WOLF ET AL. v. WEINSTEIN ET AL.
No. 70
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued February 20, 1963.—Decided April 15, 1963.
372 U.S. 633
Alex L. Rosen argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Nazareth Fairgrounds & Farmers’ Market, Inc. With him on the brief was Marvin N. Rosen. Harold Harper argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Jerome Fried. With him on the brief was Vincent P. Uihlein. On the briefs for other respondents were Arnold A. Weinstein, pro se, and Hyman L. Rutman for William McK. Shongut.
This case concerns two orders of the District Court for the Southern District of New York made in a proceed-
We decide only the issues presented by the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the District Court‘s order applying § 249 to Weinstein and Fried, adjudicated sub nom. In re Nazareth Fairgrounds & Farmers’ Market, Inc., Debtor,
The pertinent provisions of § 249 disallow compensation or reimbursement to any person “acting in the proceedings in a representative or fiduciary capacity, who at any time after assuming to act in such capacity has purchased or sold . . . stock [of the Debtor] . . . without the prior consent or subsequent approval of the judge . . . .” Both Weinstein and Fried traded in the Debtor‘s stock while serving respectively as President and General Manager.2 Both held their positions with the approval of
The District Court, after hearings upon the nature and extent of Weinstein‘s and Fried‘s duties and activities, concluded that each was a “fiduciary” within the meaning of § 249.4 The District Court thereupon ordered that
their compensation be terminated, that Fried be discharged as General Manager, and that Weinstein, whose removal as President the court believed was beyond its powers, have nothing further to do with the management of the business.5 The Court of Appeals reversed the order in its entirety on the ground that § 249 applied to neither Weinstein nor Fried. The Court of Appeals indicated that “doubtless” a literal reading of the statute‘s terms would include both, but held that § 249 was to be construed as applicable not to every “person acting in the proceedings in a representative or fiduciary capacity” but only to such persons in the particular capacities named in
We disagree with the Court of Appeals. We hold that persons performing fiduciary functions such as those which the District Court found Weinstein and Fried had performed are subject to § 249.
I.
The virtual immunity which active participants in corporate reorganizations enjoyed from judicial superintendence of abuses in the payment of compensation and allowances was one of the principal reasons for the enactment of § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act in 1934.6 “There was the spectacle of fiduciaries fixing the worth of their own services and exacting fees which often had no relation to the value of services rendered,” Leiman v. Guttman, 336 U. S. 1, 7. Section 77B, among other significant reforms, created important new judicial powers to regulate
No statutory sanction against trading in the Debtor‘s securities during a reorganization was provided before the Chandler Act. However, § 77B‘s broad mandate that fees and allowances must be “reasonable” to merit judicial approval had been held sufficient authority by two federal courts to sanction denial of compensation to persons holding fiduciary positions in reorganization proceedings who had traded in the Debtor‘s stock. In re Paramount-Publix Corp., 12 F. Supp. 823, 828, rev‘d in part, 83 F. 2d 406; In re Republic Gas Corp., 35 F. Supp. 300. These decisions found even in the general terms of the statute the embodiment of “ancient equity rules governing the conduct of trustees, including deprivation of compensation where there is a departure from those rules.” 35 F. Supp., at 305.
The relevant legislative materials leave no doubt that the purpose behind § 249 was to codify the rule of these decisions and to give pervasive effect in Chapter X proceedings to the historic maxim of equity that a fiduciary may not receive compensation for services tainted by disloyalty or conflict of interest.9 Cf. Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503, 556-560; Weil v. Neary, 278 U. S. 160;
Access to inside information or strategic position in a corporate reorganization renders the temptation to profit by trading in the Debtor‘s stock particularly pernicious. The particular dangers may take two forms: On the one hand, an insider is in a position to conceal from other stockholders vital information concerning the Debtor‘s financial condition or prospects, which may affect the value of its securities, until after he has reaped a private profit from the use of that information. On the other hand, one who exercises control over a reorganization holds a post which might tempt him to affect or influence corporate policies—even the shaping of the very plan of reorganization—for the benefit of his own security holdings but to the detriment of the Debtor‘s interests and those of its creditors and other interested groups.10
Congress enacted two distinct types of sanctions to prevent these possible practices. One appears in § 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act,
In the light of its clearly revealed objectives, no congressional purpose to exclude from § 249 insiders such as Weinstein and Fried—who are, as the District Court found, no less fiduciaries of the Debtor than committee members, trustees or attorneys—can be perceived. Certainly the possibilities for abuse of their access to inside information and its clandestine use for personal profit are
The policies underlying Chapter X and § 249 itself suggest two further reasons for not recognizing such a distinction. First, if the class of “fiduciaries” or “representatives” whose trading is regulated by § 249 was meant
Second, to define “fiduciary” in § 249 as narrowly as has the Court of Appeals would invite a form of evasion and circumvention which could readily defeat the whole purpose of the statute‘s prophylactic rule. If only a director or corporate attorney were disqualified from trading during the reorganization, how easily a director-officer could avoid the ban by relinquishing his directorship while retaining his office and therefore his access to inside information. In other words, the mere shifting of titles could enable the very class at which the regulation was directed to avoid its prohibitions. Congress plainly did not indulge in an exercise in futility in enacting § 249.
