85 P. 620 | Or. | 1907
Lead Opinion
On Motion to Dismiss the Appeal.
Motion to dismiss an appeal because the transcript was not filed within the time allowed by law. The judgment from which the appeal was taken was rendered on October 7, 1905, and a notice of appeal thereupon given in open court. Thereafter and on the- same day an order was made by the trial judge enlarging the time 60 days in which to file the transcript. On October 17, 1905, the undertaking on appeal was filed. On December 2d, a further order was made extending the time in which to file the transcript, and similar orders were subsequently made, each within the time allowed by the previous order, until February 26, 1906, when the transcript was filed in this court. The statute provides, in effect, that upon the appeal being perfected the appellant shall, within 30 days, or within such an extension of time as' the trial court or judge thereof, or the Supreme Court or. a justice thereof, may allow, file with the clerk of this court a transcript or such abstract as the rules of the court may require, but that the order enlarging the time “shall be made within the time allowed to file the transcript”: B. & C. Comp. § 553. It is argued in support of the motion to dismiss that, under this statute, an order enlarging the time in which to file a transcript cannot be made by the trial court or judge thereof until after the appeal is perfected by the filing of an undertaking and the expiration of the time in which to except to the sureties thereon, and that such is the meaning of the words “within the time allowed to file the transcript,” and therefore the order of October 7th was null and void, and as no transcript was filed within 30 days after the appeal was perfected, nor an order obtained within that period extending the time in which to file the transcript, the appeal should be dismissed. But this is too technical a construction of the statute to meet with our approval. The act of 1899 (Laws 1899, pp. 227, 229), which includes said Section 553 and is now in force governing the procedure on appeal, was designed to simplify such procedure, and to remove many of the technicalities with which ic was hedged about prior to that time. It should, therefore,
Opinion on the Merits
On the Merits.
Opinion by
This is arc action by Mollie Wolf, as administratrix of the estate of her husband, Isaac Wolf, deceased, against the City & Suburban Railway Co., a corporation, to recover damages resulting from his death, which was caused by his being struck by one of the defendant’s ears, August 26, 1902, in the City of Portland. The negligence alleged as a basis for the recovery is that the car causing tlie injury was being run down a steep incline on First Street, from Montgomery to Mill Street, at a reckless, dangerous and excessive rate of speed, ana without any warning oeing given of its approach to the crossing at Mill Street,- by reason of which carelessness, and without any fault on his part, Wolf sustained the injury at the intersection of First and Mill streets, a public crossing, which resulted in his death. The answer denies the material allegations of the complaint, and avers that at the time of the accident the defendant’s agents and servants were exercising due care and
A former judgment in this action for the sum of $500 was reversed in consequence of the court’s refusal to grant a non-suit: Wolf v. City Railway Co. 45 Or. 446 (72 Pac. 329, 78 Pac. 668). The testimony produced at the last trial is substantially the same as that.given at the prior hearing, except that one S. Price, who had not theretofore been called by either party, appeared as plaintiff’s witness; and hence a determination of the errors alleged must rest upon a consideration of his declarations under oath,, when examined in connection with other evidence. Before reviewing his testimony, however, it is deemed proper to call attention to the locus in quo where the injury occurred. The testimony shows that First Street, in the City of Portland, extends northerly on a downgrade from' Montgomery to Mill Street, which highways' cross it at right angles, and the blocks situated between the intersecting cross-streets are 200 feet in length, and the streets mentioned 60 feet in width; that the defendant owns two. parallel tracks on First Street, the rails'of each of which are placed 3 feet and 6 inches from center to center, and the space between the' two tracks is "5 feet and 8 inches from center to center, of the' rails; that the cars, which-are operated by electricity, in going north run on the east track, and those procééding in an opposite direction pass over the west line; that double-truck ear No.-64, which struck the decedent, is 28-feet long, and 34 persons can be seated therein, but at the time of the injury there were on the^car'53 passengers, a motormaii and a con-' ductor.-
■ “Q. Where was the car when you first saw it?
