Lead Opinion
(on reassignment).
[¶ 1.] Steven J. Wipf sued Dr. Terry Altstiel and Regional Health Physicians Inc. (Appellants) for medical malpractice. Through discovery, Wipf sought access to operative notes and postoperative notes relating to follow-up care of some of Dr.
Fads and Procedural History
[¶ 2.] On April 22, 2011, Dr. Altstiel performed a laparoscopic hernia repair on Wipf at the Spearfish Regional Surgery Center (SRSC). The purpose of the surgery was to repair a tear or opening in Wipfs abdominal wall. Dr. Altstiel completed the surgery around 10:00 a.m., and Wipf was discharged around 4:00 p.m. Wipf was advised to notify his doctor if he experienced any unusual pain or developed a fever.
[¶ 3.] The following day, Wipf contacted SRSC to report that he was experiencing pain in his upper back, he had a fever, and he had been unable to have a bowel movement since prior to surgery. SRSC advised Wipf to go to the emergency room, and Wipf went to the Sturgis Regional Hospital (SRH). The emergency-department doctor found that Wipf did not have a fever or bowel blockage. Although Wipfs primary complaint was pain, he had not been taking his prescribed pain medication. Wipf was advised to take the pain medication and return if he felt that his condition worsened.
[¶4.] Wipf returned to SRH’s emergency department three nights later. He reported that he felt nauseous and that he still had been unable to have a bowel movement. Wipf was admitted to the hospital for observation, and he underwent a CT scan of his abdomen the following morning. The scan revealed fluid and air in the abdomen near an opening in the mid-small bowel. SRH transferred Wipf to the Rapid City Regional Hospital, where he underwent surgery with Dr. Larry Wehrkamp. Dr. Wehrkamp discovered two perforations in the small bowel that measured approximately two centimeters in size.
[¶5.] Wipf later sued Appellants for malpractice. Wipf alleged that Dr. Altst-iel accidentally perforated Wipfs small bowel during the laparoscopic hernia repair. Wipf also alleged that Dr. Altstiel failed to inspect and find the perforations before completing the surgery. Dr. Altst-iel contended that he inspected Wipfs bowel prior to concluding the surgery and that no perforations were present. Wipf, however, pointed out that Dr. Altstiel did not note the claimed inspection in his operative note. Dr. Altstiel’s expert also testified that for him to opine that Dr. Altstiel violated the standard of care, Wipf would have to show an unacceptably high complication rate in similar procedures with- different patients, ■ Because Dr. Altstiel estimated that he had conducted approximately 955 laparoscopic hernia repairs over thirtеen years, and because Dr. Altstiel’s expert testified in his deposition that it would be relevant to consider the past 200-300 procedures, Wipf requested production of Dr. Altstiel’s operative notes involving this procedure for the prior five years, including medical reports or notes that related to follow-up care. The circuit court found those records relevant, ordered the doctor and clinic to “redact from these records the personal identifiers for each patient,”' and ordered them to produce the remaining redacted information.
' [¶ 6.] For purposes of appeal, Dr. Altstiel concedes that the redacted information is relevant.
Decision
, [¶ 7.] The physician-patient privilege, codified in SDCL 19 — 19—503(b), protects a physician-patient’s “confidential communications made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment.” But the language of the statute does not-address information in a doctor’s records that does not identify the patient and cannot be. traced back to. the patient. Additionally, unlike some jurisdictions that have passed medical information privacy acts or patient’s rights legislation that more broadly protect medical information, see 3 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 514.12[5][c] (Mark S. Brodin, ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed.1998), the South Dakota Legislature has not done so.
