Wisconsin Community Services, Inc., and Wisconsin Correctional Service Foundation, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin

said, in profession someone who once a worked “Mob links hurt Rosemont casino a lot than hair singing that’s older Reading conjunction bid.” headline designing.” significant see two con- We article, with the full text of the the court cepts passage. says in this Roeper Knafel found that thé defendant characterized the having was an It “affair” with Jordan. is mobster, plaintiff not as a a person but as interpret imply that word to believed, is possibly erroneously, who to be a term longer relationship than is contem- organized figure. an crime In another plated prostitu- in the Illinois definitiоn of case, newspaper a article a said woman said, tion. Secondly, despite as we “kidnapped” daughter. her The court reluctance of counsel for the Sun-Times to construction, found an innocent in part argument, concede the obvious at oral “the ‘kidnapped’ because word does not Roeper certainly prostitu- almost refers to offense, necessarily denote a criminal but tion when he about an “older” profes- talks custody also used contexts to describe sion. But it is reasonable to read wrongful Harrison, taking of child.” passage saying although Knafel 1, 276 Ill.Dec. 793 N.E.2d at If 773. these having (i.e., longer an affair term examples subject are to an innocent con Jordan, relationship) demanding struction, the statements which Knafel money so much from him is demeaning she complains certainly judgment are. The say herself. does Roeper Knafel the district court is Affirmed. but, prostitution committed the crime of rather, she making herself sound like

she imply has. The words “sound like”

similarity, identity. short, In Roe-

per is hard on Knafel as revealed

headline of the column: “Is Karla Knafel’s really

affection worth million?” But his $5 (and reasonably subject easily)

words construction; i.e., an innocent one WISCONSIN COMMUNITY SER stops saying short she committed INC., VICES, and Wisconsin Correc crime. Foundation, Inc., tional Service Plain tiffs-Appellees,

Our is supported by conclusion other Illinois cases. example, For Antonelli v. Inc., v. Field Enterprises, 115 Ill.App.3d MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN, CITY OF 432, 188, (1983), 71 Ill.Dec. 450 N.E.2d 876 Defendant-Appellant. a news article was titled Me “Mobster v. dia” and plaintiff referred to the ‍​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‍as a No. 04-1966. “reputed mobster.” The court found those United States Court of Appeals, subject

words to an innocent construction. Seventh Circuit. in conjunction headline had be read with the story rest of the which the 3, Argued Jan. 2005. plaintiff was to as a “reputed referred Decided June mobster,” or about onе whom the word “supposedly,” “mobster” had perhaps been

“erroneously imputed.” Similarly, in Sala International,

mone Hollinger Inc.,

Ill.App.3d 283 Ill.Dec. 807 N.E.2d (2004), Chicago Sun-Times headline WI,

Robert Theine Pledl (argued), Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Jan (argued), A. Smokowicz Milwaukee Office, City Attorney’s Milwaukee, WI, for Defendant-Appellant. BAUER, EASTERBROOK,

