70 Md. 305 | Md. | 1889
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiff is the owner of a tract of land called “Benson’s Park,” and the defendant is the owner of an adjoining tract now called “Spring Garden,” being part of “Chew’s Resolution Manor.” The piece of land in controversy, is a long narrow strip running between the two farms. The plaintiff claims title under a deed from Georgianna Haight, conveying to him all “those tracts or parcels of land situate in Howard County, constituting the farm of which the late Theodore R. S. Boyce died seized,” followed by a reference to the several deeds under which Boyce acquired title, and also by reference to a survey of said tracts or parcels of land by William Dawson, in which the metes and bounds, courses and distances are given.
The first and main question in this case is, the construction of this deed. Here are two descriptions of the property, the one a general description, and the other a special description. Is the plaintiff entitled to claim under the general description, all those tracts or parcels of land constituting the farm of which the late Theodore R. 8. Boyce died seized, or is his title limited to the land embraced in Dawson’s survey ? In the construction of a deed, as in all other instruments, the intention of the parties must prevail, unless such an intention contravenes some well settled rule of law. The object of the descriptive part of a deed, is to define what the grantor meant to convey and the grantee to receive; and when the intention of the parties is apparent and plain on the face of the deed itself, there
Now, as to the second prayer, this ought, we think, to he modified by adding the word “adverse,” so as to read “If the Court finds from the evidence that the lands described in the second, third or fourth counts of the declaration, was in the possession of Theodore R. S. Boyce as part of the farm upon which he resided at the time of his death, and was so held and claimed by him, and all those claiming under him, down to and including the plaintiff, the whole embracing a period of more than forty years; and shall further find that such possession was adverse, uninterrupted and exclusive,” &c., “then the plaintiff is entitled to recover such land.”
There was error also in rejecting the fifth prayer. The plaintiff in support of his title offered in-evidence, the partition of Benson’s Park, in Chancery in 1819, by which lot No. 3 was allotted to Samuel Gassaway, and which is described in the Chancery decree, as “Beginning at the original beginning of the whole tract, called ‘ Benson’s Park,’ and running with the first line of said land in a true direction towards a heap of stones, admitted to be at the end of the said first line, N. 49 degrees W. 133 perches and two-thirds of a perch, to a stone planted at the beginning of lot No. 1,” as laid off in said partition.
Now Tustin testifies that a line running from the stone “0. Y. 2,” the beginning of Benson’s Park, through the persimmon trees standing at the end of Mrs. Dorsey’s first line, passes directly through a stone about two feet high, standing upright in the old fence between the plaintiff’s land and Mrs. Dorsey’s, at the distance of about 133 and two-third perches from the beginning; that the stone seems to he an ancient one,
We find no error in refusing the third and fourth prayers. To entitle the plaintiff to recover he was bound to prove either a paper title, or title by adversary possession; and the principle of acquiescence and estoppel recognized by Courts of equity, has no application to this case. It follows from what we have said that defendant’s prayers, which limited the plaintiff’s right to recover to the Dawson survey, ought to have been refused.
Judgment reversed, and new trial aiuarded.