MEMORANDUM OPINION
As Michael Scott was admonished on The Office, there is a lot more to bankrupt *107 cy than just “declaring” it loudly to coworkers. Plaintiff Allen Wisdom knows this fact all top well. He has been going through a bankruptcy proceeding before a federal court in Idaho since 2011. At the outset of that action, the United States Trustee appointed Jeremy Gugino to act as the private trustee on his case. Wisdom and Gugino, however, quickly arrived at loggerheads, and, by the close of 2013, the former had filed an adversary proceeding against the latter, who then resigned from his post.
At issue in the present case are Freedom of Information Act requests that Wisdom subsequently lodged with Defendant United States Trustee Program to acquire information related to his bankruptcy proceeding and Gugino’s service as a trustee. Having been unsuccessful in obtaining the material he sought, Wisdom brought this pro se action, in which both sides now move for summary judgment. The Court concludes that an issue of material fact exists as to whether Defendant conducted adequate searches in response to these requests and properly relied on the exemptions cited to justify most of its with-holdings. The Court will, therefore, largely deny both Motions.
I. Background
To understand the present competing Motions requires a lengthy back story,' which sets forth the protracted baek-and-forth between Wisdom and the Agency over the scope and processing of the FOIA requests at issue. After the Court briefly outlines the general agency structure and the facts that gave rise to Wisdom’s desire for these records, the subsequent sections march through this procedural background as it pertains to each of his inquiries. A final section rounds out the retelling with the particulars of what has occurred since suit was filed.-
A. General Agency Structure
The United States Trustee Program, housed within the Department of Justice, oversees the administration of bankruptcy cases and private trustees. See ECF No. 14 (Motion) at 3. Sitting atop its structure, the Executive Office for the United States Trustees (EOUST) provides general policy and legal guidance to trustees and handles the Program’s administrative functions, including responding to FOIA requests. Id. at 4. EOUST, in furtherance of these duties, also promulgates administrative procedures for the suspension and removal of bankruptcy trustees. See 28 C.F.R. § 58.6.
Moving down the pyramid, a United States Trustee is appointed by the Attorney General for each federal judicial district in the country. See 28 U.S.C. § 581(a). This Trustee, in turn, establishes, maintains, and supervises the panel of private trustees who administer Chapter 7 bankruptcies in those districts. See Mot. at 4. The Trustee for Region 18 works out of the Regional Office in Seattle and oversees the judicial district of Idaho (among others).
B. Bankruptcy Proceeding
On July 12, 2007, the Region 18 Trustee appointed Jeremy Gugino to serve as a private trustee on its panel. Id at 5-6 & Exh. R.
Around four years later, Wisdom filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho. Id. at 6. The Trustee, accordingly, appointed Gugino to his case. Id. at 6. The two men, however, did not work well together, and, in December 2013, Plaintiff filed an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court against Gugino, alleging that the trustee had engaged in various forms *108 of misconduct in handling his case. See ECF No. 18 (Cross-Motion) at 6.
Shortly thereafter, on December 31, 2013, Gugino resigned from his position as a member of the region’s private-trustee panel. See Mot. at 6 & Exh. R.
C. FOIA Request 2015-2053
On March 19, 2015, over a year later, Plaintiff submitted a FOIA request to EOUST for 15 categories of records that related either to his bankruptcy proceeding or to Gugino’s service as a trustee. See ECF No. 14-1 (Declaration of Joseph Car-illi), ¶ 6. The request stated that it “pertain[ed] only to records located at the Office of the United States Trustee, District of Idaho” and declared that Wisdom was willing to pay up to $450 in attendant processing fees. See id., Exh. A at 2, 4. That very same day, EOUST sent him a letter explaining that his “complex” request had been assigned tracking number 2015-2053. Id., Exh. B.
A week later, the agency followed up with a longer letter, this time asking Wisdom to provide more details on what he was seeking to help it “accurately estimate all applicable fees for search, review, and/or duplication of [the] requested records.” Id., Exh. C. at 1. Defendant further explained that, due to privacy concerns, “most if not all of the [requested] records relating to [Gugino’s] trustee performance evaluations [we]re likely to be withheld in part or in full under FOIA exemptions.” Id. The letter nevertheless informed Wisdom that he would be responsible for fees related to processing these records unless he chose to narrow his inquiry’s scope. Id. at 1-2. The agency, finally, requested that Wisdom confirm that his request was limited only to records located at the Boise office and, in a footnote, explained that many of the requested documents would likely be held at EOUST here in Washington, D.C. W. at 2.
Plaintiff quickly responded. Id., Exh. D. In his own letter, on April 9, 2015, Wisdom declined to narrow the scope of his request and disagreed with the agency’s prediction that certain documents would ultimately be exempt from disclosure. Id. at 1-2. Wisdom also confirmed that his request focused only on records located at the Boise office, but, in his own footnote, indicated that it did so because certain regulations indicated that the documents he was requesting are “initiated and/or generated by the District of Idaho.” Id. at 3 & n.15. He then hedged, saying, “If for some reason, unknown to me, records requested were either initiated by or generated by the Boise, Idaho office but are actually located elsewhere then the request for the records would be for wherever located.” Id.
