81 Wis. 1 | Wis. | 1891
Lead Opinion
When the cause was called for trial, and before offering any evidence, the plaintiff moved to strike out the answer as frivolous, and for judgment in its favor upon the pleadings. This motion was based upon the fact that the answer, after admitting certain facts, alleges, upon ■information and belief, in effect, that each and every material allegation of the complaint not so admitted “ is false •and untrue, and therefore denies the same.” Error is assigned because the court overruled such motion. It is
The learned counsel for the plaintiff assigns error because the court, in the ninth finding, found that there was a discrepancy, unexplained by the testimony, between the amount of taxes actually levied for school purposes and all other purposes at the town, meeting and by the town board, and the amount carried out on the statement annexed to the tax roll, and he insists that the court should have found as proposed by him. The statement of the several amounts found as being annexed to the tax roll for 1888 are all contained in the proposed finding. Each contains $6,000, and no more, for school purposes, and $6,359.74 “for all other purposes” not therein otherwise mentioned. Of this $6,359.14, it is admitted in the record that $4,424.12 was for road purposes, or, as the proposed finding puts it, $1,000 for highway tax, exclusive of the two-mill tax, which was $1,424.12, and $2,000 for two bridges, one over Trout brook and the other over Silver creek. This would leave a balance under the head of “ all other purposes ” of $1,935.62, of which counsel claim $907.45 was for taxes found to be omitted in previous years, and that the balance of $1,028.17 was never voted or assessed for any purpose. But the court by the third finding found, in effect, that October 3, 1887, the town board of school directors voted that the estimate of appropriations needed for school purposes for the ensuing year be $8,000, giving the items as mentioned in the foregoing statement; and by the fourth finding found, in effect, that at the annual meeting in 1888 the board of audit recommended an appropriation of the same amount for school purposes; and by the tenth finding found that there was actually levied at the town
These several findings are sustained by the evidence. Thus it appears that there was omitted from the tax roll $2,000, which had in fact been levied for “ school purposes,” and a corresponding amount arbitrarily added to the item therein for “ all other purposes; ” so that the aggregate amount in the tax roll was really less than the amount actually levied and assessed, and that, too, without taking into account the $907.45 of taxes which had been omitted in previous years. Since the plaintiff was not required to pay any more than its proportionate share of the taxes actually levied and assessed, the question recurs whether the irregularity thus pointed out required the trial court, as a court of equity, to restrain the collection of the taxes in the case at bar. The statute expressly requires this court to disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings not affecting the substantial rights of , the appellant. Sec. 2829, E. S. This court has frequently refused to re
Counsel insists that tbe taxes are invalid by reason of defective proceedings in reference to tbe school and highway taxes prior to tbe town meeting. These irregularities arel indicated in the findings of the court, and are mentioned'in the foregoing statement. They are to the effect that sub-school-districts numbered 2 and 8, respectively, did not hold annual meetings, as required by law, in 1887; that the respective clerks thereof did not transmit, to the secretary of. the town board of school directors a written verified report for the year 1887, as required bylaw; that the school taxes for the ensuing year were voted in the absence of such reports ; that the secretary of the school board did not make to the board of supervisors a written statement showing the moneys received and disbursed for the year 1887; that the town board did not render to the board of audit, at its annual meeting in 1888, the written'statement required by secs. 820, 1226, R. S. In Fifield v. Marinette Co. 62 Wis. 532, the trial court, on the default of the defendants, set aside certain tax certificates as a cloud upon the plaintiff’s title, by reason of the assessor’s failure to sign or verify the assessment roll on which the sale was made, upon which the certificates were issued; and this court reversed the judgment, and held that a “ court of equity will not set aside or enjoin the collection of a tax for mere irregularities in the tax proceedings, unless the taxes justly chargeable to the property are first paid or tendered in all cases where such taxes are ascertainable. A complaint, which does not allege in direct terms the injustice and inequality of the tax, and further allege a state of facts which, if proved on the trial, would establish the truth of the gen
It is claimed that the taxes were void by reason of several thousand acres of land of unequal value being arbitrarily assessed at the uniform rate of $100 for each forty. But the statute prescribing the duties of the board of review, and in force when the assessment in question was
