*1 289 GARY WINSLOW, Appellant, Plaintiff and v. INC.,
MONTANA RAIL LINK,
corporation,
a Montana
Respondent.
Defendant
No. 99-483.
Submitted on
2000.
Briefs June
Decided
2000.
November
MT
292.
St.Rep.
For Appellant: Towe; Erik Thueson and Jamie Thueson & *3 Lamb, Helena.
For Respondent: Keck; Ronald MacDonald and Darla Lind, Datsopoulos, MacDonald & Missoula.
JUSTICE LEAPHART delivered Opinion the Court. (Winslow) 1 Gary appeals Winslow from the First District ¶ Judicial I, Court’s dismissing Memorandum and Order Counts II and III of jurisdiction complaint subject grant- Winslow’s for lack of matter and (MRL) ing summary judgment to Montana Rail Link on IV Count seeking punitive damagеs. appeals Winslow also the District Court’s denial of his motion to amend his and asks Court to this discovery on an rule unresolved issue. We reverse in affirm in part, and for part, proceedings. remand further
Background began working working Winslow for MRL in Prior to for ¶2 1987. MRL, employed by he to was the Milwaukee Railroad from 1965 1976. Bargaining His employment subject with MRL was to a Collective (CBA) Agreement union, between of Locomotive his Brotherhood Engineers to disci- рrovisions relating and MRL. The CBA contains requiring and that
pline appeals hearing process and establishes an just an such cannot be dismissed without cause employee as Winslow a fair session. impartial fact-finding and without and performing job MRL, related for In the fall of while duties personal injury He out a pain groin. felt a sudden his filled Winslow groin. his He saw pulled he had a muscle in explaining form that reported his suggested surgery. Winslow to MRL that doc- dоctor who surgery. under- required tor felt was a hernia and that it Winslow this and returned surgery September subsequently went of 1995 to duty. 20,1995 received a order light work on On December he written hearing “fail[ure] address his disciplinary from MRL to attend a injury.” Specifically, provide regarding [his] factual information failed to that he report MRL’s accusation was that since Winslow had earlier, three his claim fraudulent. disci- years had hernia Special Adjustment held and thе Board of plinary hearing was (Board) injury, hernia was a unre- pre-existing found Winslow’s “[MRL] MRL. The Board concluded that employment lated to his with dishonesty,” [Winslow] for right had the to terminate his obvious terminated. Winslow was Board’s decision federal court. appeal did not job he due
Rather, alleging filed a in state court lost he claim requested He mismanagement to MRL’s and misconduct. also damages. punitive for infliction of mental distress and for Mismanagement, Violation to dismiss Winslow’s claims moved Wrongful Fair Common Law Dealing, ofthe Covenant of Faith and Good subject jurisdiction for lack of matter Discharge, and Emotional Distress Damages. The District summary judgment as to Punitive and moved for summary judgment. to dismiss granted motions Issues appeal restate the issues follows: negligent the claim for dismissing 1. Court err in Did the District jurisdiction? lack of dismissing err in the claim for Violation 2. Did the District Court Dealing? Fair Faith and of the Covenant Good dismissing the Common Law Did the District Court err Discharge? Wrongful Claim for *4 the for Emo- dismissing in claim Did the District Court err 4.
¶9 tional Distress? granting summary judgment in Did the District Court err 5. Damages?
Punitive in denying 6. Did the District abuse its discretion Wins- complaint?
low’s to amend his motion discovery 7. this Court resolve a which dispute Should by the Court?
addressed District
Standard of Review
granted
appears
should
unless it
be
¶13 Motions
dismiss
not be
yond
can
no set of
in
his
plaintiff
prove
support
doubt that
facts
him
claim which would entitle
to rеlief. Hilands
Club v.Ashmore
Golf
328,
Discussion 1. Did the Court err dismissing negli- District the clаim for gent mismanagement lack subject jurisdiction! complaint, alleges negligently MRL “mis- managed” investigation and, thus, its into is injury the hernia liability 39-2-703, argues, however, MCA.MRL § 39-2-703,MCA, only injuries wrongful applies personal § and not to discharges employment. from It contends that is Winslow’s claim properly a wrongful discharge characterized as claim and pre- is (WDEA). empted by Wrongful Discharge Act Employment from 1(a): 39-2-703, MCA, personal injury Is limited to claims? § 39-2-703(1), MCA,provides: Section
(1)Evеry person corporation railway or or operating railroad by any employee this state is hable for all sustained ofsuch em- person corporation consequence neglect any or ofthe other ployee any employee thereof or other in consequence wrongs, thereof and of the willful whether of com- omission, any ne- employee mission or other thereof when such glect, mismanagement, wrongs are manner connected any railway with the use and or railroad on or operation about le- employed. liability which he is No contract restricts such binding. gal or *5 statute, the noted that there analyzing this District Court de very interpreting
are
few cases
the statute and all such cases were
early
century.
injured
in the
Those
all
cided
twentieth
cases
involve
employee.
none
the
exam
workers and
invоlve
termination of an
For
(1907),
v.