A month later, EOUST responded that it now understood the scope of 2015-2053 to include “all records of any nature contained in [Gugino’s] oversight file ... whether maintained in Boise, Idaho or other [USTP] offices.” Id, Exh. E. To speed his recovery of the Boise documents, however, EOUST recommended that Wisdom agree to a two-stage “rolling release protocol.” Id. at 4. The agency, under this plan, would first search for and release records found in the Boise office for his review; if he wished to proceed with more records, only then would the agency go to a stage-two search of the other offices. Id EOUST concluded that this “two-stage method” would best enable Wisdom “to make a more informed decision as to whether [he] wish[ed] to narrow the scope of [his] search to just those records obtained from the Boise, Idaho office” at a later date. Id. The agency estimated as well that the fees for the request would fall around $224.50— well below Wisdom’s previous commitment to pay up to $450. Id. at 3. It nevertheless *109 asked him to please “let [the agency] know whether this is acceptable” and to provide pre-payment of these fees by June 8, 2015. Id. at 4.
Wisdom adequately complied, agreeing on May 11 that the agency’s “consolidated review of [his] request [wa]s accurate” and indicating that he “d[id] not object to the ‘rolling release’ protocol.” Id., Exh. F. He also attached a check for the advance fee. Id. at 2.
All cylinders seemed set to fire, then, but once the agency began the search, it discovered that the archiving of certain trustee reports had been done by date, rather than by trustee. Id, Exh. G. EOUST thus reached out to Wisdom a week later to inform him that it would now take significantly longer than the agency had originally estimated to weed out the reports related to Gugino. Id. Defendant also noted that the Boise office had confirmed to EOUST in the meantime that some responsive reports were consolidated in the Region 18 Office with reports from other federal districts, meaning that at least some of the requested documents would not be located at the Boise office after all. Id.
Wisdom responded to clarify that he was not seeking some of the difficult-to-sift reports and to ask for an explanation of why relevant records might be located outside the Boise office despite certain regulations to the contrary. Id. The parties worked out these issues over the next few days in a further exchange of emails, and things again seemed to be on track for a reasonably timely completion of the searches. Id., Exh. H.
EOUST, indeed, thereafter proceeded to search for the documents and initially returned Gugino’s check for $224.50 to him on the ground that it did not require advance payment for searches that were projected to cost less than $250. Id., Exh. I. By July 28, 2015, however, the agency’s stage-one search of the Boise office had already totaled 16.75 hours, thus yielding a fee of $411.25. Id, Exh. J at 2. The agency sent Wisdom another letter requesting that he now remit that amount by August 24, 2015, or it would close the processing of his request. Id. Wisdom timely sent in the requested amount again, although the government had still not turned over any records. Id, Exh. K.
Nearly a month later, in fact, Wisdom had still heard nothing from the agency about the documents he had requested. Frustrated that he had yet to see a single record, Plaintiff sent another email to Defendant, asking it to let him know when his request, now pending for 167 days, would be completed, “at least” as to the first part. Id, Exh. L. EOUST responded the next day that it anticipated a partial release later that month. Id, Exh. M.
The agency, however, again failed to produce anything on its proffered timeline. Well over a month later, on October 8, Wisdom thus inquired anew about the status of his request. Id, Exh. N. He reiterated his previous complaint that the agency’s delay in producing records was in serious breach of the “statutory time requirement in which to comply with release of the requested documents” and asked that it either provide a reasoned basis for its refusal to give him the documents or fast-track their release. Id
The very next day, EOUST sent Wisdom a partial stage-one batch of documents. Id, Exh. O. This initial release contained 58 pages “subject to redactions pursuant to FOIA Exemptions (b)(5) and/or (b)(6).” Id at 2. Over two months later, the agency sent a second stage-one crop of 111 pages, again subject to redac-tions under various FOIA exemptions. Id., Exh. P. Two months later, on February 2, *110 2016, the agency sent a third—-which it described as a “final”—release of redacted records from its search of the Boise office. Id., Exh. Q.
In a footnote accompanying this final set of documents, the agency indicated that “for administrative purposes only” it would consider these stage-one releases—i e., the first half of his “bifurcated” 2015-2053 request—as the entirety of his FOIA request, but, should he “wish to pursue the second part of [his] request,” it would prioritize that search under a new case number as though it had been received on March 19, 2015. Id. at 1 n.2. The agency further indicated that it would apply the same fee rates to this stage-two search if he elected to proceed with it. Id. at 2-3. By this time, nearly a full calendar year had passed since Wisdom first submitted his 2015-2053 request and, as discussed below, this case had already been filed.
D. FOIA Request 2016-2003
Four days after the first 2015-2053 release, Wisdom submitted on October 13, 2015, another FOIA request to the Agency for any records related to the processing of his 2015-2053 request. Id., Exh. S. He did so based on his belief that someone within the agency was obstructing his access to the documents he had requested. See ECF No. 18-1 (Declaration of Allen L. Wisdom), ¶ 26. In particular, he felt that the agency’s vacillations on the location of the records, the applicable exemptions, and the fees associated with the search might indicate interferance with his efforts to acquire more information about Gugi-no’s service as a trustee. Id., ¶¶ 26, 28. The agency wrote back two days later, designating this new FOIA request as 2016-2003 and, as before, classifying it as complex. See Mot., Exh. T.