A. I saw it about Montgomery Street, as soon as it came up the hill. * * . .
Q. Was it at Montgomery Street when you saw it first?
A. That is something I could not tell you.
Q. Will you swear it was as far up as Montgomery Street ■ when you first saw it?
A. I could swear it was a block away when I seen it.
Q. Where was Mr. Wolf when you first saw the car?
A. He was on the first track—on the west track. ■
Q. When you first saw the car, Mr. Wolf was then on-the west track, the one the cars run up -on?
A. Yes; on the west track.
Q. And where was the. car then ? How far up ?
A. A block.
Q. Up at Montgomery Street, one block away?
A. Yes.
Q. Was Mr. Wolf walking at a tolerably brisk speed, or was he going very slowly?
A. He was walking pretty briskly.
. Q. And he walked right along all th'e time and did not stop?
A. Yes.
Q. You looked at him all the time?
A. Yes. * * '
A. I noticed that he kind of looked in the beginning of his going on Mill Street. I noticed that when he went in on Mill Street—I noticed that when he went in to cross on Mill Street —he turned in and looked a little to see if any car was coming. * *
• Q. Was there anything to obstruct his view, if he looked up the street from where he was ?
A. Nothing in the way. It was uphill.
Q. There was nothing in your way?
A. Nothing in my way.”
2. It is argued by defendant’s counsel that Price’s testimony is so 'opposed to all reasonable probabilities as to require its exclusion as a matter of law from the jury, leaving the case as it stood at the former appeal; and, this being so, errors were committed as alleged. There are certain facts of such general notoriety that they are assumed to be known by a court without any proof thereof (B. & C. Comp. § 719), and if the testimony of a witness transcends the laws of nature it is undoubtedly the duty of a court to withdraw such testimony from the consideration of the jury: Smitson v. Southern Pac. Co. 37 Or. 74 (60 Pac. 907). Thus, in Blumenthal v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 97 Me. 255 (54 Atl. 747), it was ruled that, when the undisputed circumstances show that the story told by a witness upon a material issue cannot by any possibility be true, it is incumbent upon the* court to take such testimony from the jury. In that case the plaintiff was hurt by a collision with the defendant’s train, after he had successfully crossed two of its tracks; and in referring to the circumstances of the injury, as detailed by the party suffering therefrom, Mr. Chief Justice Wiswbll makes the following observation: “The plaintiff, according to his own testimony, was driving at a fast walk, and witnesses for the plaintiff testified that in their judgment the speed of the freight train was from 15 to 20 miles an hour. Assuming these estimates to be correct, when the plaintiff was upon the first track, with an unobstructed view of the railroad
In Spiro v. St. Louis Transit Co. 102 Mo. App. 250 (76 S. W. 684), Mr. Justice Goode, discussing the legal principle under consideration, remarks: “Yerdiets resting on evidence which looks contrary to the ordinary course of nature are not infrequently set aside, and retrials directed, by appellate courts, as a proper precaution against an unjust outcome of litigation. While it is fundamental that juries must weigh evidence and trial judges revise their findings, instances happen in which, from one cause or another, this practice so obviously failed to work out a right result that an imperative call is heard to supplement it by an exceptional procedure in order that justice, the end of all procedure, may not be frustrated. This prerogative of courts of error is sparingly employed; but that
3. The defendant’s counsel, invoking the rule enunciated in the cases from which the foregoing excerpts have been taken, insist-that, as it appears from Price’s sworn statements Wolf passed from the west rail of the west track to a point about 12 inches east of the east rail of the east track, a distance of 13 feet and 8 inches, where he was struck by the corner of the ear, while it was going from Montgomery Street to Mill, a space' of 200 feet, shows that the car must have traveled more than 14 times faster than he did; and, assuming that Wolf walked at the moderate rate of 3. miles an hour, when the
