123 S.W.2d 951 | Tex. App. | 1938
This case involves the sole question whether the Texas Motor Carriers Law (R.C.S. Art. 911b, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art.
The question here presented has been considered in a number of decisions, state and federal, and was finally determined in favor of the Commission's contention in McDonald v. Thompson,
The only factual difference between the case at bar and the McDonald Case is that McDonald applied to the Railroad Commission for a certificate which was "denied on the ground that the proposed operations would subject the highways *952 named in it to excessive burden and endanger and interfere with ordinary use by the public," [page 178] whereas Winton has never made application to the Commission for a certificate or permit, and the Commission has therefore had no opportunity to pass upon these questions. As in the McDonald Case, Winton claimed the right to operate under the "grandfather clause" of the Federal Act, and had continuously operated since 1934 under successive injunctions against the Commission, issued out of the 77th Judicial District Court of Limestone County, up to the date this suit was filed, May 9, 1936. According to his testimony, whenever the appellate court dissolved an injunction he would transfer his trucks to some other person, procure another injunction in the name of such person, and give each of his truck drivers a certified copy of such injunction to prevent molestation by state enforcement officers. The present suit was for a temporary and permanent injunction. The former was granted, but dissolved upon final hearing and permanent injunction was denied.
After McDonald's application for certificate was denied, and his appeal from the Commission order was overruled (Railroad Commission v. McDonald, Tex. Civ. App.
The power of the state to deny the use of its highways to interstate motor traffic for hire "on the ground that the proposed operations would subject the highways named in" the application for permit or certificate "to excessive burden" or "endanger and interfere with ordinary use by the public," includes as a necessary or appropriate incident thereto the power to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations whereby to determine in each instance whether the proposed additional burden is excessive in the named respects. Granted the power of the state to deny the use of its highways to the stated traffic upon the stated grounds, no serious question as to the power to require application to the Commission for a certificate or permit is presented.
Invoking the general rule that "courts of a state have a right to place their own construction upon their statutes," appellant contends that we are not bound by the above Federal decisions; asserting that our Supreme Court in Southwestern Greyhound Lines v. Railroad Commission,
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
*953Affirmed.