and Boyd. And after his death his administrator converted this timber into lumber, aggregating 530,050 feet. Morgan would account for a certain sum as realized from the sale of this lumber. It was sold to Kyle & Morgan, of which firm S. D. Morgan was a member. Morgan could give no definite account of what this lumber brought. His basis of accounting for it seems to be the price paid by Kyle & Morgan to
Morgan-complains of a charge of $700.49. We think this comiflaint is just. It grows out of a check in favor of the decedent, but which came to the hands of his administrator from Kyle & Morgan. Kyle & Morgan rendered an account against Wolfe’s estate charging it with that check showing a balance in favor of Kyle & Morgan against the estate for $4,426.22. Morgan paid it. The commissioner refused to allow the balance shown by that account, but deducted from the $4,426.22 the $700.49. That check was charged to Morgan as administrator, and he should have been credited with the $4,426.22, the balance of account of Kyle & Morgan paid by-him. We think the decree is erroneous in this matter. Morgan should have been credited with $4,426.22.
As to the charges of $25 for a safe, $12 for a desk and $7 for a check i)erforator. Morgan claims that they were accounted for in his accounting for a sale of store goods belonging to the decedent. But the evidence of Mrs. Wolfe contradicts this, and shows a sale of them by Morgan. We cannot overrule the commissioner and court in this matter.
As to the claim of $83 for the use of saw mill. The testimony is contradictors7. We see no' ground for overruling the circuit court in this, and especially under the legal' rule above stated.
As to the item of $20 for cash paid on funeral expenses by Mrs. Wolfe. Why is it charged to Morgan? We see no ground for. it.
As to a charge of $400 on account of part of the purchase money for which Morgan sold a saw mill. He sold it at private sale, taking no security, owing to his sickness at the timé, as he says. He says that upon his recovery he found
As to the items of $1.25, $15, $1.80, $8.75 and $16.70, which were disallowed in the report for expenses of administration, sworn to by Morgan.. We think his oath justifies his allowance of these items under principles stated in Barton’s Ch. Prac., 2nd Ed., vol. 2, p. 731, sec. 210, part 1.
As to a claim of $2,856.29 credit for handling^hauling and loading lumber. The commissioner allowed $2,036.21 of it, refusing to allow the balance because vouchers were'not presented. Those vouchers presented were allowed, a large number. The administrator was called upon for vouchr ers for the balance, but did not produce them. We cannot say that hundreds of dollars can be charged to a dead man’s estate without vouchers. It was the duty of the administrator to take them. The commissioner says that a sum was placed in the account of disbursements under this head apparently only to make the account balance, but without specification or vouchers. This claim is not of sufficient weight to overrule the report.
The refusal of commission is justified by the statute providing that if an administrator fails to settle his accounts within the time required by law- he shall be denied commission.
The point is made that depositions were read relating to matters in two amended bills taken before they were filed. We do not sustain this contention for the reason that the original bill called for a full account under which any part of the assets chargeable to the administrator could be taken cognizance of. The amended bills sought to charge the administrator with lumber manufactured from timber belonging to the estate. They could only have the effect of charging him with assets with which he could be charged under the original bill. Those depositions could be read under the
The commissioner did not make settlement by annual rests. There was no exception on that account, nor is there in this Court. Complaint is made that he charged interest on balance from close of first j’ear of administration, but should not have charged “interest until six months after the first year.” This point is not good. Interest is charged on each year’s balance from its close. We do not see that the result would be different if the settlement had been with annual rests. We do not see that the balance did not exist at the end of the first year.
We have dealt with items presented as erroneous in a brief of appellant’s counsel.
We, therefore, reverse the decree and remand the cause to the circuit court in order that a decree may be pronounced in accordance with principles herein stated.
Reversed.