We granted certiorari to determine whether the employee lockers in this case are included within the concept of a “vault” or “other apparatus or equipment under the third degree burglary statute, § 18-4-204(1), C.R.S. (2005); and if included, whether the third degree burglary statute violatеs due process of law because it is unconstitutionally vague both on its face and as applied. We hold that the lockers in this case are not included within the concept of a “vault” or “other apparatus or equipment.” We do not reach the sеcond issue. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and vacate Adam Winter’s conviction for third degree burglary.
I. Facts and Proceedings Below
Defendant Adam Winter was employed by a truck shop, Marini Diesel, from September 2000 to February 2001. Part of Winter’s work involved tаking the work coveralls delivered from the cleaners each week and placing them above or inside each of the employees’ lockers.
The employee lockers at Marini Diesel did not have internal locking mechanisms and were similar to typical gymnasium or school lockers. Although possible to secure them using a standard padlock or similar locking device, no locking devices were provided and the lockers were never actually locked by any of the employees.
Sometime in Januаry 2001, several employees noticed small amounts of cash were missing from their work lockers and one employee was also missing a wallet. Suspecting theft, one of the employees installed a small video camera in the room. Video footage frоm the camera later revealed Winter looking through four of the lockers and taking items from them.
Winter was subsequently arrested. During a stationhouse interrogation, he admitted taking cash from the employees’ lockers, totaling approximately $163. Winter was charged with оne count of third degree burglary, a class five felony under section 18-4-204, C.R.S. (2005), 1 and one count of theft, a class two misdemeanor under section 18-4-401, C.R.S. (2005). Although the theft *194 charge was later dropped, the jury was instructed as to the theft charge as a lesser non-included offense of the burglary charge. The trial court did not inform the jury that the defendant could be found guilty on both the third degree burglary and theft counts. The jury did not complete the verdict form on the theft charge.
Following a jury trial, Winter was found guilty on the burglary charge. He was subsequently sentenced to а two-year term of probation. Winter appealed his conviction. In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction.
People v. Winter,
No. 02CA0947, slip op. at 5,
II. Analysis
Winter appeals his conviction on the basis that his actions do not fall within the purview of the third degree burglary statute. Section 18-4-204(1), the statute under which he was charged and convicted, provides as follows:
A person commits third degree burglary if with intent to commit a crime he enters or breaks into any vault, safe, cash register, coin vending machine, product dispenser, money depository, safety deposit box, coin telephone, coin box, or other apparatus or equipment whether or not coin operated.
The particular items listed in the statute are not further clarified or defined.
Winter argues his conviction cannot be sustained because lockers are not among the items in the statute. He further argues that a locker is not a “vault” or its equivalent, nor is it properly considered “apparatus or equipment” under the statute. On this basis, Winter contends the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to convict him under section 18-4-204(1).
To determine whether Winter’s actions fall within the purview of the statute, we first look to the рlain language of the statute.
See Lakeview Associates v. Maes,
As a result, we turn to two rules of statutory construction. First, criminal statutes in derogation of the сommon law are narrowly construed in favor of the defendant.
See People v. Nees,
Second, where a general term follows a list of things in a statute, we apply the principle of
ejusdem generis,
that is, the general terms are applied only to those things of the same general kind or class as thоse specifically mentioned.
See Davidson v. Sandstrom,
In affirming Winter’s conviction, the court of appеals relied upon the underlying statutory intent of the General Assembly as construed by another division of the court of appeals. In
People v. Garcia,
a division of the court explained that the statute was intended “to address the problem of unauthorized entry into any structure or apparatus designed to receive and hold money or valuables.”
The court of appeals also analogized the instant case to
People v. Geyer,
Looking at the statute generally, the list includes such traditional safekeeping equipment, as vaults, safes, safety deposit boxes, and cash registers, as well as coin vending machines, product dispensers, and coin telephones. Given the relative abundаnce of lockers and their frequent use for safekeeping valuables, the omission of lockers from the list strikes us as significant.
