282 S.W. 164 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1926
The sole assignment of error is that since it is conceded that the account sued on was solely for hay, oats and salt that was sold and delivered to subcontractors which was used by them in feeding the horses and mules used by them on the work of constructing a road under a contract with the Missouri State Highway Commission, that such items do not, as a matter of law, fall within the terms of the bond and therefore no recovery for such items can be had against the surety on the bond.
The Missouri State Highway Commission entered into a written contract with O.J. Hanick for the construction of a gravel highway in Lewis county, Missouri, designated as project No. 38.
At the time of the execution of said contract a bond was given to the Missouri State Highway Commission signed by Hanick as principal and the Royal Indemnity Company as surety, conditioned among other things for the faithful performance of the terms and conditions of said contract, and that the principal and surety "shall pay all lawful claims for materials furnished or labor performed in the construction of said highway. . . ." It may be well to note that the contract among other things provides that the contractor is required to provide all necessary machinery, tools, apparatus and other means of construction.
The firm of Thompson McDaniel was engaged in the construction of the project No. 38 in question as subcontractors under Hanick and the hay, grain and salt *574 making up the items of the account herein sued upon were fed to the horses and mules belonging to said subcontractors while said horses and mules were being used in grading and hauling work on said highway.
Appellant contends that the bond in question is a common-law bond, because not taken to the State, county, city, township, school or road district as provided by section 1040, Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1919, but is taken in the name of and to the Missouri State Highway Commission, "which is a municipal corporation with power to sue and be sued and to contract and to be contracted with."
It is true that the bond is taken in the name of the Missouri State Highway Commission, whereas section 1040, Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1919 requires the execution of the bond to the State, county, city, town, township, school or road district, as the case may be, but the bond does, however, in all respects measure up to the requirements of section 10898, Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1919 (repealed by section 2, p. 133, Laws of Missouri, 1921, First Extra Session, but which was in effect until December 31, 1922), which section requires that the "successful bidder shall enter into a bond . . . and conditioned for the faithful performance of the contract, . . . and the payment for all materials and labor furnished and performed in the completion of said contract and giving the right of action to materialmen and laborers for materials furnished and labor performed under said bond. . . ."
However whether it be construed to be a statutory bond or a common-law bond can have no effect upon the ultimate determination of the question involved herein in that the language of the condition of the bond itself under which plaintiff seeks to recover is the same as that required by either section 1040 or section 10898 of our statutes. And it has been directly held that a bond, though voluntary and not authorized by any statute, is valid if it does not contravene public policy or violate *575
any statute, and that in the interpretation of such bond the intentions of the parties gathered from the whole instrument must control its interpretation. [Kansas City to use of Kansas City Hydraulic Press Brick Co. v. Youmans,
Having in mind that the contractor was required under the terms of his contract to provide all necessary machinery, tools, apparatus and other means of construction, we must decide then whether feed for horses used by a subcontractor in the work falls within the contractor's bond which is conditioned that the contractor and his surety, "shall pay all lawful claims for material furnished or labor performed in the construction of said highway. . . ."
We have examined many cases in other states as well as those of the United States courts, together with those of our own State which have any bearing upon the subject in hand. Our conclusion is that under the condition of the bond herein, which is the same as the requirement of section 1040 of our statutes, only such articles as actually went into the structure or work or improvement, so as to become a part of the same, or such as were used solely for and wholly or substantially consumed or destroyed in the construction of the work, structure or improvement, fall within the protection of the bond.
Whatever our personal views may be as to the desirability for broadening the conditions of bonds required to be given by contractors for public work, we can only *576 interpret the statute as it stands. To attempt to do more would be a direct invasion of the exclusive field of our Legislature.
The feed furnished for the teams which makes up the account sued on here under the precise language of the bond before us, did not enter into the construction of the work being done by the contractor, nor can it, in our view, be ruled that the feed was "material" that was "used in such work." This is true even though the feed was eaten and wholly consumed by the teams which were used by the contractor in doing a part of the work. The feed in our view was required primarily for the purpose of maintaining the life of the teams, and the teams of course were to be used in the performance of any other contract that the contractor might get. The teams may be likened to machine graders, scrapers, tools, etc., which are not materials in the sense used in the statute but are materials that go to make up the so-called contractor's plant or outfit or equipment which are available not only for this one contract but for other work, and which in the instant case the very terms of the contract required the contractor to furnish. If we are to hold feed for the horses within the bond, then a blacksmith's claim for labor for shoeing and the veterinary for his services must likewise come within the bond. Each of these items however, in our judgment, must be viewed as collateral to the contract and as not contemplated by the parties as coming within the language of the bond as "materials furnished for or labor performed in the construction of said highway."
