Wolfe v. Geno
351 N.W.2d 316
Mich. Ct. App.
1984
Check Treatment

WOLFE v GENO (ON REMAND)

Docket No. 73404

Court of Appeals of Michigan

Submitted August 29, 1983.—Decided May 1, 1984.

134 Mich App 433

Leave to appeal applied for.

Kathleen Wolfe brought an action in the Saginaw Circuit Court against David P. Geno on March 3, 1981, alleging that Gino was the father of a child born to plaintiff on February 2, 1973. The court, Fred J. Borchard, J., granted accelerated judgment on the ground that the action was barred by the six-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed,

. Plaintiff sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court and the Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration in light of
,
. On remand, held:

The statutory six-year period within which a paternity action must be brought is substantially related to the state‘s interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims and is sufficiently long so that it is not violative of equal protection rights.

Affirmed.

CYNAR, J., dissented. He noted that paternity actions involve other present and future rights of the child in addition to the right to receive child support. He would reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand to the trial court for addition of the child as a party, appointment of an appropriate representative and an order for the parties to brief and argue the issue of the future rights of the child.

CHILDREN BORN OUT OF WEDLOCK — PATERNITY — LIMITATION OF ACTIONS — EQUAL PROTECTION.

The statutory six-year period within which a paternity action must be brought is substantially related to the state‘s interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims and is sufficiently long so that it is not violative of equal protection rights (MCL 722.714[b]; MSA 25.494[b]).

REFERENCES FOR POINTS IN HEADNOTE

10 Am Jur 2d, Bastards §§ 78, 79.

Statute of limitations in illegitimacy or bastardy proceedings. 59 ALR3d 685.

Robert L. Kaczmarek, Prosecuting Attorney, and Roy Degesero, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for plaintiff.

ON REMAND

Before: BEASLEY, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and CYNAR, JJ.

PER CURIAM. Plaintiff filed this paternity action on March 3, 1981, alleging that defendant was the father of her child born on February 2, 1973. The trial court granted defendant‘s motion for accelerated judgment pursuant to GCR 1963, 116.1(5), on the ground that plaintiff‘s cause of action was barred by the six-year statute of limitations applicable to paternity actions. MCL 722.714(b); MSA 25.494(b). We affirmed the trial court‘s decision in

, relying on
, lv den
.

Several months after the release of our decision the United States Supreme Court decided

, in which Tennessee‘s two-year statute of limitations for paternity actions was declared violative of equal protection principles. On plaintiff‘s application for leave to appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court directed us to reconsider our prior decision in light of
.

In striking down Tennessee‘s two-year limitations period, the United States Supreme Court followed precisely the reasoning set forth in

, where a one-year limitations period imposed by Texas was also found to be violative of equal protection principles. The analysis of
had been followed by this Court in
, where a different result was deemed justifiable given the difference in length between a one-year and a six-year statute of limitations.

Upon full consideration of plaintiff‘s claims, we reaffirm our earlier decision and again hold that Michigan‘s six-year statute of limitations for paternity actions does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of either the state or federal constitutions. US Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 2.

does not alter the constitutional analysis to be applied in this case and we continue to rely on
, in holding that (1) the six-year limitations period is substantially related to a permissible state interest in preventing the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims, see
and (2) six years provides a reasonable opportunity for legally interested parties to file paternity actions. See also
.

Affirmed.

CYNAR, J. (dissenting). I must respectfully dissent from the majority. The paternity action is no doubt encouraged by the state whenever possible to determine and place the responsibility of support on the father, where such responsibility belongs. The mother brings the action in her own behalf to protect her right to continue to receive assistance for herself and her child. Otherwise, the child‘s interests are not represented. In addition to the right of the child to receive support many other present as well as future rights of the child are involved, depending on the facts and circumstances of a specific case. I would reverse the trial court‘s order of dismissal and remand the matter to the trial court for the addition of the minor child as party plaintiff, acting through an appropriate appointed representative. Additionally, I would order a rehearing of the motion for accelerated judgment and after argument order briefs concerning the future rights of the child in this case, which rights have been decided with such finality.

Affirmed.