Before and WOOD, Judges. Circuit EASTERBROOK, Judge. Circuit Community (WCS), Wisconsin Services nonprofit corporation, provides services for the prisoners benefit of former and persons drug-abuse with mental-health or problems. Its web site at www.wiscs.org the organization’s background describes operations, half-way current such as houses, alcohol drug-abuse treatment programs, and employment counseling. outpatient Its mental-health clinic in cen- overcrowded; tral Milwaukee is WCS 7,500-square-foot facility deems the inade- quate to serve the 400 clients who frequent search, purchased it. After building about one mile west of the exist- ing facility. (Technically Wisconsin Cor- rectional Service Foundation bought and WCS; leased it to we refer to both affili- “WCS.”) 20,000 ates as It wants to use square feet as a building this mental- health clinic. Because the in a structure is zone, operation business of a mental-health depends special-use clinic on a permit un- der Milwaukee’s zoning code. Mil- See waukeе Code Ordinances 295-603-1. Zoning Ap Milwaukee’s Board of peals hearing held and denied WCS’s request a special-use permit. for Its deci sion refused to take account federal statutes, such as Title of the Americans with Disabilities Act the Rehabilitation Act, may require governmental bodies exceptions to make for the benefit of dis persons. abled After the district court (and reminded the City) Board regulation, 28 C.F.R. 41.53. Milwaukee clause re- supremacy the Constitution’s to comply propriety actors does not and local either quires all state law, F.Supp.2d 842 regulations see 173 But gloss. with federal or see (E.D.Wis.2001), hearing was held. College new Community v. Southeastern same, because the Davis, was the 410-11, outcome 99 S.Ct. U.S. could have (1979) that WCS Board concluded (doubting the validi- 60 L.Ed.2d 980 space elsewhere. purchased leased ty regulation); gloss both the land within WCS’s 785 acres of More than L.C., 581, 592, Olmstead U.S. mental- preferred operating area ‍​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‍(1999) (reserv- 2176, 144 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. clinics; medical clinic are zoned for health decision). ing subjects these future from normal no Milwaukee’s deviation Housing The Fair Amendments to use required have been rules would Act, 3604(f)(3)(B), § 42 which cov U.S.C. the under normal of these sites. And express ground, ers contains an related stated, rules, special-use per- a the Board the requirement, and dis accommodation a medical inappropriate mit because regulation trict understood the court a the site could undermine rede- clinic at gloss the Title II and the Rehabili under that called for commer- plan velopment tation track the FHAA. See Wash Act to to be there. enterprise cial situated WCS ington High Athletic v. Indiana School court, grant- which returned to the federal (7th Cir.1999). Ass’n, 840, 845 n. 6 181 F.3d in its favor and summary judgment ed do us to Again parties not ask do requested City directed the to issue assume, given We shall otherwise. F.Supp.2d 1096 special-use permit. 309 contrary, (E.D.Wis.2004). argument lack of requires the Federal law identical, leads us to legal rules are which City accommodate the foundation’s Park, Building Richton clients, held, Hemisphere Co. v. court whether (7th Cir.1999), and 171 437 Good engaged discrimination F.3d Board Foundation, code v. zoning Shepherd has Inc. Mo whether or Manor (7th persons. mence, 557, Cir.2003), disparate impact 561-64 323 FHAA. arose under the both which ADA nor the Title of the Neither Act, § con- U.S.C. Rehabilitation 29 that Mil- court conсluded district provision. general tains a accommodation by per- waukee to accommodate WCS had ones, such specific lots of There are its new loca- mitting open it to clinic at requirement wheelchair-accessibility (a) clients need tion its disabled because transit, § but public see 42 U.S.C. (b) building more WCS space, general ac- There is a nothing general. option. its least-cost Then purchased was III, which rule in Title deals commodation would be a proposal that WCS’s found and services public accommodations of its finan- accommodation “reasonable” entities, 42 see operated private U.S.C. at F.Supp.2d cial 1104-08. situation. II, 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv), Title which organizations, Like other charitable governmental in the public services covers do more for for cash and can strapped realm, of accommodation lacks sort if it can situate facilities where its clients (or III in Title requirement to be found is highest. ratio benefit/cost I, we discuss be- that matter Title which Getting proposition from that low). requirement An accommodation permit must legal Milwaukee rule that by regulation, 28 been added to Title II is, however, a 35.130(b)(7), location preferred to the WCS its Rehabili- C.F.R. Building major Hemisphere plus problem by judicial gloss Act another tation —for (a judge decision that the district did not when mental-health clinics want to bend cite) FHAA clinics held that the does not the rules than when dental-health municipalities depart from request. their make same codes to reduce the cost at which disabled Some language Shepherd Good (or, here, can persons acquire housing might Manor be understood to support services). explained mental-health We judge’s district “ approach. We wrote: the reasonable-accommodation re reasonably ‘Failure to accommodate’ “rules, quirement applies policies, etc. liability. theory an alternative The the people that hurt handicapped by reason of ory entirely be if redundant it re handicap, their rather than that hurt them proof quired defendants’ actions solely by they what virtue of com were motivated animus toward the mon with people, other such as a limited handicapped. for the Indeed (em money”. amount F.3d at theory meaningful, accоmmodation to be phasis original). See also United States theory liability must be for cases (7th Palatine, 37 F.3d Cir. where we assume is a there valid reason 1994). city, city behind actions of the but the court got

