Wolf v. SundquistWolf v. Sundquist
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Koch
OPINION
KOCH, Judge.This аppeal involves the right of persons unalterably opposed to the death penalty to serve as jurors in capital murder eases. Two persons who had been excused for cause in separate capital eases filed suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County, seeking a declaration that excusing prospective jurors who, as a matter of religious conscience, could not consider imposing the death penalty violated the prospective jurors’ constitutional rights. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the jurors appealed. We have determined that the practice of excluding jurors whose religious principles prevent them from cоnsidering the death penalty regardless of the law and the evidence is not an unconstitutional religious test, does not violate the jurors’ constitutionally protected freedom of religion, and does not unconstitutionally discrim-mate against these jurors. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
I.
Janet L. Wolf is an ordained Methodist minister who resides in Nashville. She was summoned for jury duty in 1990 and was among the panel of prospective jurors in the first degree murder trial of William C. Dug-ger for the 1989 murder of Robin Boswell in Percy Warner Park. 1 During the voir dire, the assistant district attorneys general questioned the prospective jurors about their ability to consider imposing the death penalty because the State had announced its intention tо seek the death penalty against Mr. Dugger. In response to these questions, Ms. Wolf stated that she was philosophically, morally, and religiously opposed to the death penalty and that she could not set aside her personal opposition to the death penalty, even if the law required her to, because she believed that “it’s аlways wrong.” The trial court granted the State’s challenge for cause because “her views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of her duties as a juror in accordance with the jury instructions and oath.”
Gerald S. Bowker resides in New Johnson-ville and is a member of the Southern Baptist Church. In October 1991, he was summoned for jury duty by the Circuit Court fоr Hum-phreys County and was one of the prospective jurors in the trial of William Eugene Hall and Derriek Desmond Quintero, two escaped inmates charged with the first degree murder of Buford and Myrtle Vester.
2
The trial court and the lawyers questioned Mr. Bowker and the other jurors about their attitudes concerning the death penalty be-: cause the State was seeking the death penalty in the case. During voir dire, Mr. Bowker stated that he was a Christian and that he had been brought up to believe that the death penalty was wrong. He also stated that he could not set aside his personal opinions about the death penalty and that he
In December 1994, Ms. Wolf and Mr. Bowker filed a class action suit in the Circuit Court for Davidsоn County seeking declaratory relief that excluding persons from serving on juries in capital cases because of their religious opposition to the death penalty violated
II.
The right to trial by jury secured by our state and federal constitutions necessarily contemplates that the jury will be unbiased and impartial. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220, 66 S.Ct. 984, 985, 90 L.Ed. 1181 (1946); Ricketts v. Carter, 918 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tenn.1996); Durham v. State, 182 Tenn. 577, 584, 188 S.W.2d 555, 558 (1945). In its constitutional sense, impartiality envisions not only freedom from jury bias against the defendant but also freedom frоm jury bias in the defendant’s favor. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219-20, 85 S.Ct. 824, 835, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965); Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70-71, 7 S.Ct. 350, 351, 30 L.Ed. 578 (1887); Houston v. State, 593 S.W.2d 267, 272 (Tenn.1980), rev’d on other grounds, State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 543 (Tenn.1992); Toombs v. State, 197 Tenn. 229, 231-32, 270 S.W.2d 649, 650 (1954).
An impartial jury consists of jurors who will find the facts and conscientiously apply the law. Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 417, 107 S.Ct. 2906, 2914, 97 L.Ed.2d 336 (1987); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423, 105 S.Ct. 844, 851-52, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). To be considered impartial, a juror must be free of personal bias and must be indifferent and disinterested between the parties. Eason v. State, 65 Tenn. 466, 469 (1873). Unbiased jurors do not give free rein to their own biases or prejudices, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 153, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1434, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring), and are able to follow the trial court’s instructions. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 596-97, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2960, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978).
The courts are not strangers to issues involving the exclusion of prospective jurors whose opposition to the death penalty affects their ability to follow the law and the instructions of the trial court. Up to this point, the litigation focused exclusively on the defendant’s constitutional right to be tried by an impаrtial jury selected from a cross section of the community. It is now settled that a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights are not violated by excusing prospective jurors for cause when their personal beliefs concerning the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair their performance as a juror in accordancе with their instructions and their oath. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852; Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980); State v. Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d 161, 167 (Tenn.1994); State v. Alley, 776 S.W.2d 506, 518 (Tenn.1989).
