185 Ga. 380 | Ga. | 1938
On April 10, 1933, upon the petition of creditors, the superior court of Bibb County appointed receivers who took charge of certain assets in Georgia, of Public Indemnity Company, a New Jersey corporation, International Reinsurance Corporation, a Delaware corporation, and other related corporations. On or before that date, service of the petitions, proceedings, order of appointment, and rule nisi was made on the companies by serving their agents in this State. No contest was made by the defendants, and the only questions raised in the progress of the case involved the validity and priority of interventions and claims of creditors, and the administration of the assets. On April 19, 1933, a Delaware court appointed receivers in that State for International Reinsurance Corporation. On April 31, 1933, the Com
On March 4, 1937, “the Public Indemnity Company by Honorable Carl K. Withers, commissioner of banking and insurance of New Jersey, and, as such, liquidator” of that company,
The commissioner excepts to orders refusing the allowance and relief, after the hearing of testimony. The assignments of error are: (1) that as statutory receiver of Public Indemnity Company
1. While a chancery or statutory receiver can not sue in the courts of a foreign jurisdiction by virtue of his appointment alone, he can do so when he is expressly or by necessary implication vested with title, or when he is made a quasi-assignee or representative of creditors.” Bullock v. Oliver, 155 Ga. 151 (116 S. E. 293, 29 A. L. R. 1484); Mell v. McNulty, 185 Ga. 343 (195 S. E. 181), and cit. While the instant pleadings of the commissioner of banking and insurance of New Jersey, seeking to intervene in a receivership proceeding in a superior court, claimed this right by virtue of an order of a New Jersey court of chancery, and in that respect were insufficient, they also set up that the New Jersey statute, under which the commissioner took over the affairs of the involved corporation in the State of its domicile, authorized him to sue for, ■recover, and distribute all corporate assets wherever situated. Under the rule stated, these averments sufficed to authorize an intervention, subject, however, to the same conditions which would control the right of any creditor to intervene, as here sought, after decree and an order barring claims.
2. With reference to interventions by two other alleged creditors in this proceeding, this court has held that where the creditors knew of the pendency of the litigation, and in the exercise of ordinary prudence should have known of the entry of the decree, but failed to file an intervention until after the decree and for more than a year after the order barring all claims not previously filed, the court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing the interventions, even though “a liberal rule should be observed for permitting creditors to intervene and assert their rights, [and] even though the time provided in ‘ bar ’ orders may have expired, provided a reasonable excuse is given for failure to have observed it.” Industrial Realty Co. v. International Reinsurance Cor., Lone Star Cement Co. v. International Reinsurance Cor., 183 Ga. 605, 613 (189 S. E. 49, 53). This court has also affirmed the