In terms of the purposes and the underlying policies of § 249 there is therefore no justification for the Court of Appeals’ construction exempting Weinstein and Fried. We turn now to the parsing of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act by which the Court of Appeals reached its conclusion.
Article XIII of Chapter X, of which § 249 is a part, provides generally for matters of “compensation and allowances.” Sections 241, 242 and 243 authorize the bankruptcy court to allow reimbursement and compensation to the persons specifically named in those sections. The Court of Appeals concluded that the prohibitions of § 249 apply only to those persons named in §§ 241-243, who are required to apply to the court for compensation or reimbursement under § 247. The Court of Appeals reasoned from the location of § 249 within the article that only the “strangers” to the corporation mentioned in §§ 241, 242 and 243, whose services would not have been rendered but for the reorganization, and who could not therefore have been compensated without judicial approval, could be taken to be within § 249. The court buttressed this reading by reference to distinct and separate sections of the Act providing for the compensation of officers and employees.
Our reading of the same sections leads us to the contrary conclusion; in our view they support our broader reading of § 249. First, it is significant that the coverage of § 249 is defined in terms quite unlike those of the earlier sections of the article. While §§ 241-243 and § 247 detail with care the classes of persons to whom compensation is to be allowed and by whom application is to be made, § 249 speaks generally of “any committee or attorney, or other person acting in the proceedings in a representative or fiduciary capacity . . . .” Had the Congress meant the coverage of this section to be coextensive with that of its predecessors in the article, it would presumably either have referred expressly to the earlier sections as the guidelines for § 249, or would have enumerated the same groups again in
Further parsing of the statute reinforces this conclusion. There is, for example, no mention in §§ 241-243 or § 247 of the directors of the Debtor corporation. Yet there seems little doubt that directors, who are fiduciaries even of a solvent corporation and its shareholders, may be brought within the prohibitions of § 249 if they trade in the Debtor‘s stock. See In re Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., supra, at 711. On the other hand, it is not entirely correct to say that Article XIII authorizes allowances only for “strangers” whose services would neither have been rendered nor become compensable save for the reorganization. Both the indenture trustee and the attorney for the Debtor are, for example, expressly named as Article XIII applicants, required under § 247 to seek compensation, at least for services pursuant to the reorganization. Neither can properly be considered a “stranger” whose relationship to and services for the corporation arise solely out of the petition for reorganization.
We turn next to the argument that § 249 cannot have been intended to embrace officers and employees in light of certain provisions concerning their compensation in Article VIII. Section 191, for example, authorizes the Debtor in possession to “employ officers of the debtor at rates of compensation to be approved by the court.” The suggestion is that once the court has approved a rate of compensation under that section, such approval must be taken to immunize the officer from the sanctions of § 249. We cannot accept that suggestion, for surely there are various forms of disloyalty or conflict of interest which would disentitle an officer to com-
The approval of an officer‘s rate of compensation does not confer an immunity from equitable sanctions, nor can it immunize him from § 249. Section 191 does no more than vest the court with additional authority to pass in advance upon the qualifications and the salary of an officer of the Debtor before he assumes or continues in office. There is no suggestion in that section or elsewhere that such approval was intended to diminish in any way the court‘s statutory powers over fees and allowances conferred broadly by the Chandler Act. That officers and other employees may receive their compensation on a weekly or monthly basis while other persons subject to § 249, such as attorneys and trustees, customarily serve without compensation until the conclusion of the proceeding, is a difference without legal significance in this context.14 The application of § 249 turns not upon the
manner in which, or the time at which, payment is made, but rather upon the nature of the services and responsibilities which are being compensated.