Several months went by before the agency followed up with a call to Wisdom to discuss his new inquiry’s scope. Id., Exh. U. This conversation was immediately memorialized in an email from EOUST to Wisdom on January 15, 2016, for the express purpose of “confirm[ing] what we discussed and to ensure that [the agency] had described accurately how [Wisdom] wishfed] to narrow [his request’s] scope.” Id. In sum, EOUST would search for: “1) all administrative processing notes in the Idaho office; and 2) any correspondence between the Idaho office and the EO about FOIA 2015-2053 regarding the documents themselves; and 3) any email or other correspondence such as reports showing the procedures EO staff employed in processing the record as received from Idaho.” Id. at 2. The search, however, would exclude “[Executive Office]-only, internal records discussing solely the application of exemptions” and “correspondence relating to communications with Assistant United States Attorney Fred Haynes regarding” this lawsuit (discussed below) over the agency’s actions in regard to request 2015-2053. Id. at 2. A day later, Wisdom wrote back confirming this description was “quite accurate.” Id. at 1.
Plaintiff and the agency also negotiated a further narrowing of this request on February 23, 2016, again documenting their agreement in an email that Wisdom confirmed to be accurate. Id., Exh. V. This time they agreed that the agency would look for “[a]ny conversations between any employee of the UST program located in the Boise, Idaho field office and a third party, regarding your 2015-2053 FOIA request.” Id.
A day later, EOUST confirmed that “[ajfter a reasonable search by the Boise, Idaho office of their agency records, no records were located that appear to meet your request for information.” Id., Exh. W. In other words, the agency released no *111 documents pursuant to this second request, 2016-2003.
E. FOIA Request 2016-2033
On February 23—ie., the same day that the parties communicated about narrowing his 2016-2003 FOIA request—Wisdom confirmed that he did “wish to go forward with the- second phase [of 2015-2053] and obtain documents from the other than ⅛⅛] Idaho UST offices.” ECF No. 24 (Opposition to MSJ), Suppl. Exh. B. Over the next few days, the agency thus wrote two follow-up emails to Wisdom, referring to his stage-two request as a “new” FOIA case and designating it a tracking number of 2016-2033. Id., Suppl. Exh. C.
Wisdom immediately objected to the agency’s characterizations of this as a “new” inquiry via his own letter on February 26, specifically complaining that its “unilateral] redesignat[ion]” of his request was unjustified when it was simply the previously agreed-upon second stage of 2015-2053. Id., Suppl. Exh. D. To support his position, Wisdom quoted from previous letters exchanged between himself and the agency about the expediency benefits of a rolling two-stage process. Id, He noted, in particular, that the language in these communications of a “second stage” hardly implied the agency would consider the search to be an entirely “new” request at some future point. Id. A few days later, the agency responded by insisting that his request was indeed “new,” though it also nevertheless continued to refer to it as the second part of his “bifurcated” 2015-2053 request. Id., Suppl. Exh. E.
On March 7, 2016, Defendant completed its search of other USTP offices for responsive records and notified Wisdom via email that it estimated a review of the discovered documents would cost him around $567.53 in pre-paid fees. Id., Suppl. Exh. G at 3. Within days, Wisdom sent in the payment, and the parties worked out the exclusion of some potentially responsive documents in an effort to reduce unnecessary or duplicative costs. Id, Suppl. Exhs. F & G.
On March 18, the agency sent Plaintiff 209 pages of redacted documents pursuant to this final request. Id., Suppl. Exh. I.
F. Procedural History
On October 23, 2015, shortly after the agency’s first 2015-2053 release and Wisdom’s submission of request 2016-2003 (the one related to the processing of his first request), he filed the current action. See ECF No. 1 (Complaint). In his initial Complaint, Wisdom alleged that USTP had unlawfully withheld and redacted documents relevant to his 2015-2053 request and initiated a multi-stage “rolling release” schedule that violated their mutual agreement to timely turn over the documents in just two stages. Id., ¶¶ 23-27.
A little more than a month later, on November 30, Wisdom amended his Complaint to reflect the agency’s continued failure to produce further documents or to make a final determination on his 2015-2053 request. See ECF No. 2 (Amended Complaint). He also added a new claim to challenge the agency’s tardy response to his 2016-2003 request, noting that he had heard nothing from the agency in over twenty days since it had first assigned that inquiry a tracking number. Id., ¶¶ 28-35. In short, Wisdom effectively expanded the scope of this action to include the agency’s failure to produce documents for both 2015-2053 and 2016-2003 within the applicable statutory timeframes' provided by FOIA, as Defendant had turned over just one partial release of 2015-2053 documents at that point.
After Defendant’s Answer, the Court set a briefing schedule, and the agency made *112 the subsequent additional releases discussed above. The parties’ Cross-Motions for summary judgment are now ripe.
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment may be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact is one that would change the outcome of the litigation. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
FOIA cases typically and appropriately are decided on motions for summary judgment. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Border Patrol,
III. Analysis
Congress enacted FOIA in order “to pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.” Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose,
As mentioned above, the parties have now cross-moved for summary judgment. Before addressing the merits of these Motions, the Court first takes up Defendant’s contention that what the agency designated as request 2016-2033 should not be considered here because Wisdom did not first administratively appeal that particular determination. The sections that follow then address, respectively, whether the agency’s supportive declarations comport with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the adequacy of its three searches for responsive records, its reliance on specific exemptions to justify its attendant redac-tions, and, finally, its compliance with FOIA’s segregability requirements. At the end of the day, the Court determines that, for the most part, USTP has not sufficiently discharged its duty.