[¶ 8.] The text of SDCL 19-19-503 does not protect all of a physician’s “medical records.” Rather, it only protects physician-patient “confidential communications” contained in medical records. SDCL 19-19-503(b). Because the text of SDCL 19-19-503(b) fails to address either the disclosure of anonymous, nonidentify-ing information or whether nonidentifying information is a physician-patient “confidential communication,” it is informative to consider the cases from other jurisdictions that have similar rules protecting physician-patient “confidential communications.” With almost unanimity, the courts applying analogous rules protecting physician-patient “confidential communications” hold that when adequate safeguards ensure the anonymity of the patient, relevant, noni-dentifying information is not privileged;
• [¶ 9.] Additionally, even courts interpreting broader privilege rules protecting “any communication” or “any information” hold that relevant, adequately protected, nonidentifying information is not privileged. See Ziegler v. Superior Court,
[The physician-patient privilege] shields from disclosure certain information communicated between a physician or a mental health therapist and a patient, so long as the information “is communicated in confidence” and for the purpose of diagnosis and treatment of the patient. Under [the physician-patient privilege], communicating information contemplates an exchange of information between a physician and a patient. . In short, to be operative, [the privilege] requires two actors — a patient and a physician,, and an exchange of confidential information concerning a particular subject matter — diagnosis and treatment. All of these elements must be present for the privilege to be activated; mere descriptions of diagnoses and treatments that make no reference to а patient are ineligible for protection under [the privilege]. Indeed, the presence of identifying information and the orders of the court are what make the information privileged. Without an identified individual connected to a diagnosis, the diagnosis contains nothing more than medical terminology. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York cogently explained this concept:
that any record containing a diagnosis, an evaluation or a treatment, even if it cannot be connected with a patient, is privileged — is not self evident. ... [0]ne might argue, as a matter of theory, that the use of the disjunctive in the [rule] means that any document containing a patient’s identity or diagnosis or evaluation or treatment is privileged.... Such a construction, however, would lead to preposterous results. A scrap of paper upon which a physician had jotted down a patient’s name, or wrote only the word “indigestion” (a diagnosis) or “aspirin” (a treatment) or “malingеring” (an evaluation) would, or at least could, be privileged. The ... rule-makers could not possibly have so intended.
Staley,
[¶ 11.] To ensure that privileged information is not disclosed, the circuit court must ensure that the information to be disclosed is nonidentifying. No third-party patient can be associated with the information. Additional safeguards such as protective orders should also be considered. The cases considering patient, anonymity have required such things as: redaction of all personal information as well as any information that would tend to identify a patient; sealing documents; prohibiting the attorneys and parties from attempting to learn the identities of the patients or making contact with them; and prohibiting any person that viewed the information from disclosing any of the informatiоn. See Ziegler,
[¶ 12.] In this case, the circuit court required Dr. Altstiel to “redact the personal identifiers for each patient, in-eluding the patient’s name, address, phone number, date of birth, and social security number.” The court did not, however, require redaction of other information that could identify the patient, such as the patient’s medical history or information regarding family members. There is also no indication that the court considered whether identification of the patient could occur because of the size of the community. This could be significant because as Dr. Altstiel points out, Sturgis and Meade Counties have small populations, which could lead to identification of a patient; Cf. Staley,
[¶ 13.] Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opin
Notes
. The circuit court required redaction by Dr. Altstiel and the clinic before disclosing the information. The court's order provided:
Defendant shall provide to Plaintiff copies of all the medical records (beginning with the operative note and including all medical reports or notes generated for the next 30 days that in any way related to care for, or recovery from, the laparoscopic hernia repair surgery) for each patient on which Dr.Terry L. Altstiel performed laparoscopic hernia repair surgery during the years 2009 through 2013;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall redact from those records the personal identifiers for eаch patient, including the patient’s name, address, phone number, date of birth, and social security number, prior to disclosing these records to Plaintiff....
. The records sought in this case would not be discoverable in many malpractice cases because they would not be relevant, However, in this case, Dr, Altstiel’s expert made the information relevant in his deposition testimony, and Dr. Altstiel does not contest the court's relevancy determination for purposes of this appeal.
. The Chief Justice’s dissent contends that the plain text of SDCL 19-19-503 is broad enough to cover all medical records, whether identifying or nonidentifying. CJ. Gilbert-son’s dissent ¶¶ 18, 20. Both dissenting opinions point out that we have applied the privilege in SDCL 19 — 19—503 to a doctor’s treatment records. See, e.g., Shamburger v. Behrens,
. The only cases that have concluded noni-dentifying information may be privileged are inapposite. For example, Baker v. Oakwood
. The dissenting opinions contend that we should not follow the virtually unanimous rule because those cases eschew a ''plain-text” analysis of the language. See C.J. Gil-bertson’s dissent ¶ 21; J. Severson’s dissent ¶¶ 38-39. However, there is no dispute that SDCL 19-19-503 does not address anonymous, nonidentifying information that has no
. In light of this disposition, we need not address the other arguments raised on appeal.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
[¶ 16.] This case involves nothing more than a question of statutory construction. However, the majority's decision today results in serious damage to patient privacy by judicially creating a redaction exception to SDCL 19-19-503, South Dakota’s physiciаn-patient privilege.