Our view is not shaken by the Federal cases cited by respondent. [Brogan v. National Surety Co., 246 F. 257; U.S. v. Lawrence, 252 F. 122.] These cases must be viewed in light of the Federal Statute, namely, Act of Congress of August 13, 1894 (28 Stat. at L. 278, ch. 280, N.S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2523, amending act Feb. 24, 1905, ch. 778, 33 Stat. at L. 811 N.S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1071) which provides that any person *577 contracting for any public work shall execute a penal bond that the contractors shall pay for not only labor and material that go directly into the completed structure, but for all labor and material furnished "in the prosecution of the work provided forin such contract." It is at once apparent that the language of the Federal Statute is much broader than that of conditions of the bond before us and of our Missouri statutes, and is in fact broader than many of the Mechanics' Lien Acts of the several states. And it has been directly held that "the Act of Congress and the bond given under it are susceptible of a more liberal construction than the lien statutes referred to, and they should receive it." [City Trust, Safe Deposit Surety Co. of Phil. v. U.S. to use of Bryant, et al., 147 F. 155; Surety Co. v. Lawranceville Cement Co. (C.C.), 110 F. 77; U.S. for use of John Davis Co. et al., v. Illinois Surety Co. et al., 226 F. 753.]
We have examined each of the cases cited by respondent and find them readily distinguishable from the instant case by reason of the difference in the language of the Federal Statutes as compared with that of Missouri.
This is also true with reference to several cases cited by respondent from various State courts. The case of Clatsop County for use of Frye Co. v. Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland, 189 P. 207, in which case the Supreme Court of Oregon held the person supplying meals to a subcontractor on public work is a furnisher of "labor and material" within the contractor's bond; and also the case of City of Portland for use of Hansen v. New England Casualty Co., 289 P. 211, by the same court, in which food for horses working on a project was held "material" furnished a subcontractor, are not applicable to the case in hand, being clearly distinguishable on fact. The Oregon statutes, section 6266 L.O.L., as amended (L. 1913, p. 59) required that the contractor give bond to the county, conditioned, among other things, to "pay all laborers, mechanics, subcontractors and materialmen *578 and all persons who shall supply such laborers, mechanics orsubcontractors with materials, supplies or provisions forcarrying on such work, and all just debts, dues and demands incurred in the performance of such work." The language of the Oregon statute is therefore much broader and comprehensive than ours; and than the conditions in the bond herein. The Oregon statute "is practically a counterpart of the Federal Act of Aug. 13, 1894, from which it is derived. . . . The statute is fully as broad as the Federal Act. The Oregon Act is garnished with the stronger words where provision is made for security for the payment of `labor or materials for any prosecution of the work provided for in such contracts.'" [Clatsop County, etc., v. Fidelity Deposit Co., supra.]
In the case of Hess Skinner Engineering Co. v. Turney (Tex.),
In the case of Kansas City to use of Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Southern Surety Co.,
The ruling therein that a right of action accrued to the carrier against the surety on the bond for the freight charges was reached upon the authority of Federal cases alone: namely, Brogan v. National Surety Co.,
Also the case of Pacific Wood Coal Co. v. Oswald,
In the case of Hilton v. Universal Construction Co.,
We are of the opinion that the rule we adopt herein finds support in an opinion en banc by our Supreme Court in Kansas City to use of Kansas City Hydraulic Press Brick Co. v. Youmans,
And to the same effect in American Surety Co. v. Lawrenceville, etc., 110 F. 717, the court said, in distinguishing between those items sued for which the bond covered and those which it did not, "the underlying principle which has governed the master is correct in that he has discriminated between labor and materials consumed in the work or in connection therewith, and labor and materials made use of in furnishing the so-called contractor's plant and available not only for this but for other work."
Also in the case of Beals v. Fidelity Deposit Co.,
The view we are adopting in the instant case finds support in the further case of Fay v. Bankers' Surety Co.,
And also the case of Dudley v. R.R. Co.,
To the same effect Pennsylvania Co. v. Mehalley, 116 Am. St. Rep. 746,
The same view is expressed in the case of United States of America, for use, etc., v. Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland,
It follows from what we have said above that the items herein sued on do not as a matter of law fall within the conditions of the bond and that therefore the defendant's demurrer offered at the close of the case should have been sustained. Therefore the court erred in rendering judgment for the plaintiff on the account herein sued for and for that reason the judgment should be reversed. It is so ordered. Daues P.J., and Nipper, J., concur.