139 Ga. 231 | Ga. | 1913
A man, claiming to have a right of action for a personal injury,, employed 'an attorney, and in writing agreed that for his services the client should pay him one half of any sum realized from the claim, by settlement, suit, or compromise; provided that the expenses of the client for doctor’s bills and drug bills were to be paid “before dividing the amount received on the claim.” The attorney brought an action in the name of his client, alleging that the attorney was negotiating with an 'agent of the defendant for a settlement, and that the latter had notice of the contract by which he was- to receive a part of the recovery or settlement, but nevertheless settled with the client, without the knowledge or consent of the attorney. It was not distinctly stated that the settlement was made before the suit was brought, but it is inferable from the allegations of the petition, which are to be taken more strongly against the pleader; and the case was argued on that theory. There were allegations as to the liability of the defendant to the plaintiff for the injury. The court overruled the demurrer to the petition, and the defendant excepted.
As the law was embodied in the Code of 1863, it was declared that the attorney’s lien should attach for his fees and for a general balance on all sums collected by •him, and upon all property recovered by his services. Provision was also made in regard to the right of 'an attorney condemning property to a fee from the proceeds, although older liens might demand and recover such proceeds from his immediate client. The next section (1990) was as follows: “Parties can not, by settlement between themselves, defeat the attorney of any lien or claim under contract with his client of which the opposite party had notice prior to the con
The act of 1873 as to attorneys’ liens was -codified in the Code of 1895 as section 2814, and in the Code of 1910 as section 3364. Each of these Codes was adopted by statute, and in neither of them did section 1990 of the original Code appear. The act thus-codified broadened the previous law as to attorneys’ liens. The section of the original Code which is quoted above was a part of the law as it stood before that act, and we think has been superseded by the act, the codifications omitting that section, and the adoption of the Codes. The broader general act took the place o.f -
It has been suggested that an agreement for the attorney to receive his compensation out of the recovery was in the nature of an equitable assignment to him; and certain language by Bleckley, J., in Twiggs v. Chambers, 56 Ga. 279, 281, was relied upon as sustaining that position. The statute under construction gave a lien on all suits as well as on the property recovered. The headnote declared that the attorney whose fee was payable by contract
We have not been unmindful of the argument of counsel for the plaintiff that an injustice, if not a fraud, had been perpetrated upon him by the settlement made directly with his client, after he had ojDened negotiations for a compromise ,and after notice of his contract for a conditional fee. But we are unable to hold that the attorney for the plaintiff acquired any lien beyond that provided by the statute, or any further right as a quasi assignee.
Judgment reversed.