In Blumenthal v. Boston & Maine Railroad and in Stafford v. Chippewa Valley Elec. R. Co., to which eases reference has hereinbefore been made, there was no conflict of testimony as to the rate of speed of the train and car respectively causing the injury, while in the ease at bar that question is controverted. In order clearly to understand this branch of the subject, a statement of the defendant’s theory of the cause and manner of the injury is deemed appropriate. No witness was called at the last trial by the defendant, but its counsel read to the jury the testimony given on behalf of their client at the prior hearing. This evidence is set out with some particularity in the former opinion (Wolf v. City Ry. Co. 45 Or. 446: 72 Pac. 329, 78 Pac. 668), and may be thus summarized: As the ear was going north about 10 o’clock in the forenoon of August 26, 1902, which was a dry day, Wolf was seen crossing First Street, at the south line of Mill, whereupon the motorman immediately rang the bell and applied the brakes, checking the speed of the car from 8 or 10 miles an hour to 3 or 4, during that period of time; .that when Wolf reached the west track, where his view was unobstructed, he halted as if to permit the car to pass, and the motorman then released the brakes and the ear started ahead, but when it was within about 7 or 8 feet south of the crossing Wolf suddenly attempted to pass in front of it, whereupon the brakes were firmly applied, but the motorman was unable to stop the car in time to prevent the
Assuming the fact most strongly against the plaintiff, that her husband was struck while he was at the extreme north line of the south cross-walk of Mill Street, the car ran across the remainder of that highway, or 48 feet, and if Friedman’s testimony is to be believed the front end of the car, which was the line of contact, was not stopped until it had gone three times the length of the car, or 86 feet, below the crossing, thus making the entire distance, according to his estimate, 132 feet over which the car passed before it was stopped after causing the injury. If Mrs. Park’s opinion is accepted, however, the intervening space over which the car passed after the accident, before it could be stopped by the motorman, who testified that he set the brakes as hard as he could, was 148 feet. As the speed of a car may reasonably be determined by the distance which it covers on the rails before it can be stopped, when the brakes
The witness answered:
“The first time I saw him, he was at the first track, passing. * *
Q. How many steps did he take before the car came in sight ?
A. He was crossing. He was in the middle of the track, and • crossing the tracks.
Q. That is the position he was in when the car passed you?
A. When the car passed me I did not see him.
- Q. Yon did not see the car pass yon?
A. I saw the car pass, but I did not see Mr. Wolf at that time.
Q. How far was the ear from the crossing when it passed you?
A. The ear was about three houses from the baker shop.
Q. Then that was three houses above the baker shop, and the
A. Yes.”
4. In referring to the testimony last quoted, the defendant’s counsel make the following statement in their brief, to wit:
“The usual width of houses is 16 feet, which would place him (Ruvensky) 80 feet from the corner, where he saw Wolf crossing the track, when the car was so far behind him and up the street that he could not see it without looking around, nor did he see it until it afterwards passed him. Now, if the car was running at the rate of speed to which he testified, it must have been at least 30 feet further back, which would place the car not less than 100 feet from the crossing where Wolf was seen by Ruvensky in the act of crossing.”
No testimony was offered tending to show the width of the houses mentioned, nor did Ruvensky indicate the rate of speed which the ear attained, except to state that it was going fast, and that it was about two seconds after it passed him before Wolf was struck by it. It is impossible accurately to determine from Ruvensky’s testimony how far south of Mill Street the car was when he' first saw Wolf, or how far the witness was at that time from' the street corner, except his estimate as to the latter distance,' that it was about half a block, or 100 feet) and the car still'further behind him.- • “A person about to cross a street at a regular crossing;”- says Mr. Justice Fell, in Callahan v. Philadelphia Traction Co. 184 Pa. 425 (39 Atl. 222), “is not bound to wait' because a car is in- sight. If a car is at such a distance from him that hé-has ampie time to cross if it is run at the usual speed, it cannot be said as a matter of law that he is negligent in going on.” So, too, in Philbin v. Denver City Tramway Co. 36 Colo. 331 (85 Pac. 630), Mr. Justice Maxwell, in speaking of the measure of care demanded from a traveler on a public highway, asserts: “It is not negligence per se for one to cross a street railway track in front of an approaching car, which he has seen and which is not dangerously hear.” If - the jury believed the testimony of Ruvensky and of Price, they had the right to conclude that the approach