[¶ 17.] .1. Analysis of South Dakota’s physician-patient privilege
[¶ 18.] In determining whether SDCL 19-19-503 applies to redacted patient records, this Court must first examine the plain language of the statute. E.g., Pitt-Hart v. Sanford USD Med. Ctr.,
[¶19.] In light of the foregoing, the onus is on the majority to demonstrate how under the plain text of SDCL 19-19-503 a confidential communication (e.g., a medical record, see supra ¶ 18) ceases to be either confidential or a communication when redacted. The majority fails to do so. I can only assume that in the majority’s view, the removal of identifying information from a medical record renders what was a “confidential communication” merely a • “communication.” However, as noted above, a communication is confidential “if not intended to be disclosed to third persons[.]” SDCL 19-19-503(a)(4) (emphasis added). The word intend means “[t]o have in mind a fixed purpose to reach a desired objective” or “to have as one’s purpose[.]” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed.2014). Thus, in order for redaction to remove the “confidential” quality of a communication, redaction would have to actually create a “fixed purpose” in the mind of the patient to disclose the communication to a third pаrty. But passive assent is not active intent, so even if hundreds of Dr. Altstiel’s patients would passively accept the dissemination of their redacted medical records (assuming they even find out about it), that is a far cry from having a “fixed purpose” of providing their medical information to Wipf. Therefore, under the plain text of SDCL 19-19-508, a medical record is confidential as long as the patient does not- intend to disseminate it, regardless of whether it has been redacted.
[¶ 20.] Instead of explaining how a patient medical record ceases to be a confidential communication under SDCL 19-19-503 when redacted, the majority merely observes that SDCL 19-19-503 “does not address the disclosure of .anonymous, nonidentifying information!!]” Supra ¶ 8. According to the majority, this observation “alone should - end any ‘plain text’ argument.” Supra ¶10 n. 5.
[¶ 21.] Despite the plain text of SDCL 19-19-503, the majority relies on a number of decisions from other jurisdictions holding that the disclosure of redacted medical records does not violate the purposes of their respective physician-patient privileges. See supra ¶¶ 8-10.
[¶22.] The rule of the foregoing decisions should be rejеcted even if we ignore the plain text of SDCL 19-19-503. The cases relied on by the majority essentially conclude that disclosing third-party medical records does not violate the physician-patient privilege if the patient’s identity is not disclosed. However, South Dakota’s physician-patient privilege is not merely concerned with a patient’s privacy. It “expresses a long-standing policy to encourage uninhibited communication between a physician and his patient. It is a privilege that seeks to insure the free flow of health care, absent any fears on the patient’s part that anything he says might later be used against' him.” Maynard,
[¶23.] Even under the new exception created by the majority, the facts of this case do not warrant disclosure. The probability that a patient will be identified could depend on a number of factors including the volume of data disclosed, the rarity of the patient’s particular combination of medical conditions,
[¶ 24.] The damage done by the majority today to the privacy interests of South Dakotans is not limited to those who seek medical cafe. The phrase confidential communication is uséd throughput SDCL chapter 19-19 to define a number of different privileges. In addition to the physician-patient privilege, this phrase is used to define the lawyer-client privilege (SDCL 19-19-502), the spousal privilege (SDCL 19-19-504), the religious privilege (SDCL 19-19-505), and the public-officer privilege (SDCL 19-19-508). Under the majority’s decision today, arguably a communication between an attorney and her client is now discoverable, as is the confession of a penitent made in confidence to a clergyman, if a third party can convince a judge that the identity of the communicator will not be discernible by such disclosure. Little is gained in this case by placing at risk the privacy of anyone who seeks medical care, legal advice, or spiritual guidance in South Dakota — Dr, Altstiel already provided the information Wipf ostensibly seeks in this case.