We must construe our constitution as a whole and must harmonize and give effect to each of its provisions, Patterson v. Washington County, 136 Tenn. 60, 66, 188 S.W. 613, 614 (1916); State ex rel. Witcher v. Bilbrey, 878 S.W.2d 567, 575 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1994), and we should not permit the language of one provision to render another provision ineffective. Vollmer v. City of Memphis, 792 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Tenn.1990). Accordingly, the contours of a prospective juror’s right to serve on a jury should be consistent with those of a criminal defendant’s right to a jury trial. These rights, after all, share a common purpose—to assure that juries are fairly chosen and impartial.
III.
Ms. Wolf and Mr. Bowker first assert that excluding them from jury service in capital eases becausе of their religiously motivated opposition to the death penalty violates
Both
While
The struggle for religious liberty through the centuries has been an effort to accommodate the demands of the State to the conscience of the individual.
Girouard v. United States,
328 U.S. 61, 68, 66 S.Ct. 826, 829, 90 L.Ed. 1084 (1946). Both
Bеing excluded from service on a jury in a capital ease does not infringe upon a person’s religiously motivated opposition to the death penalty. These persons remain free to follow and to assert their beliefs. While excluding these persons from juries in capital cases affects their ability to translate their religious bеliefs into action,
IV.
Ms. Wolf and Mr. Bowker also assert that questioning them concerning their religious beliefs with regard to the death penalty amounted to a religious test prohibited by
Many of the early colonists came to America to escape religious persecution and discrimination. They understood “the extreme dangers as well as difficulties of connecting the civil power with religious opinions.” 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 459 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1891) (“1 Story”). Two of the common manifestations of the entanglement of church and state were state-established churches and the use of religious tests to exclude religious minorities from public and political life.
Ironically, the same persons who had fled from religious persecution in England and Europe soon began engaging in the same conduct in the colonies. State-sponsored religion was commonplace by the time of the Revolutionary War, Martin v. Beer Bd. for Dickson, 908 S.W.2d 941, 948 n. 9 (Tenn.Ct. App.1995), and many colonies were using religious tests tо impose burdens and disabilities of various kinds upon other religions depending largely upon what group happened to be politically strong enough to legislate in favor of their own beliefs. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489-91, 81 S.Ct. 1680, 1680-82, 6 L.Ed.2d 982 (1961); 2 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law *35-37; 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 615-16 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1891) (“2 Story”). The colonists responded to these new threats to individual religious liberty by including strong safeguards in their early state constitutions and bills of rights. Thirteen state constitutions currently contain proscriptions against the use of religious tests to qualify for jury service. 4
Religious tests probe religious beliefs.
Torcaso v. Watkins,
367 U.S. at 494, 81 S.Ct. at 1683;
Paty v. McDaniel,
547 S.W.2d 897, 907 (Tenn.1977),
rev’d on other grounds,
435 U.S. 618, 98 S.Ct. 1322, 55 L.Ed.2d 593 (1978). Their purpose was to define qualifications to hold public office or to participate in other important civic activities such as testifying as a witness or serving as a juror. These tests took many forms, including statutes restricting the right to hold public offiсe to persons who had received Holy Commun
Notwithstanding the constitutional prohibitions against using religious tests, the courts have repeatedly approved excluding from jury service persons whose religious beliefs affect their ability to be impartial. In an early decision upholding thе exclusion of a Quaker from a capital case jury, Justice Story stated:
To insist on a juror’s sitting in a cause when he acknowledges himself to be under influences, no matter whether they arise from interest, from prejudices, or from religious opinions, which will prevent him from giving a true verdict according to law and evidence, would be to subvert the objеcts of a trial by jury, and to bring into disgrace and contempt, the proceedings of courts of justice.
