2 Wend. 457 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1829
The decision of this case depends upon the validity of the defendant’s discharge under the insolvent act. Discharges under state insolvent laws have been assailed, on the ground that they impair the obligation of contracts. The leading case calling in question the constitutionality of the insolvent laws of the states, is that of Sturges v. Crowninshield, (4 Wheaton, 122.) Though the language of the court in that case might admit of a broader application, both this court and the court of chancery of this state have considered it as going no farther than to declare the discharge inoperative upon a debt existing antecedent to the passing of the law under which the discharge was granted. (Mather v. Bush, 16 Johns. R. 233, and Hicks v. Hotchkiss, 7 Johns. C. R. 297.) The supreme judicial court of Massachusetts has viewed the decision of the U. S; court in the same light. (13 Mass. Rep. 16.) During the same term of the supreme court of the U. S. another important decision was made in relation to these insolvent laws. In the case of McMillan v. McNiel, (4 Wheaton, 209,) the court laid down principles that go far to declare all discharges under state insolvent laws void. Our courts have confined the application of this decision to cases precisely similar to that before the U. S. court. The debt in that case was contracted in South Carolina while the parties were residents of that state. The defendant afterwards obtained his discharge under the insolvent laws of Louisiana on a cessio bonorum. He was subsequently sued in that state on the contract made in South Carolina, and interposed his discharge obtained in Louisiana, and it was declared invalid. It appears. to be impossible to distinguish in principle this case from that of McMillan v. McNiel. It is true that the suit in that case was prosecuted in the United States
Judgment for the plaintiff.