A. Exhaustion
Before diving into the merits of these Cross-Motions, the Court must first consider a threshold issue that could narrow the scope of that review. In its Opposition, Defendant briefly asserts that Plaintiffs challenge to the 2016-2033 re lease—ie., 2015-2053 documents that were located outside its Boise office—has no purchase here because Wisdom did not exhaust his administrative remedies by appealing that particular determination through the agency’s procedures first. See Opp. at 15-16. In support, the agency summarily states that it properly classified 2016-2033 under a distinct tracking number when Wisdom informed it that he wished to proceed with 2015-2053’s second stage in February 2016. Id. at 15. Because Defendant also later notified him, when it released responsive records in March 2016, that he hád a right to appeal that determination, the agency contends that his failure to pursue such relief means he “technically” failed to exhaust his remedies as to those records. Id. at 16.
Administrative exhaustion of a FOIA request is, as the agency argues, “generally required before filing suit in federal court.” Hidalgo v. FBI,
Wisdom met these constructive-exhaustion requirements here. To begin, Defen *114 dant does not argue that he has not exhausted his claims with regard to his 2015-2053 request; it only believes that 2016-2033 should be treated separately. Yet, if, as Plaintiff maintains, his 2016-2033 request is merely a component of 2015-2053, then he must have exhausted that as well. Whether this is true is thus the question the Court must decide first.
Constructive exhaustion is determined by the actions (or lack thereof) an agency has taken by the time a suit is filed in the district court. See Oglesby,
The agency’s unilateral and tardy reclassification, taken over Plaintiffs active protests, cannot strip Wisdom of his right to judicial review of an already-pending claim. The purpose of FOIA’s exhaustion requirement is not to trick an unsuspecting requestor into relinquishing his right to his day in court, but rather to allow the agency an “opportunity to exercise its discretion and expertise on the matter and to make a factual record to support its decision.” Oglesby,
The agency’s subsequent actions, moreover, also bar an exhaustion defense here. As discussed above, when it created the 2016-2033 designation for these records in February 2016, Defendant assured Wisdom that this change would not alter his rights. Id. Exh. Q at 1 & n.2. In fact, it promised him that the classification would be used solely for its own administrative purposes and the request would still be prioritized as though it had been received a year earlier. Id. Given that this case was already pending by this time, an accomplished tea-leaves reader would have been hard-pressed to divine that Defendant intended to retroactively shield from imminent judicial review this final, outstanding portion of its tardy 2015-2053 determination. Finally, when a defendant has made these particular representations, which reasonably would have deterred a plaintiff from seeking administrative redress within FOIA’s attendant deadlines for an administrative appeal, the core purposes of FOIA’s exhaustion regime would not be advanced by allowing the agency to thus avoid judicial review entirely.
On the specific facts of this case, therefore, the agency has failed to show it has a viable exhaustion defense to any of Wisdom’s claims. See Hidalgo,
B. Carilli Declarations
As mentioned above, in the FOIA context, the agency bears the burden to demonstrate that it has conducted a reasonable search and that a claimed exemption applies to any record that it subsequently withholds. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Dep’t of Justice,
In accord with this practice, USTP relies on two such Declarations from Joseph Carilli, a trial attorney in EOUST who has been responsible for its FOIA compliance efforts since February 4, 2016. See Carilli Decl., ¶ 1. Wisdom maintains, however, that the agency cannot rely on these particular Declarations because they violate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c)(4)’s requirement that a declaration be made based upon “personal knowledge.” See Cross-Mot. at 13. Carilli cannot possibly have such knowledge about the search and applicable exemptions, Plaintiff asserts, as he did not take over these duties for the agency until well after those tasks were largely completed for the FOIA requests at issue here. Id at 13-15. Wisdom thus asks the Court to strike most sections of these Declarations before proceeding with its analysis. Id at 15.
In making this argument, however, Plaintiff misconstrues what Rule 56 mandates in the FOIA context. A FOIA declarant may satisfy that rule’s personal-knowledge requirement “ ‘if in his declaration, [he] attestfs] to his personal knowledge of the procedures used in handling [a FOIA] request and his familiarity with the documents in question.’” Madison Mech., Inc. v. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., No. 99-2854,
Carilli, in this case, attests that he is responsible “for agency compliance with [FOIA] ” and has “direct involvement in the processing of responses to requests for access to [USTP] records and information.” Carilli Decl., ¶¶ 1-2. He also explains that, his statements “are based upon my personal knowledge, upon information provided to me in my official capacity, and upon conclusions and determinations reached and made in accordance therewith.” Id., ¶2. In others words, he has based his conclusions on information provided to him by other agency employees and his own review of agency records.
While the Carilli Declarations might have provided this necessary information *116 in a more direct and clear manner—e.g., by using the tried-and-true recitation of a “familiarity with the documents in question”—the language he has used nonetheless presents a sufficient approximation to satisfy Rule 56’s requirements here. The Court, accordingly, declines to strike these affidavits as deficient and may now proceed to consider whether the search procedures they describe were adequate.
C. Search Adequacy
“An agency fulfills its obligations under FOIA if it can demonstrate beyond material doubt that its search was ‘reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.’ ” Valencia-Lucena v. Coast Guard,
For ease of reference, the Court takes up the adequacy of these searches—and Carilli’s Declarations in support—in separate sections corresponding to the three request numbers.
