172 Ind. 313 | Ind. | 1909
It appears from the record that William Brooks, a resident of Hancock county, died on February 8, 1907, leaving surviving him four children as his only heirs at law; that on February 20, 1907, an instrument in writing, purporting to be his last will, and bearing date of January 6, 1906, was duly admitted to probate in said Hancock county. Appellant, one of the children of the deceased, her children and the three other children of the deceased are the only beneficiaries under said will. Said will was attested by three witnesses, J. H. Kimberlin, Marshall Jeffers and Marion Brooks. Marion Brooks, one of said witnesses, was named in the will as executor, and after the probate of the will he accepted said trust, filed his bond, qualified and entered upon the discharge .of his duties as such executor, and was acting as such when this suit was brought. Marshall Jeffers, another of said witnesses, was and still is the husband of Nellie C. B. Jeffers, a daughter of the deceased, and one of the beneficiaries under said will.
This action was brought by appellant against appellees under §3154 Burns 1908, §2596 R. S. 1881, to contest said will after the probate thereof, on the ground that Marion Brooks and Marshall Jeffers at the time they attested said will were not competent to be witnesses to the same, because said Brooks was named therein as executor, and said Jeffers was, at the time he attested the will and at all times since has been, the husband of Nellie C. B. Jeffers, a legatee under said will. Appellees’ demurrers for want of facts were sustained to the complaint, and, appellant refusing to plead further, judgment was rendered in favor of appellees.
It follows that, if the probate of said will had been resisted under §3154, supra, said attesting witness Marion Brooks, although named as executor therein, would have been a competent witness, on behalf of those seeking to probate said will, as to all facts in controversy in said case, and therefore competent to be a witness to said will.
We are not required to decide and do not decide in this case whether said Jeffers was a competent witness to said Avill, because, as we have already shown, tAvo of said attesting witnesses, Kimberlin and Brooks, were competent witnesses when they attested said will, which is all the statute (§3132, supra) requires. It is evident that the court did not err in sustaining the demurrer to the complaint.
Judgment affirmed.