12 A.2d 92 | Pa. | 1940
This suit arises out of the issuance by the receiver of the First National Bank of Darby of a writ of scire facias to revive a judgment, held by that bank at the time it went into liquidation, against H. Walter Weaver and Charlotte R. Weaver, his wife, which judgment admittedly had then been reduced to the sum of $912.90.
In the affidavit of defense and amended affidavit of defense filed by Weaver and his wife to the writ, a set-off of $913.56, by way of new matter, was claimed, since that amount was on deposit in the name of "H. Walter Weaver, Collector" at the time the bank was first placed under the control of a conservator, on March 25, 1933. The receiver filed a motion for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense, and, after argument thereon, it was dismissed by the Court of Common Pleas. The receiver thereafter appealed to the Superior Court, *490 and from the order of that court reversing the lower court, this appeal was allowed to Weaver and his wife.
From the well pleaded facts relating to the set-off, it appears that the balance in question represented moneys collected by Weaver as the collector of county, township, and school taxes in the township of Darby, Delaware County; and that on receipt of the tax duplicates from each taxing unit, he became personally responsible by law for all taxes levied and assessed in the duplicates and was required to furnish bonds with surety so conditioned.* It is further averred that since the insolvency of the bank, he has fulfilled his legal obligation to each taxing unit and has paid to them the equivalent of the sum on deposit when the bank closed.
Since two or more persons sued jointly may set off a debt by the plaintiff to any one of them (Miller v. Bomberger,
We are all of the firm conviction that the set-off should not be allowed. By using the word "Collector", Weaver expressly stamped the funds, not as his own, but as belonging in equity to some third person. Our law abounds with instances where words of similar fiduciary import created a presumption that the funds were not personal deposits, but were trust funds. Most recently, upon a careful analysis of all the earlier cases, we have accorded such effect to the words "clerk of courts" (Erie County v. Lamberton,
Defendant's allegations in the new matter as to the true nature of the account, far from rebutting the presumption arising from the use of the word "Collector" that the funds were trust monies, operate rather to prove that presumption. Instead of demonstrating that the deposit belonged to Weaver in his own right at the time the bank became insolvent, the averments show that upon that date, the fund represented tax collections, set apart by Weaver from his own moneys in trust for the taxing units concerned. It is immaterial that as custodian of the collections, Weaver in effect contracted to insure their safe-keeping and could deposit them wherever he chose. These factors do not have the effect of vitiating his fiduciary obligations with respect to the fund. What was said in this regard in Trestrail v. Johnson, supra, 395, was not an ill-considered dictum, but was the enunciation of a principle which is firmly embedded in our law.
To mention but a few illustrations: Despite the existence of the same personal accountability, the interest paid by the bank on a fund thus deposited has been held not to belong to the officer, but to the beneficiary: County of Lackawanna v. Duffy,
It is equally irrelevant that Weaver has now settled in full with the taxing units: Mullins v. Breeding, supra. A realization of the superior equities of the other general depositors has led to the rule that the right to set off is governed by the state of things existing at the moment of insolvency, not by conditions thereafter arising, nor by any subsequent action taken by any party to the transaction:Franklin Trust Company of Philadelphia, supra, 370; Harr v.Bankers Securities Corporation,
The order of the Superior Court is affirmed; costs to be paid by appellants.