494 N.E.2d 133 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1985
Lead Opinion
William Todd Wion, plaintiff-appellant, filed a complaint in replevin alleging a conditional gift of a diamond engagement ring to Lisa R. Henderson, defendant-appellee, on May 23, 1981. Plaintiff terminated the engagement a year later. After a trial to the court the plaintiff has appealed from findings and judgment in favor of the defendant.
There are three assignments of error.
"1. The gift of an engagement ring * * * [is] a conditional gift.
"2. The donor may recover an engagement ring upon termination of the engagement absent an agreement to the contrary."
The third assignment of error will be discussed first.
The trial court found that the plaintiff broke the engagement with the defendant in order to marry his present wife. This finding of fact is supported by *208 the evidence. Implicit in the findings of fact is a finding of fault on the part of the plaintiff and no fault on the part of the defendant.
R.C.
It has been held that "[t]he donor of an engagement ring can recover the gift only if the engagement is dissolved by agreement or if it is unjustifiably broken by the donee." Coconis v.Christakis (1981),
The holding in Coconis appears to be the majority rule in this country. Annotation, Rights in Respect of Engagement and Courtship Presents When Marriage Does Not Ensue (1972), 46 A.L.R. 3d 578.
We hold that absent an agreement to the contrary an engagement ring need not be returned when the engagement is unjustifiably broken by the donor.
In view of our holding we find only harmless error alleged in the appellant's other assignments of error.
We affirm.
Judgment affirmed.
BROGAN, P.J., concurs.
KERNS, J., concurs in judgment.
Concurrence Opinion
Since the evidence is susceptible to a reasonable finding that Wion told Henderson to keep the ring after he had terminated their engagement, he divested himself of any possible incidence of ownership therein. At that point, the ring took the form of any other unconditional gift which might have passed between the parties without reference to the prospects of marriage. For this reason, I concur in the judgment. *209