Mont.
ple,
Ry.
in Lewis Northern
Co.
Pacific
218,
MCA, applies only personal claims, injury to the exclusion of mis management handling in the employeе of an termination.
1(b): 39-2-703, MCA, Is preempted by § WDEA? The District Court reasoned that because Winslow’sclaim is for wrongful discharge, the WDEA applies. Except as provided in § 39-2-912, MCA,the WDEA is the remedy wrongful exclusive dis- charge. 39-2-912(2),MCA, Section states that the WDEAdoes not ap- ply discharge to the of an employee by a covered CBA. The District (1) Court concluded that by CBA, since Winslow is covered he has no (2) claim wrongful discharge WDEA, under the since his claim for “mismanаgement” requires CBA, construction of the the claim is (RLA). preempted by the Railroad Labor Act *6 agree with the District Court’s first proposition. Since Winslow is an employee by covered a collective bargaining agree ment, the WDEA has application no to 39-2-912(2), his claim. Section MCA. As to the second proposition, the fact that Winslow is an em
ployee by covered bargaining agreement collective does not nеces sarily mean that his claim for mismanagement requiring is one an in terpretation or construction of agreement that and pre is therefore empted by the RLA. The scope of federal preemption was addressed Hawaiian
Airlines, Inc.
246,
v. Norris
2239,
512 U.S.
114 S.Ct.
129
Norris,
L.Ed.2d 203.
an airplane mechanic, had refused
sign
to
off on
the maintenance record
a plane
of
that he did not believe to be safe.
He was accused of insubordination. After a CBA disciplinary hearing
he
Winslow,
was terminated. Like
Norris
forego
decided to
an admin
istrative appeal and chose to file a
claiming
lawsuit
that he had been
wrongfully discharged. Norris,
250-51,
state preempted by law claims were federal law.Preemption, the Court stated, lightly “should not be inferred” when it employment comes to standards which are “within the pоlice power traditional ofthe state.” Norris, 252, 114 512 2243, 129 U.S. at S.Ct. at L.Ed.2d at 211. Norris’ contract, Winslow’s, union like governed by was the RLA.In address Act, ing 151 ofthe the § Court held it does demonstrate “a clear and manifest congressional to purpose regime broadly create a that pre-empts protections substantive by States, extended the
296 Norris, agreement.” of 512 independent negotiated labor U.S. at 255-56, 2245, Act, at at of 114 S.Ct. 129 L.Ed.2d 213. Under 301 the § “ ‘merely that federal the basis preemption ensures law will be for inter agreements, says nothing about the preting coUective-bargaining rights may adjudication provide substantive State workers when of agree does not the of such rights depend upon interpretation those ’’Norris, 2249, 129 262, 114 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 217 ments.’ U.S. at at 399, 409, Lingle Magic v. Div. 486 U.S. (quoting Norge of Chef. 420-21). L.Ed.2d 108 S.Ct. Court, in concluding We determine that the District that “requires claim the CBA”and is therefore interpretation Winslow’s RLA, the much into allegations rеad too the the com preempted the complaint rights makes no reference to the CBA or to plaint. Rather, under the agreement. and remedies accorded Winslow that alleges guilty “mismanagement MRL was or ne complaint that 39-2-703, right MCA. The source the to be free from glect” § law, MCA, statutory 39-2-703, is inde state § any negotiated agreement. teachings pendent of labor Under Norris, subject the claim is to federal preemption. dismiss, addressing MRL’s motion the District Court allegations well-pled complaint to treat the as ad required complaint light and to construe the most favorable to
mitted
Club,
tion of of alleges a claim for viola complaint, In Count II of fair and a claim for com dealing faith and good tion of the covenant of the claim discharge. The District Court dismissed wrongful law mon faith implied good dealing for violation of the covenant of and fair Albertson’s, holding in v. upon based our Foster Inc. Foster, any 835 P.2d 726. In we held that cove implied good dealing of and fair employment
nant faith the context arises Foster, underlying employment, from the contract of which in as well here, is bargaining agreement. bargaining the collective Collective federal, agreements interpreted according must be not state law. “Thus, the implied by covenant claim is preempted pursu federal law Foster, 126, 835 ant 301.” Mont. at P.2d at 726. re § As Winslow luctantly brief, in his reasoning concedes the same his claim applies to good for breach ofthe of faith. that cоvenant We hold the District Court dismissing did not err in good the claim violation ofthe of covenant dealing. faith fair 3. Did District err in Dismissing Court the Common Law Wrongful Discharge?
