196 Iowa 498 | Iowa | 1923
I. This controversy grows out of a somewhat complicated situation resulting from the execution of successive contracts by the several purchasers of a farm situated near Orient, Iowa. On February 9, 1920, Nellie Hennessy, unmarried, agreed, by a contract in writing, to convey the farm in question, which comprised 160 acres, - to appellee herein, on March 1, 1921, for a consideration of $40,400, to be paid as follows: $3,800 cash; $4,600 March 1, 1920; $4,000 March 1, 1921, with interest amounting on the later date to $1,560; and the balance, $28,000, by assuming or executing notes for that amount, secured by a first mortgage upon the farm. The legal title to the farm on the date mentioned, and at all times prior to November 19, 1921, was in the intervener, George H. Williams, who, on June 21, 1919, by a contract in writing agreed to convey the same to Sylvester Handley, for a consideration of
The petition in this action was filed on October 4, 1921. It sets up the material and relevant facts stated above, and that Nellie Hennessy was not the owner of the land, and prayed a
The evidence, except as to the matters stated above, was more or less conflicting. Appellee denied in ioto the alleged oral agreement with Nellie Hennessy, and testified that it was after March 1, 1921, and after the notes and mortgage had been executed to Williams, that he learned for the first time that she was not the owner of the farm. He declined to accept a deed from Williams, and demanded a conveyance from Nellie Hennessy. However, he finally consented to accept a deed from Williams, provided that it expressed a consideration of $40,400, the purchase price fixed by his contract with Nellie Hennessy. This, Williams at first declined, but later consented, to do. By this time, appellee had changed his mind, and refused to accept a conveyance from anyone but Nellie Hennessy, who had died without executing a deed.
"I. The contract between him [appellee] and Nellie Hennessy entitles him to a deed from her or from her heirs; and Mary Strong, although offering to take title and to deed to him, has not at this time title to the land, and cannot convey what she has not.
"II. While there has been a novation of the debts, so far as plaintiff, Nellie Heiinessy, and Williams are concerned, such would not require plaintiff, in and of itself, to accept a deed from a third person.
"III. That there was no such mutual mistake in drawing the contract as authorizes the court to reform same.
"IV. That, while there was sufficient in the acts and conduct of plaintiff to constitute a waiver of deed from Miss Hennessy and to accept deed from Williams, had there been no other complications of title, yet, as he is not shown to have known, at the time he was willing to accept the Williams deed of the Handley and Eigenheer contracts, and especially as to the fact that Anna Eigenheer was a party to the Handley contract and was not a party to the Hennessy contract, he cannot be held to have waived a matter or defect of which he had no knowledge.
"V. Defendant Mary Strong is in no good position to demand specific performance, as neither she nor the estate of her intestate has title to convey. Neither of the other parties is in position to enforce specific performance, for the reason they have no contract with plaintiff to perform. Plaintiff could not enforce specific performance from any of these parties, and thus the obligations are not mutual. ’ ’
So far as the finding of the court is against appellant, it is
II. The written opinion of the court was filed November 18, 1921. No decree was filed, however, until February 2, 1922. On November 19th, Mary M. Strong, intervener, filed a motion asking the court to reopen the case for the purpose permitting her to make tender of- a warranty deed conveying the farm to plaintiff, together with an abstract showing a good, merchantable title, subject only to the $28,000 mortgage he had agreed to assume, and to permit her to file an amendment to her petition in intervention. On the same day, an amendment to her petition was filed, setting up facts designed to excuse her from taking title in herself prior to the submission of the case, and tendering other issues which would require further pleading by appellee. On November 23d, appellee filed a motion to strike the amendment to the petition in intervention, upon the ground that same was filed too late, and presented new issues for trial. On January 31, 1922, the court filed a written opinion, sustaining the motion to strike. Appellant intervener also appeals from this ruling by the court.
The rule is, of course, to permit amendments; but permission is granted or refused in the sound discretion of the court.
We have examined the' record with care, and reach the conclusion that the decree of the court below is right; and it is, therefore, — Affirmed.