[¶ 25.] To summarize, this Court’s past decisions firmly establish that patient medical records are confidential communications within the meaning of SDCL 19 — 19— 503. In order for redaction to remove the confidentiality of a medical record, it must create an intent — i.e., a fixed purpose — in the mind of the patient to actually disclose his or her medical information to a third person. The majority avoids this plain-text analysis in order to subscribe to the purpose-driven analysis of extrajurisdic-tional decisions that also avoid plain-text analysis. In doing so, the majority bypasses a fundamental rule of statutory construction and imрroperly adds another prerequisite to application of the privilege. Additionally, the majority fails to address the dual purpose of South Dakota’s physician-patient privilege: protecting the patient’s privacy and encouraging uninhibited communication between patient and physician. Finally, the majority fails to address the effect its decision would have on several other privileges, including the attorney-client privilege and the clergy-penitent privilege. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 27.] Because the majority creates a redacted-patient-records exception to SDCL 19-19-503, it does not address Wipfs additional arguments for permitting discovery. Wipf contends that the plain meaning of SDCL 19-19-503 is unreasonable because according to Wipf, it violates public policy. However, he does not cite any supporting authorities, and his argument on this point consists almost entirely of rhetorical questions. He asks:
If Altstiel’s interpretation is adоpted, how could patients injured by the negligence of their doctor ever show that doctor is incompetent to perform a procedure if the patient cannot discover the results of other procedures? For example, if a doctor consistently performed a medical procedure incorrectly, the evidence from those other procedures showing the doctor violated the standard of care would be vital. .
Yet, SDCL 19-19-503 also “expresses a long-standing policy to encourage uninhibited communication between a physician and his patient,” Maynard,
[¶ 28,] Finally, Wipf essentially argues that HIPAA categorically “preempts [s]tate privilege laws that offer protection to de-identified medical records.” Wipf relies solely on In re Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation, 254 F.R.D, 50 (E.D.N.Y.2008). In that case, several states sought “damages, including reinl-bursement for Medicaid payments, stemming from the alleged unlawful marketing of Zyprexa, an atypical anti-psychotic drug manufactured by [Eli Lilly & Company].” Id. at 51. The cases were removed to federal courts and consolidated. Id. “As part - of its discovery demands, Lilly [sought] a sampling of medical records for Medicaid patients who used Zyprexa, as well as records for patients who took other atypical anti-psychotic drugs during the relevant time period.” Id. “[T]he States argue[d] that their respective physician-patient privilege laws prohibited] discovery of the patient medical records.” Id. at 52. After determining that each of the cases involved federal questions, the court held “that de-identified health information is not protected under HIPAA, and that, to the extent state privilege laws offer protection to de-identified medical records, HIPAA preempts those laws.” Id. at 54.
[¶ 29.] Although the Zyprexa court’s conclusion seems to support Wipfs argument that HIPAA preempts' South Dakota’s physician-patient privilege, this conclusion is difficult to reconcile with the provisions of HIPAA itself, as well as with the conclusion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Northwestern Memorial Hospital v. Ashcroft,
[¶ 30.] On appeal, the Seventh Circuit rejected the district court’s application of state-law privilege to a federal-question suit. Id. However, the court explicitly stated that a state “is free to enforce its more stringent medical-records privilege ... in suits in state court to enforce state law[.]” Id. The court concluded that HI-PAA “should be understood to ... create a procedure for obtaining authority to use medical records in litigation. Whether the records are actually admissible in evidence will depend among other things on whether they are privileged.” Id. at 925-26. Unlike Northwestern Memorial Hospital and Zyprexa, the present case does not involve a federal question — Wipfs malpractice claim against Appellants is purely a matter of South Dakota’s negligence law. Therefore, under Northwestern Memorial Hospital, HIPAA does not categorically preempt state privilege laws, and further analysis is necessary to determine whether South Dakota’s physician-patient privilege is preempted in this case.
[¶ 81.] Congress passed HIPAA in 1996 and charged' the Secretary .of the Department of Health and Human Services (the Secretary) to produce a regulatory > scheme to implement the Act. Among other things, HIPAA and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto produced the Privacy Rule, which. governs the use and disclosure of protected health information by covered entities. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2015). HIPAA also includes a preemption provision:
[A] provision or requirement under this part, or a standard or implementation specification adopted or established under sections 1320d-l through 1320d-3 of this title, shall supersede any contrary provision of State law, including a provision of State law that requires medical or health plan records .(including billing information) to be maintained or transmitted in written rather than electronic form.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d-7(a)(l) (Westlaw through Pub.L. No. 114-248);- 45 C.F.R. § 160.203. However, there are several exceptions to this general preemption rule. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d~7(a)(2); 45 C.F.R. § 160.203. Notably, HIPAA does not preempt a contrary state law if it “relates to the privacy of individually identifiable health information and is more stringent than a standard, requirement, or implementation specification adopted under [the Privacy Rule].” 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b).
