65 Pa. Commw. 97 | Pa. Commw. Ct. | 1982
Opinion by
This is the appeal of Michael J. Wolfe from an order of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board affirming a referee’s denial of his claim for benefits.
On the basis of this testimony the referee, affirmed by the Board, made the following findings of fact:
1. That the Claimant is receiving social security benefits and in addition works staggered hours for the Defendant, Globe Security.
2. That the Claimant receives telephone calls at home from his supervisor, one Leiutenant [sic] Stutz, inquiring as to Claimant’s availability to work as a security guard at the Budd Plant on certain days on a certain shift.
*99 3. That when the Claimant indicates his availability for said work, he reports to the Guard Headquarters located on the Budd Company premises; Claimant, after signing in for work, receives his work assignment for the day.
4. On the date in question, April 20, 1979, the Claimant, as was his usual custom, boarded a SEPTA bus, wearing his uniform and carrying his lunch pail.
5. At the corner of Stokley Street and Hunting Park Avenue, Claimant got off the Route R bus at approximately 7:30 a.m., he then purchased a newspaper at the corner and as he proceeded to cross Hunting Park Avenue, a public street, Claimant was struck by an individual on a bicycle, knocking Claimant to the ground and causing the injuries alleged in the petition.
6. Claimant was not required to wear his uniform when reporting for work.
7. That the Claimant had not reached the premises owned and/or controlled by the Budd Company, nor had Claimant signed in for work that morning.
8. Claimant was struck by the individual on the bicycle while Claimant was on his way to work.
The referee and the Board concluded that the claimant’s injuries are not compensable because they were received while the claimant was on his way to work before he had entered upon the premises of his employer and before he had begun to perform his duties. We affirm.
Section 301(c) of the Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act, Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §411(1) provides in pertinent part:
The terms ‘injury’ and ‘personal injury’ as used in this act ... shall include all other injuries sus*100 tained while the employe is actually engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer, whether upon the employer’s premises or elsewhere, and shall include all injuries caused by the condition of the premises or by the operation of the employer’s business or affairs thereon, sustained by the employe, who, though not so engaged, is injured upon the premises occupied by or under the control of the employer, or upon which the employer’s business or affairs are being carried on, the employe’s presence thereon being required by the nature of his employment.
In interpreting this provision the appellate courts of this Commonwealth have consistently held that absent special circumstances not here appearing, injuries received by an employee travelling to or from his place of employment are not compensable. Eberle v. Union Dental Company, 390 Pa. 112, 134 A.2d 559 (1957); Houlehan v. Pullman Company, 280 Pa. 402, 124 A. 640 (1924); Del Rossi v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 210 Pa. Superior Ct. 485, 233 A.2d 597 (1967); Giallonardo v. St. Joseph’s College, 177 Pa. Superior Ct. 87, 111 A.2d 178 (1955); Davis v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 41 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 262, 398 A.2d 1105 (1979); Schofield v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 39 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 282, 395 A.2d 328 (1978); Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board v. Hickory Farms, 28 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 30, 367 A.2d 730 (1976); Workmen’s Compensation v. Hentish, 20 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 514, 341 A.2d 926 (1975). This interpretation is grounded on the recognition that in the usual case an employe travelling to or from work is neither on the premises of his employer, nor engaged in the furtherance of his employer’s affairs.
When [the claimant] was crossing the highway, which separated his employer’s property, he was proceeding from one part of his working premises to another in performance of his duties as prescribed by his employer. Therefore when he was accidentally killed on the highway he was actually engaged in his master’s business, and claimant became entitled to the benefits provided by the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
Id. at 433-434, 19 A.2d at 541.
It is clear that in the instant case the claimant had not yet arrived at his place of employment or received his daily assignment and therefore was not, as was the claimant in Strunk, engaged in the furtherance of his employer’s business when injured. Neither was the claimant enroute to or from a parking lot where his
In' conclusion, equally applicable here is the Supreme Court’s description of the facts supporting a denial of benefits in Eberle v. Union Dental Company, 390 Pa. 112, 116, 134 A.2d 559, 560 (1957): “When injured, claimant was no moré than a member of the public using the sidewalk as a pedestrian — the purpose for which this part of the street had been dedicated for public use” (emphasis in the original).
Order affirmed.
Order
And Now, this 2nd day of March, 1982, the order of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board in the above-captioned matter is affirmed.