The district off on the is liable nonetheless if failed to reason wrong by assuming foot that may ably “WCS handicap accommodate the of the [prevail] by showing plaintiff.” intentional discrimi 323 say F.3d at To that nation, disparate impact, or failure to reasonable accommodation is an “alterna not, make a theory however, reasonable accommodation.” 309 tive of is liability” added). F.Supp.2d (emphasis at 1104 As say theory independent that is of both explained Hemisphere Building, we in intentional discrimination and disparate requirement FHAA’s accommodation impact; is that would Hemisphere contradict not free standing. Building, See also Brandt v. which panel Shep Good (7th Cir.1996). Chebanse, 172 82 Ac herd Manor did not purport to do. We commodation in parlance the FHAA’s is this of passage Shepherd understand Good by impact the means disparate which as a of point Manor restatement made zoning alleviated. If building-code Hemispherе Building: or reasonable ac heavily rule bears more on than theory commodation is a independent of city on other persons, change must intentional discrimination because it is the rules to necessary the extent disparate to redress which impact means is allevi In adverse effect. panel absence dis ated. The Shepherd Good Manor however, parate impact, there no suggest need did not a duty there is for accommodation under FHAA. accommodate regulations when laws and disparate neither discriminate nor cause A requirement imposes equal cost Proof of effects. one or the other is essen all persons on dispa- does have such a tial. (disabled impact. everyone rate as Just or not) housing needs prefer According WCS, would Supreme Court (disabled less, not) pay everyone so disapproved approach or this court’s in US Barnett, needs prefer medical care and would to Airways, Inc. v. U.S. (2002). pay less. If applies Milwaukee the same S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 589 That rules to clinics dental- seniority mental-health decision considered systems how clinics, health 12112(b)(5)(A), § there is nеither discrimina- interact with U.S.C. tion nor disparate impact. The statutes do the accommodation I requirement Title ADA, city forgiving to be more of the which employment. covers find form The district court did not as a discrimi- This section defines accommo- making zoning nation “not rules more Milwaukee’s bear heavi physical or mental to the known dations ly on kind of medical services that the indi- qualified of an otherwise limitations especially frequently disabled need than on applicant an disability who is vidual with of medical that all kinds services mem entity such employee, unless сovered populace require. bers of the Milwaukee’s the accommodation can demonstrate that rules, its criteria zoning stated on hardship an undue impose would treat special-use permits, mental-health such covered operation of business identically. clinics Both dental-health obligation that an entity”. Barnett held “health clinics” under system almost al- depart seniority from a See Milwaukee scheme. Code Ordi “impose hardship” an undue ways would (definition), nances 295-7-31 295-59- business, did not though Court on criteria). parties 5.5 (special-use possibility that modifica- rule out the some agree that more than 785 acres zoned for tions not do so. use “health lie clinics” within WCS’s ADA, governs Title II of the which clinic, preferred area for its new and that claim, compara- any language lacks WCS’s have purchased space WCS could or leased 12112(b)(5)(A). §to accommoda- ble of this land—and would done FHAA, from which requirement tion of the cost, so but for the which it deemed exces borrowed, has the rule of decision been parties sive. The debate whether WCS different structure. Instead di- search; thorough out a carried Milwaukеe per- recting employer treat disabled says diligence that with more WCS could solicitude, does, I Title special sons with have acquired properly building a zoned the FHAA defines as discrimination “a budget. acknowledges within its this WCS make accommoda- refusal to says but that its search was reasonable. rules, practices, or policies, tions in ser- however, law, the this On our view of vices, may be when such accommodations for Searching is irrelevant: bar debate necessary person equal op- to afford such gains any no for than for is harder WCS enjoy dwelling” to a portunity use market, entity in so other the real-estate added). (emphasis point The of this clause the need to search is not source opportunity” which, “equal is to assure — Hemisphere Building, disparate impact. in we concluded the means freedom from adverse effects in costs experience WCS would extra local laws and rules that affect disabled market, as it would need going back disability, yet persons because of that do brokerage pay to another commission pose equivalent but non- problems might capital loss need to absorb regulation persons. The Title prices dropped, if real estate have (though, FHAA, to clause in the is similar this of a new expect gain buyer it as a could accommodations that “are neces- requiring old), as a seller of the but site what loses sary 28 C.F.R. to avoid discrimination”. ex perspective is ante. appropriate 35.130(b)(7). in Nothing under- Barnett any rights not obtain extra under WCS did way opportuni- mines read “equal we building buying law while federal ty” Hemisphere Building. in language up in air. Other- special-use issue was problem fi- The that WCS encountered is city strong-arm аnyone wise could nancial, pose and Milwaukee’s rules making a expedient of commitment financial to all would- same considerations then the sunk More- pointing costs. property. be users of over, (7th Cir.2002). Milwaukee, experienced WCS in re- success questing special-use permits zoning up barking wrong Milwaukee is tree variances for its other facilities. Over that arguing judges federal must “defer” years requested special WCS has treat- to local deciding codes when what ment of seven parcels, and six of these accommodations are reasonable. Federal requests granted have been but the rules; supersede statutes state and local —all impact involved in this suit. Disparate one whether an is accommodation difficult to say is see. We don’t is law, required is one of though federal however; impossible, may have more WCS proposed extent which a accommodation evidence offer. disrupt would state must policy weigh balance, predeces as Barnett and its hope may best for WCS lie also, e.g., sors See show. Ansonia Board discrimination, showing subject actual Philbrook, 60, Educatiоn 479 U.S. 67- the district court did reach. (1986) 107 S.Ct. 93 L.Ed.2d 305 testimony Much before Board of (discussing accommodation under Title VII Zoning Appeals evinced antipathy to a 1964); of the Civil Rights Act Trans mental-health clinic that would include Airlines, Hardison, World Inc. v. 432 U.S. many among released convicts clientele. 63, 84, (1977) 97 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d That exemplified some witnesses the “not (same). Our difficulty the district my yard” back approach does not neces court’s resolution ques concerns initial (for sarily mean that the Board took that tion whether WCS is entitled to ac bidden) view, community it did refer to commodation, and is the issue on opрosition as one reason for its decision. parties which the now should concentrate This if implies that WCS or some other their attention. organization had proposed use the same building perform checkups for a HMO vacated, judgment and the case provide outpatient kidney dialysis, the proceedings remanded further consis- Board might yes. well said Such a opinion. tent with this difference in treatment would discrimi be