Consideration of the function and responsibility of the officers of a Debtor corporation left in possession also supports our construction. The concept of leaving the Debtor in possession, as a “receivership without a receiver,” 15 was designed to obviate the need to appoint a trustee for the supervision of every small corporation undergoing reorganization, even though it appeared capable of carrying on the business during the proceeding. Continued possession by the Debtor, authorized by § 156, is subject at all times to judicial termination and the appointment of a disinterested trustee under § 159. But so long as the Debtor remains in possession, it is clear that the corporation bears essentially the same fiduciary obligation to the creditors as does the trustee for the Debtor out of possession.16 Moreover, the duties which the corporate Debtor in possession must perform during the proceeding are substantially those imposed upon the trustee, § 188. It is equally apparent that in practice these fiduciary responsibilities fall not upon the inanimate
The foregoing discussion answers two further arguments grounded on statutory construction. First, it has been contended that officers and managing employees must be deemed to be outside § 249 because their compensation derives from “consensual arrangements” and because they were compensated before the filing of the petition for the very services they continue to perform thereafter. The suggestion overlooks, with respect to officers at least, the requirement imposed by § 191 of judicial approval not only of salary but of the holding of office itself. More important, as to both officers and managing employees, the suggestion fails to appreciate the change which the filing of the petition and judi-
Finally, it is suggested that important differences between “what is demanded of a trustee and what is expected of officers of a debtor in possession” require the omission of the latter from § 249. 296 F. 2d, at 683. The argument proves too much, for surely the prohibitions of § 249 cover persons other than the trustee—various groups such, at the least, as those listed in §§ 241-243, who are held to a fiduciary standard although, unlike the trustee himself, they need not be “disinterested” within the meaning of
In concluding as we do that an officer or a managing employee of a Debtor in possession may be a fiduciary for purposes of § 249, we do not mean to suggest that one who holds such a position is necessarily within that section. That question requires in each case a careful exam-
In this case the District Court took evidence concerning both Fried‘s and Weinstein‘s activities and responsi-
III.
But the bare holding that § 249 has been violated does not automatically determine the consequences of such a violation. We turn now to that aspect of the case. There is no doubt that proof of trading in contravention of the statute requires at least the denial of any application for past compensation then pending, and the disallowance of all future compensation.20 The District Court went so far but declined to go further. We must now consider whether the District Court was also required, in order fully to effectuate the policies of § 249, to order restitution or recoupment of salaries already received by Fried and Weinstein for their beneficial services to the Debtor. As we have observed, the fact that these salaries
It is argued, however, that to require restitution at this late date, particularly when the trading involved small amounts of stock and was carried on apparently in good faith and without knowledge of the existence of § 249, imposes an unduly harsh sanction—a remedy disproportionate to the offense. While we recognize that in a case such as this the remedy is indeed a severe one, we cannot find that Congress intended anything less. To hold that one who trades in violation of § 249 forfeits only his right to future compensation would place a premium on concealment of transactions in the Debtor‘s stock and thereby jeopardize the salutary policies of the statute. Moreover, it is well settled that when the question arises in a terminal application for compensation or reimbursement under § 247, an applicant who has engaged in forbidden transactions near the end of the proceeding is to be denied compensation for all services he has rendered to the Debtor, however valuable those services may have been.21 Thus the policies of the statute afford no alternative but to order the restitution of all amounts of compensation and reimbursement received by these respondents since the start of the reorganization.
If the remedy seems harsh in this case, it is wholly consistent with the uniform application of this statute by the lower courts. As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has recognized in an earlier case, “[t]his result may well work harshly in individual cases . . . . But in § 249 of the Bankruptcy Act Congress clearly intended drastic results and thought them necessary to eliminate the serious abuses of insider information which had long been existent in equity reorganizations. . . . In the past excuses of inadvertence or de minimis have not been per-
We do not agree, however, that a violation of § 249 of itself requires the discharge of the violator from his corporate office. While a bankruptcy court possesses extensive power over the tenure and the conduct of officers and employees, and might find that trading during the reorganization rendered an officer unfit for further service to the Debtor, even without compensation, that result does not follow inexorably.24 In the present case the District Court apparently relieved Fried and Weinstein of their corporate responsibilities solely because of the violation of § 249. The Court of Appeals, finding no violation, saw no occasion to determine whether the discharge of the respondents might nevertheless be justified by considerations outside that section.
The question of the bankruptcy court‘s power to remove a corporate officer is a difficult and complex one, in which state and federal law may be intricately interwoven.25 We therefore intimate no view concerning
either the court‘s powers with respect to the removal of an officer, or the propriety of exercising in this case whatever powers may exist. That question must be reconsidered by the courts below in the light of our holding that the conduct of the respondents did constitute a violation of § 249 which disentitles them to all compensation.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the dismissal of the writ respecting the issues involved in Fried v. Margolis, 296 F. 2d 670, but would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in the Nazareth case, 296 F. 2d 678, relating to § 249 of the Bankruptcy Act. On that score I fully agree with Judge Friendly that at “the very least, courts are justified in demanding a clear indication of Congressional purpose before inflicting” such a “Draconian penalty” (296 F. 2d, at 683) as the Court‘s decision now imposes on petitioners Weinstein and Fried. The very triviality of the transactions involved in this particular case cautions against acceptance of the Court‘s ready construction of § 249.