This brings us to the alleged illegality of the town meeting at which the taxes in question were assessed. At the annual town meeting of the town, held April 5,1887, a resolution was adopted to the effect that the next town meeting of the town should be held at the court house in the city of Ashland. It was lawful for the town to thus provide for holding its next town meeting in the city. Ch. 162, Laws of 1883; S. & B. Ann. Stats, sec. 783a. The time for opening the polls at such town meeting to be so held at the court house in the city was April 3,1888, at 9 a. m. Secs. 29, 782, S. & B. Ann. Stats. The town board met at the time and place named, and adjourned to the Shores block, as mentioned in the foregoing statement. The statute provides that, “ whenever it shall become impossible or inconvenient to hold a town meeting, at the place designated therefor, the town board of inspectors, or a majority of them, after having assembled at or as near as practicable to such place amd opened the meeting, and before receiving any votes, ma}'adjourn suoh meeting to the nearest convenient place for holding the same, and at such adjourned place forthwith
Since the section of the statute quoted required the board, as inspectors, to proceed at such adjourned place forthwith with the meeting, and, since they did so proceed at 9 o’clock a. m., it may fairly be inferred that the meeting at the court house was, at most, but a few minutes before that time. Besides, the board was composed of officers acting under the sanction of an oath, and some presumptions may be fairly indulged in favor of the legality of their action. Tainter v. Lucas, 29 Vis. 375; State ex rel. Willis v. Prince, 45 Wis. 613. In speaking of the action of the county boards, it was said by the present chief justice, in Hark v. Gladwell, 49 Wis. 177, that ‘‘it will not do to apply to the orders and resolutions of such bodies nice verbal criticism and strict parliamentary distinctions, because the business is transacted generally by plain men, not familiar with parliamentary law. Therefore their proceedings must be lib
But it is contended, in effect, that even if the town board met at the court house at substantially the time prescribed by law, yet that it does not affirmatively appear from the findings or the records that it was “ impossible or inconvenient ” to hold the meeting at that place. Manifestly the statute did not require that it should be impossible to hold it at that place; otherwise the words “ or inconvenient ■would not have been used in the statute. Such words are-flexible in their meaning, and were necessarily addressed to-the good judgment of the board. The same may be said, of the objection that it does not affirmatively appear that room 15, Shores block, was “the nearest convenient place”' to the court house for holding such meeting.
But it is further contended, in effect, that it does not affirmatively appear that the board opened the meeting at the court house, or upon such adjournment caused proclamation thereof to be made, etc. It will be observed that-the section quoted does not prescribe that any persons, other than the town board shall be included in such meeting at the time of such adjournment. It could only include • those electors- of the town who happened to be present. There is a possibility of its including the great bódy of such electors, or even all. But the probabilities, confirmed by experience, are that but very few, if any, aside from the members of the board, are likely to be present at the opening of such meeting. It is enough to know that the statute only requires the presence of the town board, and it does not even require that they should all be present. The language of the section is that “ the towm board of inspectors, or a, majority of them, after having assembled . . . mid opened the meeting, . . . may adjourn such meeting,” etc. Manifestly it is not essential that any one should be present, at the time of such adjournment, except a ma
It is true the statute quoted requires that, upon such adjournment, the board shall cause proclamation thereof to be made, etc.' The only purpose of requiring such proclamation to be made is to inform the electors who happen to be present at the time, and who might not otherwise know, of what had transpired. The adjournment must necessarily precede the proclamation of it. At most, the proclamation could only be co-extensive with the persons present to be so informed. If none were present except the members of the board who voted the adjournment upon the motion made, then the making of such proclamation would furnish no information to any one. The object of such proclamation is similar to the object of the requirement to station a constable or other proper person at the place where the meeting was so opened, to notify such electors as might subsequently arrive of such adjournment and the place to which the meeting had been so adjourned. If there is any difference in their importance, it may be inferred that the proclamation is of the least importance, since those present at the time of such adjournment would be very likely to ascertain the fact.
We must conclude that there was a valid town meeting. To hold otherwise would require a too strained and finical construction of the statutes for the practical administration of town affairs.
By the dourt.— The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
It is clear to my mind that the alleged town meeting, at which the town taxes in question were levied, was in fact no legal meeting.
The statute provides that whenever it is impossible or inconvenient to hold the meeting at the designated place, the inspectors,-after having assembled at or as near as practicable to such place, “ and opened the meeting,” may adjourn “ such meeting ” to the nearest convenient place, and
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the views of Mr. Justice Winslow, above expressed.