1. 2015-2053
To remind the reader, the first request sought, from the Boise office, 15 categories of documents related either to Wisdom’s bankruptcy or Gugino’s service as a trustee. EOUST tasked the Assistant United States Trustee (AUST) for Region 18 with conducting a search for these documents. See Carilli Decl., ¶ 24. The AUST then identified seven employees in the Boise office likely to have “knowledge” of the records, including himself, trial attorneys and paralegals assigned to Wisdom’s bankruptcy case, and the bankruptcy analysts assigned to trustee oversight. Id, ¶ 26. These employees subsequently searched the Boise office’s shared computer drive, the Region 18 shared computer drive, their own individual hard drives, and their personal hard drives stored on the local Boise server for the terms: “Gugino,” “Wisdom,” the relevant bankruptcy case numbers, and “blanket bond.” Id., ¶¶25-27. An employee also manually searched a hard-copy trustee-oversight file, but did not search any hard copies of the bankruptcy case files, as those were no longer located in the Boise office. Id, ¶ 27. Any documents located in the search were then sent to EOUST for processing. Id, ¶ 28.
While the Court understands this declaration to imply that the agency strove to be thorough in its efforts, the recounting of its search is facially flawed under this Circuit’s caselaw. To satisfy the dictates of FOIA, Defendant must, at a minimum, “aver that it has searched all files likely to contain relevant documents.” Am. Immigration Council v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
Where the government, as it has here, fails to make such an attestation, courts have typically found that an issue of material fact exists as to the adequacy of the search. In Jefferson v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 05-848,
Defendant, likewise, has failed to meet its burden here. In fact, USTP makes only vague averments that it assigned the official “responsible for the maintenance of all records held in the Boise, Idaho office” to spearhead its search, that he in turn identified “the search locations where the records may be located,” and that his office maintained “both hard copy and electronic files of bankruptcy case files, system of records JUSTICE/UST-001 Bankruptcy Case Files and Associated Records and trustee oversight files, system of records JUSTICE/UST-002 Bankruptcy Trustee Oversight Records.” Carilli Decl., ¶¶ 24-26. The agency never proceeds to declare that the AUST or other employees ultimately searched every hard copy and electronic system that might contain responsive documents. This attestation, as a result, simply does not pass muster. See Oglesby,
In the absence of an affidavit containing the specific declaration that the agency searched all locations likely to contain responsive documents, the Court must conclude that a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether the agency conducted an adequate search in regard to stage one of request 2015-2053.
2. 2016-2003
For largely the same reason, the agency also has not demonstrated that it adequately searched for documents related to Wisdom’s second FOIA request, which, as a reminder, sought documents pertaining to Defendant’s earlier processing of 2015-2053. This time, Carilli explains only that “EOUST determined that the responsive records would be located in the” Boise office, that it assigned the same AUST to conduct the search, and that he determined that the same seven employees “had knowledge of the records requested.” Car-illi Decl., ¶¶ 44-46. He then summarily states that each of these employees “verified that the office did not have any records responsive to the request.” ⅛ ¶ 46.
As should be clear, the agency must attest that it searched all of the places likely to contain documents pertaining to Wisdom’s request. See Oglesby,
As a result, there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to the adequacy of this search, too.
3. 2016-2088
To complete its final search for records responsive to Wisdom’s 2015-2053 request, but this time in locations other than the Boise office, the agency followed a similar path to that described above. It first “determined that the responsive records may be located in the” Region 18 Office and EOUST Office of Oversight. See ECF No. 24-1 (Supplemental Carilli Declaration), ¶ 15. For the documents located in the Region 18 Office, the local official in charge of coordinating the oversight of the panel trustees “determined that any responsive documents held [in that office] would be duplicative of the documents provided in response to EOUST FOIA 2015-2053” from the Boise office. Id., ¶ 16. The agency thus describes no search at all that took place of records in this office. While there may be some cases where no search is necessary because any such effort would clearly be duplicative, the agency never explains in sufficient detail why that would be so in this instance. Suffice it to say, then, that no search of this office at all was plainly not an adequate search here.
USTP did, however, at least conduct a search of its Office of Oversight. But, again, Carilli merely lists a variety of hard-copy and electronic resources maintained by EOUST. See Suppl. Carilli Deck, ¶ 18. He then states that, after reviewing the request, the official in charge of such records “identified the search locations where the records may be located” as an office shared drive, user home drives, and the hard-copy trustee-oversight ' files. Id., ¶¶ 18-19. This official then conducted a “search” of these locations and sent the responsive documents to EOUST officials for processing. Id., ¶¶ 20-21.
As should be obvious by now, this final search thus again fails to describe with “reasonable detail” an effort this Court could determine “was reasonably calculated to discover the requested documents.” SafeCard,
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To sum up, the Court concludes that, for the first two FOIA requests at issue in this case, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the agency’s search for responsive documents was adequate. While the government’s Motion as to the search fails because it has not properly described its searches, Plaintiffs summary-judgment Motion as to the search likewise falls short, as it remains unclear whether the *119 searches themselves were inadequate or just inadequately explained by the government. USTP, accordingly, must either supply a sufficient declaration or conduct a new search. As to the final 2016-2033 request, the Court concludes, based on the agency’s own representations, that its search was inadequate and that Wisdom is thus entitled to summary judgement on this limited score. In other words, EOUST must renew its search as to these last records.
D. Exemptions
Next up are the numerous redactions made by the agency and the FOIA exemptions it cited in justification—primarily Exemptions 5, 6, and 7(E). The Court takes up each in turn below.
Before doing so, however, it bears noting that Plaintiff spends a good deal of time in his Cross-Motion and Reply discussing various exemptions that the agency either did not rely on or that he ultimately concludes he is not interested in challenging. See, e.g., Cross-Mot. at 23 (after discussing Exemption 7(C), recognizing “Exemption 7(C) is not at issue here”). In particular, he expressly waives any challenge to the agency’s reliance on Exemption 6 to redact direct-dial telephone numbers for its employees and on Exemption 3 for redactions of various tax-return documents. Id. at 25. As a result, the Court will not examine those particular withholdings.