Claim for
Foster,
held
we
that a common
claim for retaliatory
law
dis
charge related
sexual
independent
harassment was
of the collec
agreement;
tive bargaining
[did]
“it
not turn on the meaning
of
Thus,
term of the
bargaining agreement.
collective
the appellant’s
wrongful
clаim
discharge
independent
is
bargaining
collective
agreement for purposes
preemption.” Foster,
of 301
§
above conclusion. As we stated above in our discussion ofthe misman agement claim, alleged neglect Winslow has was guilty mismanagement 39-2-703, railroad violation of MCA.That § claim, statutory remedy law, independ invokes under state ofhis ent remedies under the CBA. Although inquiry the factual re solving mismanagement question may the con parallеl just CBA, tractual determination cause under the resolution of the MCA, 39-2-703, claim under does necessarily § meaning of any bargaining agree turn term of the collective Thus, Foster, ment. as in that the wrongful discharge we hold Winslow’s preempted by claim is not the RLA.
298 Dismissing Did Court err in Claim Emo- 4. the District
¶33 tional Distress? forth claim intentional infliction Winslow’s sets a the claim for emotional distress. The District dismissed emo-
of being dependent upon wrongful claim for dis- tional distress jurisdictiоn. As charge which the court concluded it had no we over above, concluding already held the District Court erred have wrongful claim for dis- independent Winslow’s charge preempted. was 209, High Press 271 Mont. Country Indep. In Sacco v.
232, 237, 896 411, 425, 428, recognized separate cause of ac P.2d we of Con negligent tion for or intentional infliction emotional distress. contentions, issue trary preempted. to MRL’s such claims are not This (S.D.N.Y.1977), R.R. v.MTA Metro-North was аddressed Shannon 177, in which the Federal District Court concluded: F.Supp. 952 not re- infliction of emotional distress claim does [A]n intentional CBA, antici- any interpretation of the and the court cannot quire interpret that one needs to collective pate argument serious bargaining particular in order to determine whether agreement outrageous. conduct is extreme and Shannon, F.Supp. 952 at 181. agree reasoning District Court in with thе Federal not for infliction of emotional distress does de
New York a claim pre interpretation of the CBA. It is therefore pend upon Norris, at 129 the RLA. 512 U.S. at S.Ct. empted by L.Ed.2d 217. granting summary judgment on Did Court err in the District
punitive damages? summary appeals judgment of review in from Our standard genuine there is an absence of issues
de novo.We determine whether judgment is entitled to moving party material fact and whether the Enterprises P D & Lenon v. & Land as a matter of law. Brinkman 1112, 1114. P.2d must be an reasoned that since there The District Court punitive there can award actual before bean award some it sub determined that did have damages and since the court had claims, was no basis any Winslow’s there jurisdiction ject damages. Ac punitive could find either actual or which the court on summary judgment granted MRL’smotion cordingly,the court abovethat the Dis- this Court has determined damages. Since punitive trict Court did clаims, have matter over some ofWinslow’s underlying District Court’s premise (complete jurisdiction) lack of Accordingly, incorrect. its conclusion that there would likewise be no that, basis for either actual or punitive damages therefore, was entitled judgment as a matter of law was erroneous. sum- *9 mary judgment dismissing the punitive damages claim for is reversed. 6. Did the District ¶40 Court abuse its discretion denying in Wins- low’smotion to amend complaint? his
¶41 review a district court’s denial of a motion to amend the pleadings to determine whether the court abused its discretion. Fed erated Mut. Ins. Co.v.Anderson 33, 40, 991 P.2d After MRL ¶42 filed its motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and its motion for summary judgment punitive on dam ages, Winslow moved to amend complaint his to add a claim for emo tional distress under FELA and to add a new factual pu basis for his nitive damage claim. that, The District Court held holding our in Peuse v.Malkuch 221, 228, Mont. 911 P.2d Winslow cоuld change legal his theory after MRL filed its motion summary judgment. appeal, On Winslow does not mention the proposed emotional distress claim under FELA but does contend that the court erred in not allowing him to amend the complaint to add a new factual basis for the punitive damage claim in the original complaint. In the Peuse decision relied upon by Court, the District Peuse
sought to amend the pleadings years two after original рleadings had been filed. We concluded that:
If the amendments were allowed after summary the motion for judgment, [the respondent] unduly would prejudiced be since his motion was based on the original pleadings which remained un- changed for years. almost two Litigants, should be allowed to change legal theories after a summary judgment motion for has been only filed in extraordinary cases.
