Lead Opinion
Opinion by
In 1947 thе School Board of the Borough of Ephrata, which has 8,000 inhabitants, 2 elementary schools and a high school, ordered a school census for the purpose of determining its future school building requirements. From this census it was calculated that by the beginning of the 1952-53 term, another school building containing thrеe rooms for three grades and accommodating from 60 to 65 students would be required. For the 1953-54 term 3 more rooms would be needed.
On July 10, 1950, the School Board met and decided to purchase the land of the plaintiffs, known as the Winger Farm, for the school building intended, and to this end offered the owners of thе farm, the plaintiffs in this case, |22,500, which the plaintiffs declined. On December 4, 1950, the School Board met again in this matter and adopted a resolution authorizing the acquisition by condemnation proceedings of the property in question, which embraced 54.894 acres.
The plaintiffs filed a bill of complaint in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas for an injunction restraining the School Directors of the School District of the Borough of Ephrata and the School District of the Borough of Ephrata, more conveniently referred to herein as the School Board, from initiating eminent domain proceedings against the Winger Farm. The Bill of Complaint was dismissed and an appeal to this Court followed.
The Public School Code of 1949, P. L. 30, Art. VII, sec. 703 (24 P.S. sec. 7-703) provides inter alia that:
The appellants do not question, and indeed cannot question, that the School Board has the power by this statute and under the Constitution of the Commonwealth itself, to take private property for school building purposes. They do, however, challenge the extent of that power, and properly so. Therе is no authority under our form of government that is unlimited. The genius of our democracy springs from the bedrock foundation on which rests the proposition that office is held by no one whose orders, commands or directives are not subject to review. The power of eminent domain, next to that of conscription of man power for war, is the most awesome grant of power under the law of the land. Article 1, Section 10 of our Pennsylvania Constitution, declares: “. . . nor shall private property be. taken or applied to public use, without authority of law and without just compensation being first made or secured.”
It is to be emphasized, however, that the restriction in this clause is not limited to the guarantee of just compensation. The condemnation may not take place at all without authority of law.
Did the School Board of Ephrata have authority of law to take 55 acres of land for a school building which would accommodate 65 pupils?
Although the Board here proceeded vigorously in the assumed interests of the people of the borough, the zeal exercised in the execution of its duties was as excessive
One witness testified, for instance, that the vice president of the Board said that the Board could take more land than it needed for the school building and then sell what remained over. Obviously no school board can, even in this indirect fashion, go into the rеal estate business.
The record shows quite clearly that the Board moved precipitately and without adequate preparation for the exercise of so solemn a power as that of eminent domain. No definite plans had been formulated as to the use to be made of the 55 acres. Although the Board knew that so vast an acreage could swallow up one building and many more, no specifications as to the proposed building had yet been indicated; no architect had been retained, and no surveys of the property had been made. Nor had any definitive location on the tract been designated for the intended structure. A bond issue of |150,0Q0 had been approved at the election of November, 1950, for the purpose of purchasing land and constructing a school building, but no estimate of construction costs was yet available.
The darkness in which the directors moved in this most serious business of condemnation of private property was further evidenced by the fact that, although it was generally admitted 55 acres was excessive acreage for the public use intended, the directors were prepared to condemn 71 aсres for that purpose had they known the plaintiffs owned an additional tract of 16 acres, title to which was not recorded at the time. Director R. Y. Grube testified: “Q. Would you have voted for that resolution if you had known there was an additional 16 acres, I am talking about the condemnation resolution? A. I don’t think anyone knew. Q. Would you have voted for all of the farm? A. I would have. Q. To
The members of the Ephrata School Board envisaged a vaguely formed program for the future which would encompass additional rooms to the building to be erected, a junior high school and a football field. But there was no money in the treasury or even in thought for such a program. The Lancaster School Building hereinbefore referred to cost $850,000.
The State Council of Education had approved the condemnation of the 55 acre tract, but this is no evidence of necessity for the condemnation since, as Dr. Bowman, who had been with the Department of Education for 33 years and now occupies an important post in that department, testified, the Council never denied approval of a site because it was too large. He further stated that the minimum requirement established by the State Council of Education as to the size of school sites for elementary schools was two acres for a two-room school and one additional acre for each additional fifty students, and that he would have approved the erection of the Ephrata proposed school on a 10 acre tract.
Although there is a presumption that school directors perform discretionary acts in the interests of public welfare and that their decisions have been reached by the exercise of intelligent judgment and in a legal manner after suitable investigation (Hibbs v. Arensberg,
It was very early held by this Court in Lance’s Appeal,
In the celebrated case of Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia,
What the Legislature cannot do, a, fortiori a school district may not do.
This decision is not intended to restrict the defendants in taking such action, not inconsistent with this opinion, as may be necessary to meet the needs of the School District of the Borough of Ephrata.
Decree reversed, costs to be paid by appellees.
Concurrence Opinion
Concurring Opinion by
This bill in equity was brought by the owners of a tract of land in Lancaster County seeking to enjoin the School Directors of the Borough of Ephrаta from making any use of the land pursuant to a resolution condemning it for school purposes. The learned court below found that the School Board had acted properly within its discretion in condemning the land and dismissed the bill. This appeal followed.
I agree that the action of the School Board cannot be sustained, but my reason for so deciding is entirely different from that stated in the majority opinion. I am in full accord with the following statement in the opinion of the learned court below: “The power to select school sites is vested by the legislature in the school distriсts, and their judgment in the matter will not be disturbed unless there is a well-founded abuse of dis
“In the instant case, the personnel of the defendant school board comprises a group of outstanding professional men, bankers and business men from the defendant school district. The testimony discloses that they made serious study and investigation before selecting plaintiffs’ property for school purposes; that they had a survey made of the additional families, the increase in population, and the number of children of kindergarten age, taking into consideration the necessity of sufficient land for futurе expansion and deciding that the plaintiffs’ land was the most practical location in proximity to the borough and its streets, and yet with little or no hazardous traffic conditions. The vote was by a majority vote of all of the members of the board. The site was approved by the County Board and by thе State Council of Education; and the survey made revealed that it is desirable because of its geographical location in that it is well related to the community to be served for future expansion, and is readily accessible to all pupils who are to attend the school to bе constructed on it.”
It requires a clear showing of abuse of discretion to justify setting aside the judgment of the School Board, the State Council of Education, and the Court of Common Pleas of the County in which the School District lies. It is not an abuse of discretion for the School Board to select the most suitable tract of land for its purposes and then purchase or condemn such land as a tract without computing the precise acreage which is required. Such mathematical accuracy in the determination of the area of ground required for school
The weakness of the Board’s position lies in the narrow wording of the condemnation resolution which purported to “condemn for the purpose of erecting thereon and furnishing and equipping of an elementary school building for the School District . . .” (emphasis supplied). It is well-settled that the exercise of the power of еminent domain is always construed strictly against the condemnor: Lance’s Appeal,
For this reason, and for this reason alone, I concur in the decree of reversal.