1. Exemption 5
Exemption 5 applies to “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). In other words, under Exemption 5, an agency may withhold from a FOIA re-questor any “doeuments[ ] normally privileged in the civil discovery context.” NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
a. Deliberative-Process Privilege
The deliberative-process privilege shields internal agency “advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations” in order to “protect! ] the decision making processes of government agencies.” Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
Based on these distinctions, “Exemption 5, properly construed, calls for disclosure of all opinions and interpretations which embody the agency’s effective law and policy, and the withholding of all papers which reflect the agency’s group thinking in the process of working out its policy and determining what its law shall be.” Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
Citing this privilege, EOUST defends its withholding of two types of intra-agency records here. As to the first category—which contained information about how Gugino should be evaluated as a trustee—the agency explains only that it determined these documents would “dampen the ability of the [agencyj’s employees to have open and frank discussions internally and with the trustee regarding trustee performance.” Carilli Deck, ¶ 30. The agency does not explain how these documents were “predecisional” or, in fact, whether they were deliberative in the sense of being designed to work toward the crafting of an agency policy or action. Nor does Defendant cite to whom or from whom these documents were sent.
Based on this scant information alone and bearing in mind “the strong policy of the FOIA that the public is entitled to know what its government is doing and why,” the Court cannot say that these redactions were proper. Coastal States Gas,
*121
The agency’s defense of its second set of deliberative-process redactions fares little better. This time, the agency states vaguely that the withheld documents contain discussions about how the Trustee should handle complaints being made by the public about Gugino’s demeanor. See Carilli Decl., ¶ 29. Again, no mention is made about to whom or from whom the documents were sent. Id No further description, in fact, is provided except this brief statement. Should the documents direct a formal agency policy from a supervisor to an inferior about what should be done to respond to these complaints, the privilege would not likely shield the records from disclosure. Public Citizen,
The agency, moreover, wholly fails to discuss in its declarations another page that it describes in its Vaughn Index—an index provided by the agency that cata-logues all of the records released and the cited exemptions—as being redacted pursuant to Exemption 5 and containing “information ... regarding the status of the relationship between panel trustees and bankruptcy judges.” Mot., Exh. X at 1 (referring to p.17); see also Vaughn v. Rosen,
The Court thus holds that Defendant has not demonstrated at this stage that it can withhold any of the documents for which it cited Exemption 5’s deliberative-process privilege.
b. Attorney-Work-Product Privilege
“The attorney work-product [prong of Exemption 5] protects ‘documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial’ by an attorney.” Am. Immigration Council v. DHS,
When reviewing a withholding under the work-product privilege, the D.C. Circuit employs a because-of test, inquiring “whether, in light of the nature of the
*122
document and the factual situation in the particular case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation.” FTC v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms. Inc.,
Defendant here redacted documents that it claims were “prepared by an attorney or at the direction of an attorney in connection with a possible administrative action against the Trustee” under 28 C.F.R. § 58.6 or during litigation in a bankruptcy case. See Carilli Decl, ¶¶ 29-30; Suppl. Carilli Decl., ¶¶ 22-23. Full stop. The agency says nothing more about who prepared the documents or what content they contain. Id. Nor does it clarify against whom it thought such litigation might occur or on what basis, though one might guess that it is referring to Gugino as the “Trustee” and, possibly, to Wis-doms bankruptcy case. Id. The agency thus has failed to meet its burden to justify any of these redactions through an adequately descriptive affidavit. See Ellis,
While USTP seeks in its brief to supplement this sparse description, such further elaboration is insufficient at the summary-judgment stage to meet the government’s evidentiary burden. Military Audit Project,
A sampling of the documents provided by Wisdom also reveals that at least some of the redactions made on this ground by the agency appear to be improper. For example, EOUST cited this exemption to justify redactions contained in a field report of Gugino that was conducted by a bankruptcy analyst for the apparently routine purpose of evaluating his general performance. See Wisdom Decl., Exh. C at 28-38. In another instance, the agency redacted an entire page of comments that appear to be observations written down by the Assistant United States Trustee (AUST) who was observing Gugino in court on April 22, 2013. Id. at 52. The Court cannot ascertain at this point how such routine audits of workplace performance could be considered as produced at the behest of an attorney in preparation of litigation. Put simply, these are not the sort of documents that would ordinarily be protected by the privilege.
*123 The Court, consequently, must conclude that a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether the government properly withheld any records under Exemption 5’s attorney-work-product privilege.
2. Exemption 6
Plaintiff next argues that Defendant improperly redacted three other categories of information under Exemption 6. See Cross-Mot. at 25. To qualify for this exemption, the agency must show that the following criteria are met: first, the information must be contained within “personnel and medical files and similar files”; second, the disclosure of the information “must constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6); see also Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n v. Exec. Office for Immigration Review,
Each of the three categories of information for which the government relied on this exemption—names and personal information of various individuals, Gugino’s trustee evaluations, and other trustees’ performance reviews—are discussed separately using this formula.
a. Names and Personal Information
The first bundle of Exemption 6 redac-tions consists of the names of individuals who complained to the agency about Gugi-no’s demeanor, various names of debtors who appear in those complaints, and similar identifying information contained in other documents produced by Gugino about related bankruptcy negotiations with these private citizens. See Mot. at 25, Exhs. X, Y, Z (2015-2053 Vaughn Indices); Opp., Exh. K (2016-2033 Vaughn Index). With scant explanation, Wisdom claims that none of this information was properly withheld by the agency under this exemption, but, at each step of the multi-pronged analysis, his argument falls flat.