5. No ordinance limiting the rate of speed , of a street car in Portland having been offered in evidence, nor any testimony produced tending to show what is the standard of legitimate speed for an electric car on First Street in that city, Mr. Sea-brook, of counsel for the defendant, called attention at the trial to the case of Yingst v. Lebanon & A. St. Ry. Co. 167 Pa. 438 (31 Atl. 687), as establishing the rule governing the case at" bar. In that case the plaintiff was injured by the upsetting of a wagon in which she was riding, occasioned exclusively by the fright of the horse which was drawing the vehicle. The negligence alleged was that the car was running at an excessive rate of speed, which caused the fright of the animal and thereby occasioned the injury. In rendering the decision, Mr. Justice Green, speaking for the court, in referring to the plaintiff’s witnesses, says: “Not one of them was even asked the question whether the speed of the car was greater than was allowable for an electric car to run, or whether they had any knowledge upon.that subject. No experts in such matters were called to testify as to what would be a reasonably prudent rate of speed for such a car over such a street, and, in short, no evidence whatever was given upon that subject. Nor was any evidence given for the plaintiff as to the actual rate of speed at which this car was run, and therefore the plaintiff did not furnish any proof which could guide.the jury in considering whether the defendant was guilty of any negligence in this regard.” Further in the opinion it is observed: “Electric cars have a lawful right to go ‘fast’—to go with ‘speed.’ The fact that they can do so is one of the great reasons of their being. When a witness says, therefore, in. a given case, that the car ran swiftly or with speed, he says nothing to the purpose when the inquiry is as to negligence in the rate of travel. Such testimony is
6. Excessive speed at such places augments the danger of collision with travelers, and, as it might reasonably have been inferred from the testimony produced at the trial that at the time of the accident the ear causing the injury was running at a rate of 26 or 29 miles an hour, the court could not say, as a matter of law, that the speed was reasonable, and hence it was its duty to submit that question to the jury for their consideration: Davis v. Concord & M. R. 68 N. H. 247 (44 Atl. 388). The rule thus announced is applicable in thickly populated or much-used districts, regardless of the fact whether or not a statute has been enacted or a municipal ordinance adopted limiting the rate of speed: Sundmaker v. Yazoo & M. V. Ry. Co. 106 La. 111 (30 South. 285).
7. Though the accident occurred in the City of Portland, no testimony was offered tending to show the number of people who lived in the vicinity of First and Mill streets, or to esti
8. In Golinvaux v. Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co. 125 Iowa, 652 (101 N. W. 465), it was ruled that, in the absence of an ordinance regulating the rate of speed, a train running in the suburbs of a city across a street at the rate of 60 or 65 miles an hour was not of .itself negligence, but was a circumstance to be submitted to the jury, with other evidence tending to show that the view of a traveler was obstructed at that crossing and that no bell was rung. Whether or not such excessive velocity of a train in the .outlying districts of -a city is not per se negligence, even in the absence of a municipal ordinance regulating the rate of speed, need not now be considered; for the principles of law governing the management of trains propelled by steam power and regulating ears operated by electricity are not identical: Marden v. Portsmouth, K. & Y. St. Ry. Co. 100 Me. 41 (60 Atl. 530: 69 L. R. A. 300: 109 Am. St. Rep. 476). In that case it was determined that the rule promulgated in Blumenthal v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 97 Me. 255 (54 Atl. 747), hereinbefore noted, was not applicable. We conclude, therefore, that the rule invoked is not appropriate to the case at bar, and that Wolf, when he attempted to cross the street, had the right to assume that the car, which was at such a reasonable distance, would permit him to do so, if run at the usual rate of speed (Hamilton v. Consolidated Traction Co. 201 Pa. 351: 50 Atl. 946); and hence no error was committed in refusing to instruct the jury to find for the defendant.
9. It is maintained by defendant’s counsel that the judgment given is excessive, and for that reason an error was committed in refusing to set the verdict asi.de and to grant a new trial; In. Lindsay v. Grande Ronde Lum. Co. 48 Or. 430 (87 Pac. 145), it-was ruled that the refusal of a trial, court to set aside a verdict as excessive could not be reviewed on appeal,.
Other errors are assigned; but, deeming them unimportant, the judgment is affirmed. Affirmed.