127 Iowa 350 | Iowa | 1904
The cases were not tried together, nor were they submitted in this court as one, but, as the questions arising are common to each case, they will be disposed of in one opinion.
Each of the plaintiffs purchased and paid for certain shares of stock in the defendant telephone company, upon the express agreement that each should receive for every share of stock one stockholder’s pass, good over all the lines and free'exchanges of the defendant, as and for a dividend on each share. It was further stipulated that in the event plaintiffs ceased using these passes, or assigned or transferred any of their stock, the plaintiffs or their assignees should thereupon and thereafter be entitled to dividends on their stock, the same as any other shareholder. As a part of the same transaction, it was expressly agreed by the defendant company that in the event it sold, assigned, or transferred any of its connections, franchises, or business in the State of Minnesota, it would, upon demand, repurchase from plaintiffs, at the par value thereof, any of the shares of stock then held by them; and plaintiffs, on their part agreed to accept in payment therefor the par value aforesaid. . These contracts were each made in the name of the defendant company, under its corporate seal, by its secretary and president. It is alleged in the petitions that the defendant sold its Minnesota lines, connections, franchises, and business to one Averill, or to the United Telephone & Telegraph Company; and it is also alleged that from and after August 21, 1901,, the transferee of this Minnesota business refused to recognize plaintiffs’ passes, and denies them the right to use the lines and free exchange connections purchased by it. Plaintiffs thereupon demanded of defendant that it repurchase the stock as agreed, and tendered the same to it. Defendant refused
The answers, which are identical, are long, and made up of many divisions and paragraphs. We shall not set them out m extenso, but content ourselves with stating the substance thereof, in connection with the claims now made by the defendant regarding the sufficiency thereof.
Aside from a point of practice which we shall hereafter note, defendant’s contentions are; (1) that the agreements to repurchase and for free passes were unauthorized by the defendant, and that its officers who made the agreements had no authority to do so; (2) that there was no consideration for the agreements to repurchase; and (3) that as there were a number of other persons who held stock in the defendant company, who had no right to free passes, and no such agreements for repurchase, and who purchased their stock without notice or knowledge of the agreements with plaintiffs, and as these agreements operated to diminish the value of the earnings and the assets of the company, to the prejudice of these other stockholders and.the creditors of the company, said promise of free passes and of repurchase were an undue and unjust discrimination in the plaintiff’s favor, to the prejudice of other stockholders and the general public, and/ therefore void as against public policy. The second matter of defense was withdrawn by the defendant, and it elected to rely upon the first and third. After the submission of the demurrers plaintiffs filed amendments to their petitions, to meet the second point made by the defendant, and to this defendant filed a general denial as a part of its answers. Thereupon plaintiffs filed motions to strike the first and third divisions of the answers, because they contained irrelevant and immaterial matter, did not state any defensive or issuable facts, and for the further reason that these divisions each showed completed transactions of which the defendant had had the benefit, and that it was now estopped from re
II. Tbe first divisions of tbe answers pleaded want of authority in tbe officers of the corporation to execute tbe contracts’ referred to and relied upon in tbe petitions, and want of power or legal authority to make tbe same. There is no denial of tbe execution of tbe contracts by tbe president and secretary in tbe name of tbe corporation and under its corporate seal, and this must be taken as a conceded fact, but it is claimed tbat tbe answers raise an issue as to tbe authority and power of’ tbe agents and of tbe corporation to make such
III. The second division of the answers, pleading want of consideration, was withdrawn, and to it we give no further attention.
This defense, as will be noticed, is made by the corporation itself, which has received all of the benefits of the transaction on its part. The agreement for free passes and to pay dividends is out of the case, save as it may bear on the question of fraud in the transaction, for, as already stated, that part' of the contract has, so far as this case is concerned, been fully executed, and is functus officio. But it is contended that the agreement to repurchase, which is as yet executory in character, cannot be enforced, for that, if it be recognized and sustained, it may and will diminish the earnings and assets of the company, to the prejudice of other stockholders and creditors. This is, in our judgment, the only debatable question in the case. There is no claim of any actual fraud in the transaction, and no suggestion of any secrecy with reference to the agreement. Moreover, there is no statement either in pleadings or argument that the stock is not worth what the defendant agreed to repurchase it for. Beliance is placed solely on statements to the effect that the other stockholders had no such privileges or agreements, and that said agreements to repurchase diminished the value of the earnings and the assets of the company, to the prejudice of other stockholders and creditors. It goes without saying that the enforcement of these contracts will take the amount paid for the repurchase of the stock out of the earnings and assets of the company. B'ut this is true in every case where a corporation is permitted to repurchase its own stock. However, its stockholders’ liability is reduced by that amount, and, in the absence of fraud or a plea of insolvency on the part of the corporation, we do not see how
The cases differ in many respects from most of those cited by counsel for the defendant company. In most of them the subscriber for stock was endeavoring to escape liability on his contract by reason of a contract or an understanding that he was not to be. liable thereon, .or that his liability was contingent or for only a part of the amount of the subscription price. This case involves no such question. Here the defendant corporation is endeavoring to escape liability on a contract for repurchase, of which it had the full benefit, because of some actual or implied fraud, or because the contract is void as being against public policy. We fail to see that any question of public policy is involved. A corporation may guaranty dividends upon its stock if it is so minded. To hold otherwise would be to set aside many contracts of the kind, which no one heretofore has thought of questioning. The free use of its lines was given as and for dividends, and the plaintiffs had the right at any time to renounce that part of the agreement and to accept regular dividends. It is not contrary to public policy for a corporation to repurchase its own stock. This has many times been held, not only by this court, but in other jurisdictions as well. Of course, fraud will defeat any contract; but no actual fraud is pleaded, nor is there any attempt to plead facts from which fraud might be inferred. At best, there is a mere suggestion or inference of fraud, but no sufficient facts are pleaded from which such inference may legitimately
The defendant is not a mutual company; it is purely a stock concern; and we know of no reason of public policy or of sound morals which inhibits it from making such contracts as are here sought to be enforced, in the absence of some showing of fraud or mata- fi-des. The public has no interest in such matters. Perhaps a case might be made where other stockholders or creditors could intervene, or in which creditors could enforce some liability against the plaintiffs, or object to the enforcement of the contracts, but no such questions are presented by this record. Plaintiffs paid full value for their stock when they purchased it, and were induced to purchase through the promises and agreements of the defendant, its officers and agents. To now allow the defendant to repudiate its agreements would be offering a premium upon wrongdoing. The plea of ultra vires is not looked upon with favor, and, when a corporation has received the benefits growing out of a contract, such contract will be enforced against it, unless it be entered into through fraud, or there be persuasive considerations of public policy
In order to recover in this case, plaintiffs are not required to rely uj>on an illegal contract. The agreement to repurchase the stock was neither ultra vires, illegal, nor immoral. There was no actual fraud, and no facts are stated from which fraud may legitimately be inferred. Stockholders may, in equity, sometimes set aside ultra vires. acts done by a corporation, which the corporation itself may not take advantage of. R. R. Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166 (26 L. Ed. 1015); 4 Thompson on Corporations, section 4483 et seq. But in such cases it must be shown that the conduct of the officers or directors works a substantial injury. However, speculation on this point is unnecessary, for the questions are not here at issue. We reach the conclusion that the third division of the answer presents no defense.