Starting at step one, Wisdom maintains that these records do not satisfy the Exemption 6 test as they are not found in “personnel or medical files.” But, in making this statement, he seems to overlook the fact that this exemption also covers files and information “similar” to personnel records. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). Relying on this language, courts have routinely held that government files consisting of private pieces of information similar to what might be contained in a personnel file sufficiently fit the “similar files” bill, including the type of names and bank-account numbers that the government withheld here. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FDA,
It next considers whether the individual complainants and debtors have a substantial privacy interest in the withholding of their identities. According to Wisdom, they do not, as any such interest was “extinguished with the filing” of their complaints or bankruptcy proceedings. See Cross-Mot. at 24-25. In essence, he seems to believe that because the information on who is going through bankruptcy proceedings is publicly available elsewhere, the complainants and debtors have no further privacy interest in the withholding of their names or personal information in the context of these complaints or catalogues of their disagreements with Gugino. Id
This is incorrect. As the D.C. Circuit has indicated, even where such identifying information is otherwise available in public records, individuals may still retain a privacy interest in avoiding the association of their names with complaints or other disciplinary actions. See Am. Immigration Lawyers,
The court must still, of course, proceed to the final step of its analysis as “[t]he statute does not categorically exempt individuals’ identities” given that “the ‘privacy interest at stake may vary depending on the context in which it is asserted.’ ” Judicial Watch,
On this final score, the government convincingly argues that the release of these records’ substance fully satisfies the public interest in them, and no other gain could be had by the further disclosure of these individual names or related personal data. See Mot. at 25-27. As it notes, the exposure of this identifying information could subject the individuals involved to “unnecessary public attention, harassment, or embarrassment” and stymie the government’s efforts to obtain candid information about the performance of its trustees from such parties in the future. See Carilli Decl., ¶ 33. Indeed, courts have routinely upheld the withholding of complainants’ names on similar rationales. See, e.g., Lakin Law Firm, P.C. v. FTC,
Wisdom also fails, for his part, to identify any public interest that might be furthered by the release of these names. See Carter,
As a result, the Court will grant Defendant partial summary judgment as to the withholding of these names and personal data.
b. Gugino’s Performance Evaluations
The second category of Exemption 6 redactions made by USTP involved either Gugino’s performance reviews or files prepared for the purpose of evaluating his work as a trustee, most notably his field examinations. See Mot. at 27-29. Wisdom protests that these records did not meet any of the requirements for withholding under this exemption. As before, he is largely incorrect. This time around, though, he has shown that there is a credible argument that the public interest in at least some of this information might outweigh the privacy interests at stake, and the Court will thus order the government to produce these documents for review in camera.
The first two steps of the Exemption 6 analysis are again relatively straightforward. Although Wisdom claims that these are not personnel files because Gugino is not a government employee, the discussion -above makes clear that this distinction does not matter since the information redacted is still of the type protected in “similar files.” Rose,
As to prong two, a person has a substantial privacy interest in a supervisor’s candid evaluation of his performance. See Ripskis v. HUD,
Having found that Defendant has satisfied the first two Exemption 6 requirements, the Court must now weigh' the public interest in disclosure against this recognized privacy interest. The only valid public interest, in this FOIA context, is one that serves the statute’s core purpose of shedding light on an agency’s performance of its statutory duties. See Reporters Comm.,
In this case, Wisdom makes a substantial argument that Gugino’s performance evaluations could at least marginally advance the public interest in shedding light on some form of misconduct by a trustee and the government’s response thereto. As the information turned over in several of the other records reveals here, multiple individuals and attorneys complained to USTP about Gugino’s dismissive and demeaning behavior toward debtors and other professionals with whom he worked during his time as a trustee. Wisdom is also surely correct that Gugino, as a trustee, wielded an enormous amount of official power over certain citizens, and, should that authority have been abused, the public has a clear interest in knowing how the government responded—to investigate and, if substantiated, to squelch such behavior. Presumably, at least some of these evaluations thus would contain further information shedding light on how the government reacted to potential abuse-of-power accusations lodged against a person holding significant government authority. In light of evidence of potential wrongdoing by high-ranking government officials, moreover, some courts have required the release of performance evaluations despite the privacy interests at stake, as the agency here readily concedes. See, e.g., Cowdery, Ecker & Murphy, LLC v. Dep’t of the Interior,
On the other side of the ledger, there is no evidence at this point, despite Wisdom’s claims to the contrary, of widespread abus *127 es by any other private trustees or, indeed, serious abuses of his authority by Gugino in particular. The complaints against Gugi-no focus on his potentially surly, unprofessional, and combative interpersonal style, as well as an occasional misstep in the dispensation of his duties. It is also likely the case that, as the government further contends, the disclosure of his evaluations will dampen the ability of supervisors to candidly evaluate other trustees’ performance and, as a result, somewhat inhibit the' ability of the government to effectively supervise them. Finally, the urgency to uncover these records is somewhat diminished by the fact that Gugino has resigned from his post. See Carilli Deck, ¶ 34.