natory, and be entitled to re ‍​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‍WOOD, Circuit Judge, dissenting. lief under federal law. Whether the Board question This case raises the whether acted with discriminatory ques intеnt ais City of required Milwaukee was under tion of fact whose resolution in belongs Title II with Americans Disabilities first instance to the district court. See (ADA), 42 § Act seq., U.S.C. 12131 et Swint, 273, Pullman-Standard 456 U.S. Act, § the Rehabilitation 29 U.S.C. 794 et (1982). 102 S.Ct. 72 L.Ed.2d 66 The seq., permit to issue a special-use for the may court need to take additional evidence outpatient new mental health clinic that subject, on this rather than limit consider (WCS) plaintiffs trying were to estab- Board, ation to the made record before the lish. The Milwaukee code did itas has done far. so use, flatly prohibit this require did parties

One final remark. special-usе permit The properties for in located have devoted considerable to de energy the area where WCS wanted to locate. bating proposed whether the Concluding accommoda City required aas reasonable, if tion in required one is of law matter to make reasonable accom- (and order to intentional overcome discrimina to modations WCS’s disabled clients or disparate impact. WCS), tion It is. Oco See hence to and that WCS had shown nomowoc Programs, Residential Inc. v. special-use permit was such 35.130(b)(7)(ADA). accommodation, also 28 C.F.R. See district reasonable (containing C.F.R. 41.53 similar in 28 summary judgment granted court implementing the Rehabilitation provision City to issue favor ordered WCS’s Act). regulation says nothing That about majority has vacated that The permit. pre-existing to prove an antecedent need for further the case and remanded order disparate im- intentional discrimination of the whether consideration Instead, prophylactic pact. authorizes City’s to can show that the refusal “necessary to measures that are avoid dis- dis- permit stemmed from actual grant disability,” un- crimination on basis mentally against disabled crimination entity satisfy regulatory less the can facility. I no quarrel users WCS’s justification. showing that such proposition with the way straightforward The most to view view, In my relief. would entitle WCS obligation is as an to take this affirmative however, proceedings further unneces- necessary to steps bring that are already successful- sary, because WCS has up available to the disabled to the services permit it is entitled to the ly shown that enjoy, level the nondisabled which the “reasonable accommodation” under require giving one sense will some benefits ADA in Title of the theory recognized unnecessary to the that are for I there- Act. would and the Rehabilitation A their more fortunate fellow citizens. affirm. fore mobility problem with no would person ramp; miss a person never a wheelchair acknowledges, Title II majority theAs has vision no need an audi Act 20/20 the ADA and the Rehabilitation signal in an elevator that the desired ble against discrimination prohibit intentional But accom floor has been reached. those disabilities, well persons with qualified essential for the disabled modations are disparate impact that have a as measures equal public ser person enjoy access (Henceforth only I refer on the disabled. recognized Supreme Court this vices. all ADA, it is identical for to the because when, concept Airways, Inc. v. Bar US case the Reha- purposes material this nett, U.S. S.Ct. Act.) disagree over we bilitation Where (2002), it acknowledged that L.Ed.2d 589 II of ADA extent which Title “will accommodations some independently obliges persons covered also pro conduct to times affirmative make reasonable accommodations entry intо the people of disabled mote responsible for agency the disabled. 401, 122 Id. at work force.” S.Ct. ADA, Depart- the U.S. administering the Although held that the normal Barnett Justice, a regulation ment issued employer not be run of cases an such an obli- unambiguously imposes that seniority fide to override a bona required gation: to accommodate a disabled system order entity make public A shall reasonable needs, it held that the employee’s also policies, practices or modifications to that be entitled show employee would modifications procedures when the finding circumstances warrant “special the avoid on necessary seniority discrimination that, of a despite presence the disability, public of the enti- ..., basis unless requested ‘accommodation’ system the the making particular can that Id. ty demonstrate on the facts.” is ‘reasonable’ fundamentally pur alter 122 At least for modifications would 1516. at S.Ct. therefore, service, ADA, the program or of Title I of poses the nature of imposes spe requirement accommodation activity. 650

