131 Minn. 71 | Minn. | 1915
Action for false imprisonment. Verdict for plaintiff, and from the order granting a new trial he appeals.
In a charge notable for perspicuity and brevity the jury were instructed that the evidence introduced by the defendant to substantiate the alleged justification for the arrest failed as a defense, and that their only duty was to determine and award the actual damages sustained by plaintiff, since all claims for punitive damages were withdrawn. By stipulation the verdict was reduced to $400. The court approved this as a proper amount, but granted defendant’s motion for a new trial solely upon the ground of error in the charge.
The defense pleaded was, in short: That defendant was a police officer in Hibbing; that he was advised by the chief of police that plaintiff was carrying a concealed weapon, was acting strangely, and there was some question of his sanity; that defendant was instructed by said chief to arrest plaintiff and hold him in jail until his sanity could be investigated and determined; that defendant was advised by two other persons of certain strange acts of plaintiff; that defendant had reason to believe and did believe that plaintiff was mentally deranged; and that a physician was immediately called to make an examination of plaintiff upon whose advice he was held until the next day when he was released. It was conceded that the arrest was made without a warrant, and was not for any offense committed by plaintiff, or upon suspicion that he had committed a felony.
The learned trial court conceived that the law applied by him in submitting the ease, although concededly in accord with text-books and decisions, was not reasonable and should not obtain in this state. He states: “I do not consider the rule that one who arrests another on the ground of mental unsoundness is liable for false imprisonment unless he can
There is force in the position that it is a harsh rule to hold a police officer for false imprisonment, when the conduct of the one imprisoned has been such that the ordinarily prudent officer upon the information obtained would come to the conclusion that he was insane and ought to be detained. But, on the other hand, it is readily seen to what oppression and harm a rule would lend itself, under which a citizen may be deprived of his liberty without right and without redress because, at some time or other, he has exhibited certain peculiarities or abnormal traits which, through malice or otherwise, come to the ears of an officer who, in good faith, arrests upon the report. As said by the court in Wahl v. Walton, 30 Minn. 506, 16 N. W. 397: “The power to arrest without warrant, while it may in some cases be useful to the public, is dangerous to the citizen, for it may be perverted to purposes of private malice or revenge, and it ought not, therefore, to be enlarged.” The mere fact that one has been arrested on the charge of insanity may be sufficient, as it was in this ease, to give a reputation that will exclude the one concerned from earning a livelihood in positions of responsibility. But, above all, the law does not permit even an officer to restrain or imprison a person without a warrant, except for a public offense committed or attempted in the officer’s presence, or when the person has committed a felony, or when a felony has been committed and the officer has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested the perpetrator, or upon a charge made upon reasonable cause of the commission of a felony by the person arrested. 6. S. 1913, §9066. No right, as already stated, was claimed to make the arrest under this statute. Neither was it al
We are constrained to reverse the order granting a new trial and remand the case for judgment upon the verdict as reduced.
Order reversed.