Peuse,
Mont.
based upon proposition punitive claim, thаt the damage like claims, Winslow’sother was preempted. The merits ofthat challenge would not have been by affected the proposed pro- amendment. The posed amendments did not change punitive damage “theory” of the claim. sought Punitive were original complaint. merely allegations support to add factual
The amendment seeks words, theory. other had there been merit previously pleaded In punitive defeated the preemption argument, to MRL’s it would have Thus, prej- have no damage claim even as amended. there would been allowing punitive the amendment to Count IV on udice MRL damages. its discretion in disal- We hold that the District Court abused remand, be al-
lowing complaint. the amended On Winslow should of his to add the additional fac- lowed amend Count IV original damage claim. support punitive tual contentions his discovery disрute was not 7. Should this Court resolve a by the District Court? addressed right rem- speedy contends that constitutional upon failure to rule dis-
edy has been violated the District Court’s covery year. requested Winslow has disputes particular, for over inju- had either sustained similar the identities of other workers who disciplined they after job ries from duties or had been fired or similar that, in report. light contended personal injury turned in a has workers, MRL cannot reveal their privacy rights of the other Although District Court has not ruled this names identities. *10 issue, that, economy, in the we re- judicial Winslow asks interests to appeal. in the of this We decline do privacy view the issue context so. upon by discovery issue has not been ruled Dis- Since the 1, M.R.App.P. Rule Court, ripe appeal not
trict the issue is for 3, rules for Although M.R.App.P., suspension Rule allows shown, good cause has been “good we do find such cause” discovery re- pending did not rule on the shown. The District Court jurisdic- it that it had matter quests because did not believe issue has underlying preemption over the claims. Now tion Winslow, are that the District favorably to we confident been resolved discovery timely in fashion and de- requests will address the any discovery disputes argu- regard the record with velop ably implicate privacy rights employees. of other part, in and remanded matter is affirmеd part, This reversed opinion. consistent with the above proceedings for further and DISTRICT TURNAGE, JUSTICE GRAY CHIEF JUSTICE PREZEAU, concur. sitting JUSTICE REGNIER JUDGE dissents: JUSTICE NELSON concurs and I concur with the analysis 6, Court’s of Issues 1 through inclu- sive, our with decision on those I issues. dissent from our refusal to address Issue the discovery dispute. issue, As to this last I would address discovery and decide the question presented.
¶52 Winslow was terminated employment from his nearly five years ago. Upon filing complaint, timely he commenced and dili- gently attempted to discovery obtain ofthe identities ofother workers who had injuries either sustained similar job to his from similar du- ties or who had been fired disciplined after they per- turned in a injury sonal report. opposed discovery nearly this every way possible. The trial court brought dispute early into the on but never discovery resolved the question despite Winslow’s continuous attempts get lost, decision. A trial claims, date was аnd Winslow’s ultimately, were dismissed. We have now ruled that the District Court erred in dismissing Winslow’s claims and sending we are case back for proceedings. further Unfortunately Winslow,however, he essentially is back to
square one as far as the discovery goes; issue his case is still at ground years zero despite litigation. months, No he looking doubt if years, of further delay before day he has his in court. privacy which is at the discovery heart ofthe issue is purely оne of law. This Court capable is as deciding this issue as is and, law, trial court in matters of plenary, our review is any event.
¶55 Winslow has a constitutional right speedy remedy afforded Art, II, delay. without Sec. If Mont.Const. this right constitutional has meaning case, in the context of this then we should suspend the Rules Appellate Procedure and decide the discovery issue in this appeal. Our refusal to do so is to continue the frustration ofWins- II, low’sArticle Section 16 rights already that has place taken in the trial court for long. far too I dissent from our decision as to Issue 7.
JUSTICE HUNT and join TRIEWEILER foregoing concurrence and dissent.