Given the legitimate arguments both in favor of and against disclosure of at least some of the information contained in these documents, the Court will review these particular records in camera to resolve the competing interests. Until such resolution, there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Exemption 6 justifies their non-disclosure.
c. Other Trustee Performance Evaluations
The same cannot be said about the performance evaluations of other trustees, which USTP also "withheld on the same ground as Gugino’s reviews. These documents, for the reasons already listed, plainly meet the first and second prongs of the Exemption 6 analysis. Absent any evidence of widespread wrongdoing by these trustees, though, Wisdom has failed to identify any potential public interest in their disclosure. The Court thus concludes that USTP has sufficiently met its burden with regard to withholding these documents and, accordingly, grants Defendant partial summary judgment on this claim.
* * *
To recapitulate, the Court holds that the government is entitled to partial summary judgment as to its Exemption 6 redactions of personal identifying information and trustee performance evaluations, except for Gugino’s, which the Court will order the government to produce for in camera review.
3. Exemption 7(E)
And then there was one. Citing Exemption 7(E), USTP redacted two pieces of information from the records that it turned over to Wisdom. See Mot., Exhs. Y
&
Z. Exemption 7 authorizes the government to withhold “records or information compiled for law-enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information” meets one of six requirements. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7); see also Keys v. Dep’t of Justice,
Defendant contends that the information it redacted in this case satisfies these re *128 quirements because it involves USTP’s statutory duty to alert the appropriate United States Attorney to “any occurrence that might be criminal in nature.” Mot. at 29-30 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(F)). According to the Carilli Declaration, the government made over 2,000 such referrals in 2015 alone, and the information that it redacted would reveal its techniques and procedures for detecting such illegal activity. See Carilli Decl., ¶ 37. Should the information that “suggests or forms the basis for identifying suspected fraud or abuse within or relating to bankruptcy” be made public, the government fears that bankruptcy filers would then be able to modify their activities to avoid detection and circumvent these laws. Id.
Wisdom, for his part, protests only that Defendant “has made no showing that the application of Exemption 7(E) would risk a ‘circumvention of law1 ” or would disclose any “ ‘techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions.’ ” Cross-Mot. at 28. The Court, after reviewing the redacted documents attached as an exhibit to his Cross-Motion, disagrees. See Second 2015-2053 Release at 2-3; Third 2015-2053 Release at 150-51. As to the first redaction, it appears to contain only a single line or two of information about a potential criminal concern related to one of Wisdom’s own holdings, which Gugino appears to have referred to an AUST for investigation. See Second 2015-2053 Release at 2-3. The second of the redacted emails likewise seems to discuss a referral of a certain application fee to an AUSA or AUST for investigation, though the amount of the fee has been redacted. See Third 2015-2053 Release at 150-51. Both of the redactions thus implicate the agency’s procedures for identifying fraud and, if revealed, would help debtors avoid the sort of conduct that the agency looks for in flagging potential criminal acts. Given the “relatively low bar” required to make this showing, moreover, the Court concludes that the agency has “ ‘demonstrate^] logically how the release of the requested information might create a risk of circumvention of the law.’ ” Blackwell,
The problem with the government’s representations here, instead, goes to the first requirement of Exemption 7—
ie.,
that the records or information withheld be compiled for law-enforcement purposes. Summers v. Dep’t of Justice,
The Court thus finds that the government has failed to meet its burden for summary judgment as to Exemption 7(E) as well.
E. Segregability
In the home stretch, Plaintiff argues, in rather cursory fashion, that Defendant failed to properly separate out information that could be disclosed from that which it *129 lawfully withheld under the exemptions described above.
FOIA, indeed, requires that any such “reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after the deletion of the portions which are exempt.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). While the Government is “entitled to a presumption that [it] complied with the obligation to disclose reasonably segregable material,” Hodge v. FBI,
The Court need only consider at this stage whether the government has met this burden in relation to those records upon which it has been granted partial summary judgment above, as the agency will need to review and justify its work with regard to its other withholdings in a new round of briefing. Looking only to those Exemption 6 redactions, then, the Court finds that the agency has indeed met its segregability obligations under FOIA. As detailed in the Carilli Declarations and the accompanying Vaughn Indi-ces itemizing each redaction made to the personal data and trustee performance evaluations (except Gugino’s), the agency has shown that it went line-by-line to determine whether any of the information contained therein was subject to the cited exemption. See Carilli Deck, ¶¶ 39, 47-48; Suppl. Carilli Deck, ¶29, 31-32. For any portion that was redacted, moreover, the agency has provided a specific claimed exemption detailing the information withheld and the reason that it felt such a redaction was justified under the statute. See 2015-2053 Vaughn Indices; 2016-2033 Vaughn Index. In each case, the information redacted is either minimal, such as a name, or wholly within the protection of the applicable exemption, such as a part of the performance evaluation.
Defendant is thus entitled to partial summary judgment on this issue to the extent that it implicates the aforementioned records. The Court may, however, examine a renewed segregability claim by Wisdom as to the other documents at issue once the agency has reviewed its withhold-ings and provided further justification for those redactions.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court will issue a contemporaneous Order granting partial summary judgment to Defendant, pursuant to Exemption 6, as to the withholdings that it made of personal information for various complainants and debtors, as well as to the performance evaluations of trustees other than Gugino. The Court will also grant partial summary judgment to Wisdom as to the search related to inquiry 2016-2033, meaning Defendant must conduct a new search. A genuine issue of material fact otherwise exists as to the adequacy of the other searches the government conducted, so USTP will either have to explain them in *130 more detail or renew the search process. Similarly, the government must offer farther detail to support its cited exemptions or turn over more material. The Court will also require that the agency produce Gugi-no’s performance evaluations for in camera review.