[¶ 32.] In arguing for application of South Dakota’s physician-patient privilege, Appellants argue that the “more stringent” exception applies. This argument, however, skips a crucial analytical step: determining whether the state provision is contrary to HIPAA in the first place. As noted above, HIPAA preempts only contrary' state laws. Id. § 160.203; see also Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed.Reg. 59,918, 59,996 (proposed Nov. 3, 1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160-64) (“The term ‘contrary ... is a precondition for any preemption analysis.... ”),
Contrary, when used to compare a provision of State law to a standard, requirement, or implementation specification adopted under this subchapter, means:
(1) A covered entity or business associate would find it impossible to comply with both the State and Federal requirements; or
(2) The provision of State law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of part C of title XI of the Act, section 264 of Public Law 104-191, or sections 13400-13424 of Public Law 111-5, as applicable.
45 C.F.R. § 160.202. Therefore, a state law is not contrary to HIPAA — or preempted thereby — unless one of these definitions is met.
[¶ 33.] To determine whether it is impossible to comply with both state and federal requirements, it is necessary to compare what is required under both regulatory schemes. As explained above, South Dakota’s physician-patient privilege generally prohibits discovery of redacted, third-party medical records. Therefore, the only way that it would be impossible to comply with both state and federal requirements is if HIPAA requires the disclosure of redacted, third-party medical records in this case. The Privacy Rule requires a covered entity to' disclose protеcted health information in only two scenarios: (1) when requested, under certain circumstances, by the individual to whom the information pertains; or (2) when required by the Secretary “to investigate or determine the covered entity’s compliance with [the Privacy Rule].” Id. § 164.502(a)(2). All other uses or disclosures of protected health information authorized by HIPAA are permissive rather than mandatory. Id. § 164.502(a)(1). The present case does not fit within either of these two mandatory scenarios. Even if HIPAA authorizes Appellants to disclose the information Wipf seeks, HIPAA does not require that Appellants do so. Therefore, in this case, nondisclosure complies with both HIPAA and South Dakota’s physician-patient privilege. Consequently, the privilege is not preempted under the impossibility test.
[¶ 34.] Neither is South Dakota’s physician-patient privilege an obstacle to HI-PAA’s objectives. In remarking on the Privacy Rule, the Department has said: “In general, the rale that we are proposing would .create a federal floоr of privacy protection, but would not supercede [sic] other applicable law that provide[s] greater protection to the confidentiality of health information.” Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed.Reg. at 59,926. This statement is consistent with the operation of the Privacy Rule’s preemption provision. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b) (preserving contrary state law when the law would provide greater protection than HIPAA). The plain text, of SDCL 19-19t-503 certainly furthers the objective of increasing protection for an individual’s medical privacy by restricting a third party’s access to the individual’s records beyond the restrictions imposed by HIPAA. Wipf makes no argument to the contrary. Therefore, South Dakota’s physician-patient privilege is not an obstacle to HIPAA’s objectives. Because neither definition of the term contrary is met, the privilege is not preempted by HIPAA.
Conclusion
[¶ 35.] The plain language of South Dakota’s physician-patient privilege indicates it generally applies to any communication between а patient and his or her physicians that is made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment and not intended to be disclosed to a third party. We have expressly held that a patient medical record is a confidential communication within the meaning of SDCL 19-19-503. The application of SDCL 19-19-503 is not limited by the content of the communication. Consequently, the privilege bars discovery of any qualifying communication regardless of its content — i.e., even if the patient’s personal information has been re
[¶ 36.] SEVERSON, Justice, joins this dissent.
. Prior to 2015, the physician-patient privilege was codified as SDCL 19-13-7 (Rule 503(b)).
. Although the majority acknowledges that these cases apply the privilege to patient medical records, it nevertheless claims that these eases "do not state that a physician’s records are 'confidential communications’ per se; and the text of the rule does not mention medical records — it only prоtects physician-patient confidential communications.” Supra ¶ 8 n. 3. As noted above, we have explicitly held that "treatment records are ... protected by the [physician-patient] privilege.” Shamburger,
.The majority erroneously claims that "the dispositive question is whether anonymous, nonidentifying information ... of a doctor's complication rate is a physician-patient confidential communication.” Supra ¶ 8 n. 3. This claim — like much of the majority's opinion— relies on the false premise that the circuit court merely ordered the production of "information” from Dr. Altstiel's records. On the contrary, as Justice Severson correctly notes in his dissent, the court ordered Appellants to produce “all the medical records ... for each patient on which Dr. Terry L. Altstiel performed laparoscopic hernia repair surgery during the years 2009 through 2013.” Infra ¶ 42 (emphasis added).
. This argument simply assumes the conclusion it is meant to prove — that the content of the medical record is relevant to the application of the privilege.
