91 Ala. 204 | Ala. | 1890
Reference is had to .the reports of this case as heretofore presented and decided in this court, for a fuller understanding of the matters involved in the present ajipeal.—Holt v. Wilson, 75 Ala. 58; Wilson v. Holt, 83 Ala. 528; Wilson v. Holt, 85 Ala. 595.
When the case was first here, it was ruled, (1) that by the ante-nuptial contract between Wilson and Mrs. Chambliss, an express trust was, in effect, declared on the part of the latter, to stand seized of the legal title to the use of her intended
The decision of these points was not departed from on either of the subsequent adjudications of this court in the premises; the averments of the bill in respect to them remain the same as when the cause was first appealed; the evidence subsequently taken supports these allegations, and we now re-aifirm the conclusion then reached, as to the date at which the period of twenty years, relied on to raise up a presumption of settlement of the trust, began to run. This date was, as we have seen, January 20, 1866'.
The land was sold in 1877, and 1879, by the administrator of Mrs. Campbell, formerly Mrs. Wilson; and ITolt and others became the purchasers, went into possession, and afterwards and prior to the filing of this bill paid the purchase-money in full, and the same was duly distributed to, and received by those entitled to it under the testatrix's will. The bill was originally filed against the purchasers at these sales, and certain vendees to whom parts of the land had been sold by them, and also against the devisees of Mrs. Wilson. Upon their demurrer, these latter were stricken out, and the cause proceeded against said purchasers and their said vendees, until it was developed that the sale by the administrator cum annexo testamento was void for the want of jurisdictional allegations in the petition for the order of sale, and so adjudged by this court on the second appeal.—83 Ala. 528.
When the cause was last here, it was held that, the administrator’s sale being inoperative to divest the legal title to the land out of the devisees of Mrs. Wilson, it was still in them;
The trust having been repudiated on January 20, 1866, it is manifest, of course, that the twenty years necessary to raise up a presumption of its settlement and discharge had more than elapsed on April 11, 1889, when the amendment bringing in the holders of the legal title was made ; and it is not pretended that there had been any recognition of the trust in the meantime. There can be no sort of doubt, we apprehend, that the amendment by which these parties were brought in, must stand upon the same footing, so far as their defense of staleness of demand is concerned, as if it were an original action; and, hence, any relief sought against them must be considered, in respect of the diligence with which they have been impleaded, from the standpoint of the amendment, and without reference to the filing of the original bill.—Lawrence v. Bollan, 50 Cal. 528; Miller v. McIntyre, 6 Pet. 64; King v. Avery, 37 Ala. 169; Seibs v. Englehardt, 78 Ala. 508, and citations.
This general proposition is not controverted here, but it is insisted for appellant that, under the peculiar facts of this case, it can have no application. The considerations relied on to this end are, that- Holt and others, claiming under the void administrator’s sale, had a perfect equitable title to the land, resulting from the paymeut by them to the administrator of the entire purchase-money, and its payment by the administrator to these dev.'s -e-¡, who alone had any interest in the land, or the proceeds of its sale, and that the devisees now have, or had at the time they were made parties, no beneficial interest whatever in the subject-matter of the suit, but ‘-only the mere shell of a legal title, with no kernel of equity or beneficial interest in it.” These facts may b¿, indeed they are, admitted. Hot only so, but they were in the case as heretofore presented in this court; and the rulings then made, declaring these devisees to be necessary parties, must have proceeded in
But, ii the subrogation of the complainant to the equity of Holt and others would effectuate the relief he prays, we are unable to see how the subrogation itself is to be effected. That equity arose upon certain facts with which the complainant had nothing to do. It exists by reason of an estoppel to which he is an utter stranger. All that occurred in that connection was res inter alios aeta with respect to the complainant. Holt and his co-defendants, who claim under the administrator’s sale, have a perfect equitable title, by reason of matters transpiring between them and the holders of the legal title, which operate to estop the latter from disputing their right to the land. Though the sale was void, they paid the purchase-money in full, and it went into the hands of the devisees, who now, having this money, can not be heard to say that the transaction out of which it issued to them was void, and that, notwithstanding they have been as fully benefited thereby as if it had been in all respects valid, and retain the benefits thus accruing to them, the land still belongs to them.
The devisees are not only necessary parties to this bill, they are the only necessary parties. The' complainant seeks that which they alone have, lie prays relief which they alone can give. He asserts that they have a title, the legal title, which in equity belongs to him, and which chancery should vest in him. This title is not his through them, but over them, and came to them charged with the trust which he now asks to have executed. His equity is not subsequent, but anterior and paramount to their title. He claims, therefore, not in privity with them, not under them, but by a covenant antedating their succession to the legal title, and running with the land. No privity can be predicated of these facts, showing as they do a prior paramount right in the complainant on the one hand, and a subsequent succession by the devisees on the other; and hence no estopped of the complainant, on the idea of a succession by him to the title of the devisees, can arise in favor of the purchasers, and no estoppel which the latter have against the devisees can enure to the complainant.—Bigelow on Estoppel, (5th Ed.) 347-8; Waters’ Appeal, 35 Pa. St. 523; Campbell v. Hall, 16 N. Y. 575; Doe v. Derby, 1 Ad. & El. 783.
Then,'too, the propriety of bringing in the purchasers may, perhaps, be rested on the consideration, that their possession was adverse to the complainant, and if they were not made parties within ten years from the time it took on that character, might ripen into title against him. But this clearly did not involve a necessity to make them parties, even conceding the continuance of their possession for the requisite period, whilst this bill was pending against the devisees, would have that effect; for non constat, but that a decree would pass vesting the legal title in complainant, and enabling him to bring ejectment before the lapse of ten years of such adverse possession.
The decree of the chancellor sustaining the defense of the staleness of the demand interposed by the holders of the legal title in their demurrer to the bill, and in certain of the pleas filed, is in consonance with the views we have expressed; and it is affirmed.