In particular, if the statute were intended to cover all structures designed to hold property, the statute would have been written more broаdly to specifically include lockers or similar containers with the mere potential to contain money or valuables by virtue of their design. Instead, the statute contains items that are almost always used to contain money or valuables exclusively: vaults, safes, cash registers, coin vending machines, product dispensers, money depositories, safety deposit boxes, coin telephones, and coin boxes. These items have specific uses that are plainly evident: it is this appearance that we find essential to the class.
The common characteristic of the enumerated class in section 18-4-204(1) is not simply the intended design of the apparatus or equipment. Rather, the class also involves the appearance of that structure or container. In effect, sеction 18-4-204(1) draws a distinction between actual safekeeping and mere containment. Further, this safekeeping pertains to a limited class of items: the safekeeping targeted by the statute is not merely the safekeeping of any kind of property, but instead pеrtains specifically to the safekeeping of money or valuables.
See Garcia,
Although the item in the class that comes closest to a locker is a vault, lockers and vaults are distinguishable according to their *196 plain and ordinary meanings. A vault is typically defined as “a rоom or compartment, often built of steel, for the safekeeping of valuables.” American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1906 (4th ed.2000). One commonly thinks of a vault as a large, heavily secured chamber, as one might find in a bank, museum, or casino. In contrast, a locker is defined as “[a] small, usually metal compartment that can be locked, especially one at a gymnasium or public place for the safekeeping of clothing and valuables.” Id. at 1027. As noted above, however, the class distinction turns on more than mеre design or potential use. Consequently, the distinction is not so clear as a practical matter.
A locker may be used to store any number and manner of items and may be secured or unsecured. It may be nearly any size and may be constructed from numerous matеrials. Because of these and other variations, one could speculate almost endlessly as to whether a locker is sufficiently “vault-like” to fit within the purview of “other apparatus or equipment.” Accordingly, the issue is not resolved on semantics, but must turn on the particulars of any given case.
Returning to the specific facts before us, we consider whether the employee lockers at Marini Diesel share the characteristics of the items listed in the statute so as to properly fit within the statutory class. Here, there were no measures taken to secure the lockers from unauthorized entry, the lockers did not have locking mechanisms, and locks had never been used with any of the lockers. The locker room was also open and accessible to the employeеs. Although the lockers were used to store the employees’ personal property, including cash and potential “valuables” as contemplated by the statute, the lockers did not share the other characteristics essential to the statutory class. Namely, there were no readily ascertainable features to suggest that the lockers were being employed for the safekeeping of money or valuables in the same manner as those items enumerated in the statute. There were no locks or other sеcurity devices used in conjunction with the lockers to suggest heightened security or that these lockers were reserved for securing cash or valuables. In sum, there was nothing about the appearance of the Marini Diesel lockers to clearly indicate thеy were “vault-like” or of the same type or class as the other items listed in the statute.
We find that an unsecured and unlocked locker which does not have the appearance of being employed for the safekeeping of valuables is not within the clаss of items contemplated by section 18^4-204(1). Because we resolve this issue on this ground, we do not find it necessary to address whether the phrase “other apparatus or equipment” is void under the vagueness doctrine.
III. Conclusion
We reverse the decision of the court of аppeals and vacate Winter’s conviction for third degree burglary.
Notes
. The statute has not changed in any respect from 2001, accordingly we cite to the 2005 volume of statutes.
. Specifically, we granted certiorari to determine:
1) whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that the prosecution prеsented sufficient evidence that the Petitioner entered a "vault” or "apparatus or equipment” under the third degree burglary statute, section 18-4-204(1), C.R.S. (2005), and 2) whether, as construed by the court of appeals, the third degree burglary statute violates due process of lаw because it is unconstitutionally vague both on its face and as applied to the Petitioner.
. Legislative history is sometimes useful to determine the General Assembly's intent. Here, however, audio recordings of the legislative deliberations are not available to us as the relevant portions of section 18-4-204 were enacted in 1971, and recordings are not available prior to 1973.