cial on responsibilities employers majority position that The that its concedes could not from inten be derived either the is inconsistent with that language appears theory dispa Shepherd, tional discrimination or Good the court where wrote “ ‘[fjailure impact theory. rate that unequivocally reasonably theory accommodate’ is an alternative of True, says, majority but we are deal- 646; liability.” Ante at quoting 323 F.3d ing statute, with II of the it does Title at In an to squeeze effort Good not contain same lan- accommodation theory into Shepherd its own of the FHAA guage Literally I. that speaking, as Title is ADA, suggеsts hence it that rea- true, majority but I do not understand the independent sonable accommodation is an holding Department be that Jus- only theory by insofar it is “the means authority tice its it exceeded when issued disparate which impact is alleviated.” implementing regulations interpreting Ante at 646. But is what Good requirements II. Title the con- To said. Shepherd There is difference be- trary, taking it states it is not issue a theory liability remedy tween and a regulation, with C.F.R. 28 a proven problem violation. The not, 35.130(b)(7), § in this case. If then majority’s reasoning is reflected approach Barnеtt’s accom- assumption that the can suffer a binding modation on us here: the lan- deprivation of public access to services and 35.130(b)(7) guage § substantively ‍​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‍(a) programs only if regulations laws and language identical to the Court (b) them, actively against discriminate or I, in Title construing 42 U.S.C. regulations laws and produce disparate ef- 12112(b)(5)(A). theories, however, Both of fects. these majority avoids this outcome comparison between the effect of looking to two cases this court decided has practice on group the favored and the closely anаlogous Housing under the Fair practice effect on the disfavored (FHAA), Amendments Act 42 U.S.C. group here, the disabled. — namely, 3601 eb seq.; Hemisphere Bldg. Park, (7th Co. v. Richton problem many is that there are Cir.1999), Good Shepherd Manor services facilities that are of interest Foundation, Momence, only Inc. 323 F.3d disabled people, such as the ramps (7th Cir.2003). cases, argues, Those and the audible elevator announcements actually demonstrate that there is no situations, inde- mentioned earlier. In those pendent requirement accommodation un- way prove there wоuld never be either Instead, der of these statutes. impact, individual animus or un- disparate requirement accommodation no inde- the latter theory applied less were far all; pendent remedy force at is merely broadly normally more than it is. Recall practices that have a disparate impact disparate theory impact was born in Co., As the majority Griggs disabled. sees the v. Duke Power U.S. world, (1971), the absence of im- disparate “[i]n S.Ct. 28 L.Ed.2d 158 where the pact ... is no there need for accommoda- Court considered the whether a FHAA,” extension, tion under the or high diploma school requirement GED under II the ADA. hiring Title of Ante at 646. or having for transfer a dispa- was (It explain why logic Here, does not on impact minority same rate candidates. ADA, apply would not to Title I only of the the disabled would have interest except acknowledge issue; to that in facility Barnett fore- the particular service or at argument.) closes this because the nondisabled are indifferent to services, handicap. health in con it, way prove a to Mental never be there would trast, important by uniquely people impact thаt are required disproportionate city with If a were mental disabilities. to Moreover, to the statistics needed theory. entirely territory, out zone them of its on often un- impact will be disparate show theory mentally people that disabled available to disabled. unpleasant neighbors are visitors or to not, contrary I favor does approach The