32 Neb. 845 | Neb. | 1891
Peter E. Ruffner sued William Eeering & Company in the district court of Cass county. In his petition he alleged that on the 20th day of May, 1888, he commenced work for the defendant company at their special instance and request as traveling salesman, and continued in its employment until the 28th day of July, 1888; that defendant promised to pay him the sum of $200 besides his expenses; that no part of said sum has been paid except his expenses and the sum of $100, and that there is due from said defendant company to the plaintiff the sum of $100 and interest thereon from the 28th day of May, 1888.
The defendant answered that the plaintiff commenced working for the defendant at the time specified in the complaint, and continued in the employment of the defendant for the term of two months, for which plaintiff was to receive the sum of $100 per month and $50 for expenses; that plaintiff’s expenses had been fully paid; that the plaintiff, by the terms of said contract of employment, was to receive credit on a certain indebtedness of his to defendant,
There was a trial to the court, a jury being waived, with a finding and judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $100 with interest. The case comes to this court by petition in error, three errors being assigned, as follows:
I. That said findings and judgment are contrary to law and the evidence in the case.
II. That said findings and judgment are not supported by sufficient evidence.
III. Said findings and judgment should be for defendant.
Upon the trial, Peter E. Ruffner, the plaintiff, was sworn as a witness in his own behalf. Testified that he is acquainted with Dion Geraldine; that in 1887 he was the traveling agent for "William Deering & Company in Nebraska; that plaintiff entered into a contract with him as agent for the said company in May, 1888; that after having some correspondence with him, plaintiff telephoned him and he answered to come to Omaha, which plaintiff did and met him in his office by agreement; that they talked about the work and said agent made plaintiff an offer which
The defendant offered in evidence the deposition of Pion
“In the District Court of Cass County, Nebraska.
“It is hereby stipulated by and between the parties to this suit admitted facts material to the issues in this case as follows: /
“ 1. That plaintiff agreed to work for defendant as agent in selling defendant’s machines at the stipulated sum of $100 per month, and that defendant accepted his services at said sum per month.
“2. That defendant has paid the plaintiff’s expenses while in its employ.
“ 3. That plaintiff was in the employ of defendant for the term of two months from the — day of-, 1888, until the — day of July, 1888. That prior to the time of said agreement, plaintiff was indebted to defendant in an amount greater than the wages earned by said plaintiff from defendant, and that said sum was then and ever since due and payable from plaintiff to defendant, and that during all of said time an action could be maintained by defendant against plaintiff for the recovery of the amount so as aforesaid due and payable from plaintiff to defendant.
“4. That on the 10th day of December, 1888, defendant recovered a judgment against plaintiff in the county court of Douglas county, Nebraska, for the sum of $172.55.
*851 “ 5. That in said suit in said county court of Douglas county, defendant gave plaintiff credit for the sum of $200, the wages earned by plaintiff, and which wages is the plaintiff’s cause of action in this case.
“ 6. That the plaintiff is insolvent.
“ 7. It is further stipulated, that on the 6th day of July, 1887, this defendant recovered against plaintiff a judgment for the sum of $292.25 and costs, which judgment remains in full force and wholly unpaid.
“Matthew Gbring,
“Attorney for Plaintiff.
“A. N. Sullivan,
“Attorney for Defendant."
It is probable that the finding and judgment in favor of the plaintiff depend altogether upon the efficiency of the statute and the principle underlying it, which exempts from execution or garnishment the wages of laborers, mechanics, and clerks who are the heads of families, etc., not exceeding $60, or two months’ wages, but I think that the principle underlying that statute is sufficient to sustain the judgment. It is true that the beneficiaries of this statute are designated as laborers, mechanics, and clerks, but I do not think that those terms, are terms of limitation merely, but that by the use of them the legislature intended to designate all such persons as earn their living by wages, and whose compensation is measured by the day, week, month, or year; of course not including the employes of the government, state, county, or city. As to what the contract was under which the plaintiff was employed by the defendant, the evidence being conflicting, the verdict of the jury is conclusive. The judgment of the district court is therefore
Affirmed.