United States v. Cornell, 25 F.Cas. 650, 655-56 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (No. 14,868). Our courts have consistently reached the same result, State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 915-16 (Tenn.1994); Green v. State, 147 Tenn. 299, 310-12, 247 S.W. 84, 87-88 (1922); Ray v. State, 108 Tenn. 282, 289-90, 67 S.W. 553, 555 (1902), as have the other state courts. State v. Willoughby, 181 Ariz. 530, 892 P.2d 1319, 1335 (1995); Smith v. Smith, 7 Cal. App.2d 271, 46 P.2d 232, 233 (1935); State v. Sandies, 740 S.W.2d 169, 178 (Mo.1987); State v. Leuch, 198 Wash. 331, 88 P.2d 440, 442 (1939).
Both Ms. Wolf and Mr. Bowker stated that their religious beliefs would not permit them to find the facts and to apply the law in a capital case. Thus, the trial courts excluded them, not because of their religious beliefs but because their religious beliefs prevented or substantially impaired their ability, as jurors, to abide by their oaths and to follow the law and the trial court’s instructions. Probing these jurоrs’ religious beliefs to test their ability to be impartial did not violate
Y.
As a final matter, Ms. Wolf and Mr. Bowker assert that the trial courts violated
The United States Supreme Court has held that persons whose religious beliefs prevent them from considering thе death penalty are not a distinctive group for the purpose of determining whether a jury was chosen from a representative cross section of the community. Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 415, 107 S.Ct. 2906, 2913, 97 L.Ed.2d 336 (1987); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. at 175-76, 106 S.Ct. at 1765-66. The Tennessee Supreme Court has reached a similar result, State v. Harbison, 704 S.W.2d 314, 318 (Tenn.1986), as have other state courts. Ex Parte Ford, 515 So.2d 48, 52-53 (Ala.1987); People v. Howard, 1 Cal.4th 1132, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 280, 824 P.2d 1315, 1327 (1992); Pope v. State, 256 Ga. 195, 345 S.E.2d 831, 839 (1986); Stanford v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 781, 785 (Ky.1987); State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 343 (Utah 1993); State v. Hughes, 106 Wash.2d 176, 721 P.2d 902, 906-07 (1986).
The public has a right to expect that juries in capital cases will not contain jurors who are unable or unwilling to follow the law. Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. at 416, 107 S.Ct. at 2914. Rather than excluding persons for reasоns unrelated to their ability to serve as jurors, a trial court is following its constitutional obligation to provide all parties with a fair and impartial jury when it excludes jurors who state that their religious beliefs will prevent or substantially impair their ability to apply the law to the facts of a particular case. Accordingly, the trial courts that excluded Ms. Wоlf and Mr. Bowker from the capital case juries did not unconstitutionally discriminate against them because of their religious beliefs.
VI.
In summary, we find that the practice of excluding from capital case juries persons whose religious beliefs prevent or substantially impair their ability to be impartial does not violate the jurors freedom of cоnscience under
We affirm the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for whatever other proceedings may be required. We also tax the costs of this appeal to Janet L. Wolf and Gerald S. Bowker and their surety for which execution, if necessary, may issue.
TODD, P.J., M.S., and LEWIS, J., concur.
Notes
. Mr. Dugger was found guilty of first degree murder and recеived a life sentence. State v. Dugger, App. No. 01C01-9102-CR-00034, 1991 WL 165822, at *1 (Tenn.Crim.App. Aug.30, 1991), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 3, 1992).
. Messrs. Hall and Quintero were found guilty of first degree murder. They received the death penalty for the murder of Ms. Vester and‘a life sentence for the murder of Mr. Vester. State v. Hall, App. No. 01 CO 1-931 1-CC-00409, 1997 WL 92080, at *1 (Tenn.Crim.App. Mar.5, 1997).
. Ms. Wolf and Mr. Bowker also rely on
.
. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. at 489-91, 81 S.Ct. at 1681; 2 Story, at 617.
. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. at 489, 81 S.Ct. at 1680.
. Constitution or Form of Government § 3, Proposed Constitution of State of Frankland, 1 Am. Hist.Mag. 48, 55 (1896). In the рrocess of invalidating the Franchise Laws as an unconstitutional political test for jury service, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted that “[i]f a Legislature may restrict the qualification to a political test, it may to a religious one, and declare that none save members of a particular denomination shall be competent.” Gibbs v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 72, 77(1871).