Wise v. Olan Mills Inc. of TexasWise v. Olan Mills Inc. of Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the Act),
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has not yet decided whether general compensatory damages and exemplary damages may be awarded under the Act. These issues have evoked considerable conflict among the federal courts. The subject has been discussed at length in numerous opinions and no useful purpose would be served by belaboring it here. It is sufficient to refer to the thorough discussions in
Flynn v. Morgan Guaranty Company of New York,
Despite the authority to the contrary, this Court is not convinced that general compensatory and exemplary damages may never be awarded, in any circumstances, in age discrimination cases. Counsel for the defendant contends that since no legal remedy for age discrimination was recognized by the common law, the plaintiff is limited to the remedies provided by the Act. That argument is indeed persuasive. But it does not dispose of the issue, for
“In any action brought to enforce this Act the court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this Act, including without limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing the liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation under this section.” (Emphasis added).
Clearly, the only statutory limitation on granting traditional legal relief, such as general damages, is the requirement that the relief be “appropriate to effectuate the purposes” of the Act. Those purposes, as expressed in
Congress’ clear intent to provide a full remedy for the actual harm caused by age discrimination in employment is further reflected in the “Statement of findings and purpose” in
“In- light of the psychological effects of age discrimination, the remedies of reinstatement and back pay may not be sufficient to afford adequate relief. Even prompt reinstatement and recovery of lost earnings may not alleviate the workers’ fears about their diminished capacity, fears that have been reinforced by their dismissal.” Flynn v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, supra,463 F.Supp. at 678 .
Congress obviously sought to address this form of discrimination as forcefully as possible, and to discourage the practice of ignoring the work skills of older people while, in effect, junking them for replacement by newer models. To be thus discarded can have devastating psychological effects at a time in one’s life that is often already traumatic enough. Moreover, the willful and arbitrary assignment of older citizens to society’s trash heap may be so grossly unfair and unreasonable, in some cases, as to justify imposing exemplary damages.
Congress, in the Act, has plainly expressed a national policy opposed to wasting the talents, skills, experience and wisdom of older persons. In effect, Congress has declared their work capabilities a valuable national resource to be conserved and protected. A court’s duty is to effectuate the Congressional purpose to the fullest extent possible by “such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate.” In proper cases, that relief, in this court, will include general compensatory and exemplary damages unless such damages are held, by a binding decision of the Supreme Court or the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, not within the Act’s remedies.
The defendant contends, however, that the Conference Committee Report accompanying 1978 amendments to the Act demonstrates a contrary Congressional intent. In that report the committee stated, inter alia that the “ADEA as amended by this act does not provide remedies of a punitive nature.” House Conference Report No. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 504, 528, 535 (1978). Given the Act’s unambiguous language and statement of purpose, as well as the fact that the conference report focuses on amendments to the Act’s jury trial provisions, not its remedies provisions, this Court does not consider the conference report dispositive. Indeed, since the cited report mentions only “remedies of a punitive nature” it can have no bearing on the intent to allow, or not allow, compensatory damages such as those for emotional distress, pain and suffering.
The real thrust of the defendant’s argument is an attempt to limit this Court’s power to the remedies listed in the Act. But such a holding would render meaningless the plain language of
Finally, the Court finds unpersuasive the defendant’s argument that the availability of damages would defeat the Act’s conciliatory purposes. While conciliation of age discrimination disputes may be one purpose of the Act, this is certainly not its only purpose. Nor is there any indication that it is the overriding purpose. Moreover the assertion that limiting the ultimate possible recovery will encourage conciliation is an employer’s argument. But it is another class — employees—who are the Act’s intended beneficiaries. The gist of this argu *545 ment is that fewer claims will be asserted because the likelihood of obtaining a worthwhile remedy will be decreased if compensatory and exemplary damages are not permitted. That argument, in effect, asks this Court to eviscerate the Act. Obviously, plaintiffs in these cases can argue with equal force that the prospects of conciliation and settlement are enhanced by allowing full compensatory and exemplary damages in meritorious cases, for all employers everywhere would thus have a. meaningful incentive to a void age discrimination. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more efficacious means to accomplish the Act’s purpose of discouraging age discrimination.
The defendant’s warning — that a flood of non-meritorious claims may engulf the courts — is a familiar alarm which has echoed through courthouses whenever a new legal remedy is made available. No courthouse has ever collapsed from the weight of too many litigants seeking justice, and the courts will no doubt prove competent to deal with cases arising under this Act. This threatened “parade of horribles” of unfounded claims cannot justify barring the courts to all claims on the ground some may lack merit. It is to determine which claims are meritorious and which are not that courts exist. There is no reason to assume that claimants who seek — and prove — monetary damages will have less meritorious claims than those who do not.
Accordingly, the Court holds that exemplary damages and compensatory damages for pain and suffering, including emotional suffering, are within the forms of legal relief “appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this Act” as defined by
Notes
. It should also be noted that at least four circuits have held that either or both types of damages sought in this case are not available under the Act.
See Slatin v. Stanford Research Institute,