establishments, commercial its action majority’s implication, one to the disability would be taken reason of the silently Shepherd that to conclude Good it violate the ADA. would What has in earliеr Hemi- overruled our decision happened than something here is less total Building. Hemisphere In Build- sphere exclusion, just that but that means there is case, developer FHAA a ar- ing, another Here, explored. a factual to be both re-zoning that he was entitled to gued reasonably the district court concluded that he permit so could special-use and a enough trigger that the exclusion was to for wheel- build two four-unit residences Moreover, duty to accommodate. persons. re-zon- chair-bound Without noting worth that the court also found that free to ing, would have been build he “the clinic not City conflict with for the same identical residences suitable (309 zoning” F.Supp.2d only homes instead of population, but six (E.D.Wis.2004)); special that uses like the to eight, charge he would have had inherently as recognized clinic not in facts, higher for them. these we price On (id.); compatible the area with Village duty under no held that the was only have did the board zoning practices. duty of change accommodation, power to make this accommodation had be con- power this was that “the Milwaukee rules, policies, praсtices ser- fined to Zoning has ex Appeals] [Board BOZA of “by that hurt the disabled reason vices of previous analogous willingly ercised on oc that hurt handicap, their rather than them (173 (E.D.Wis. F.Supp.2d casions” they virtue of what in com- solely by 2001)). other such as limited people, mon with summary, right In this court had it money housing.” spend amount of when it Shepherd Good identified three (emphasis original). at 440 under separate ways proving a claim court’s decision here fits The district FHAA, is no to shrink and there reason within comfortably the rule announced down to two for a claim number equally and is cоn Hemisphere Building ADA and brought under Title of the found Good sistent with elaboration majority’s ap- Act. The Rehabilitation rules, Shepherd. prac It on the focused implement- with the proach is inconsistent etc., tices, that hurt and its clients II, regulations under and it risks ing Title disabilities, op their mental as because of barring having the unfortunate effect money, physical lack of their posed to their just they relief when from appearance, or other characteristics that public entity is fail- need most: when they many only members of the ing provide share a service that dis- neеd, general public. cheaper The desire circumstances abled would under dispa- Hemisphere which was what discrimination and housing, where intentional end, prove impossible all in the Building impact about rate would be only way disabled, practical thus a limita matter. to the limited expand housing would be to supply cheap tion in does avoid such a result well disparate impact be- understanding not hurt the disabled reason their yond historical Perhaps boundaries. majority contemplates

that is what the view, In my

its remand. the district understanding

court’s of the law was cor-

rect, findings supported and its of fact are affirm, I the record. I respectfully

therefore dissent. RUTTENBERG,

Andrew

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNITED LIFE STATES INSURANCE ‍​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‍City York, in the of New

COMPANY

subsidiary of American General Cor

poration, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 04-1653. Appeals, States Court of

United

Seventh Circuit.

Argued 2004. Nov.

Decided June 2005. En July Banc

Rehearing Denied

Case Details

Case Name: Wisconsin Community Services, Inc., and Wisconsin Correctional Service Foundation, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Date Published: Jun 29, 2005

Citation: 413 F.3d 642

Docket Number: 04-1966

Court Abbreviation: 7th Cir.