. The majority’s argument can be replicated by appending essentially any adjective. For example, SDCL 19-19-503 does not specifically address the disclosure of electronically recorded medical records or medical records generated on a Tuesday. Are we to conclude, as the majority’s argument suggests, that such •records consequently are not protected under the plain text of SDCL 19-19-503? Of course not. Such a conclusion is insupportable because like the content of the medical record,
. Although SDCL 19-19-503 originated as a court rule, this Court is not free to amend the statute at will. “It is not our task to revise or amend, via judicial opinions, statutes or court rules, or to 'liberally construe a statute or court rule ,.. where such action would do violence to the plain meaning of the statute under construction.’ ” Hannon v. Weber, 2001 S.D.146, ¶ 8,
. The majority claims the rule adhered to in its selection of cases is “the virtually unanimous rule” and that "courts do not agree with the dissents' view that the ‘plain meaning' of the words physician-patient 'confidential communication’ (or analogous words) in any physician-patient privilege rule includes information that cannot be traced to a patient[.]” Supra ¶ 10 n. 5. These claims are contradicted by the majority’s note four. As the majority acknowledges, a number of other jurisdictions have held that the disclosure of redacted medical records does violate their respective privileges. See Glassman v. St. Joseph. Hosp.,
.Another decision relied on by the majority is based on a balancing test pitting the third
. As noted above, South Dakota’s physician-patient privilege may be traced back to § 499(3) of Dakota Territory's 1877 Revised Code of Civil Procedure. "In promulgating Section 499, the legislature declared: 'There are particular relations in which it is the policy of the law to encourage confidence and to preserve it inviolate [.]’ ” Hogue v. Massa,
. The majority remands "for the circuit court to consider whether additional safeguards will ensure patient anonymity.” Supra ¶ 12. Appellants indicated in their briefs to this Court that.Wipf’s discovery request involves the medical records of potentially hundreds of third-party patients. The circuit court will be required to individuаlly review each record sought on a patient-by-patient basis. The irony is that in resisting the disclosure of their medical records, some of these third-party patients may actually be forced to divulge even more medical information than
. This census data was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/ quickfacts/table/PST045215/4662100,46093, 00 (last visited December 20, 2016).
. In Dr. Altstiel's responses to Wipf's first set of interrogatories, Dr. Altstiel stated that he has practiced medicine for 33 years, that he performed approximately 950 hernia repairs between April 2001 and July 2013, and that only two of those procedures (including Wipf’s case) resulted in a perforated bowel.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
[¶ 37.] • I join Chief Justice Gilbertson’s writing hr'its entirety, and I write separately to emphasize the Court’s error today and to address the proper privilege analysis. Because today’s majority erroneously construes the physician-patient privilege to include redacted mediсal records of nonparty patients, I respectfully dissent.
. [¶ 38.] This case does not solely involve “operative notes” as the Court would suggest. The records subject to production today are the medical records of patients who are not parties to this case. As Chief Justice Gilbertson points out, the physician-patient privilege includes a patient’s treatment records. See Shamburger,
In all cases where it shall appear to the court that any person who is not present nor represented at the hearing should ■be protected -in his right to have any communication made under the confidential relations provisions of §§ 19-19-502 to 19-19-505, inclusive, and 19-19-508, excluded, it shall be the duty of the court to make such objections and orders for such purpose as to the court may seem necessary.
[¶39.] Today’s decision is contrary to the plain language of our statutes and the protection that those statutes provide for those who were not present or represented at the hearings in this case. The Court’s decision results in the production of numerous patients’ medical records, despite the privilege and privacy that those patients expect and are entitled to when they seek treatment from medical professionals.
■ [¶ 40.] Additionally, no exception applies in this case. We do not exempt communications subject to privilege merely because they may be relevant. See Voorhees Cattle Co. v. Dakota Feeding Co.,
[¶ 41.] Although this Court now uses redaction to create what it deems unprivileged “medical information,” redaction is not an exception to the privilege. “On the contrary, redaction presumes a record is subject to disclosure.” Mercer v. S.D. Attorney Gen. Office,
[¶42.] Because the plain language of South Dakota’s physician-patient privilege protects the records at issue in this case, I would reverse the circuit court’s order that Defendants produce “all the medical records ... for each patient on which Dr. Terry L. Altstiel performed laparoscopic hernia repair surgery during the years 2009 through 2013.”
[¶ 43.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice,' joins this dissent.