Appellant Woodrow Wilson was indicted for distribution of cocaine in violation of D.C.Code § 33-541(a)(l). Following a mistrial after two days of jury deliberations, he was convicted by a jury after a second trial. On appeal he contends that the trial judge erred by allowing the prosecutor, over defense objections, to impeach him with his criminal convictions after the prosecutor had advised defense counsel and the trial judge before trial that there were no impeachable convictions. Specifically, he contends that his right to select a jury, by exercise of peremptory challenges, and his right to decide whether to go to trial, or to enter plea negotiations with the government, were prejudiced. Therefore, appellant maintains that his due process rights were violated and his conviction should be reversed. We agree that the prosecutor’s pretrial statement was an assurance on which defense counsel could reasonably rely, and that its breach during trial prejudiced appellant. Accordingly, we reverse. 1
*1019 I
Around midnight October 31, 1989, undercover police officer Michael Quander was approached by Michael Pointer, who asked the officer if he was “looking” for drugs. Quander replied that he “wanted a 20,” meaning a small amount of crack cocaine. He then followed Pointer to the rear of the carry-out, where they approached a man whom Quander later identified as appellant. Pointer asked appellant “to give him one,” and appellant handed Pointer an “off-white substance that was already in his hand.” Pointer handed the object to Officer Quander, who gave appellant twenty dollars in pre-recorded funds. The officer never spoke to appellant during the drug transaction.
Officer Quander returned to his car, and broadcast a “lookout” description of the two men. He described appellant as “a black male, about five-eight, five-nine, medium to dark complected, wearing a red shirt and blue sweat pants.” A police arrest team apprehended Pointer in front of the carry-out, and Quander drove by to confirm his identification. Pointer was searched but nothing was found on his person.
Twenty to twenty-five minutes later, Officer Quander noticed appellant on the corner of Eastern Avenue and Rhode Island Avenue. Appellant was wearing the same clothing he had worn earlier, except that he now wore a green hat. Quander broadcast a “lookout,” and an arrest team detained appellant; no pre-recorded funds or narcotics were found on him. A member of the arrest team testified, as did an expert witness.
Appellant’s defense was innocent presence. He testified that he lived near the carry-out and had left home around 12:05 a.m. on November 1,1989 to buy some egg rolls for his pregnant wife at the carry-out; he had approximately three dollars with him. He was wearing blue sweat pants and a red sweat shirt with FILA on it. On his way to the carry-out he was arrested. He denied speaking to anyone or participating in the sale of drugs. On cross examination he was impeached with two 1977 convictions, one for sodomy and the other for indecent acts. Appellant’s wife also testified, corroborating his testimony that she had asked her husband to get some egg rolls shortly after midnight.
In rebuttal, the government called Michael Pointer, who claimed that appellant was with him behind the carry-out early on the morning of November 1, 1989. Pointer claimed that he had approached a man who turned out to be Officer Quander, and brought Quander to appellant. According to Pointer, appellant had given Pointer “a loose twenty rock” of crack cocaine, and Pointer had sold it to Quander. Pointer admitted on cross examination that he had entered into a plea agreement to testify against appellant in return for a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of attempted distribution of cocaine. He also conceded that he did not have an arrangement for selling drugs that evening with appellant, and he denied knowing where the drugs came from.
II
At a pretrial status conference before the second trial, the trial judge inquired of the prosecutor, “What about impeachable convictions?” The prosecutor replied, “No, ma’am.” Appellant contends that the prosecutor’s statement was an implicit if not explicit promise that appellant would not be impeached with his prior convictions were he to testify. He further contends that although defense counsel had access to information about appellant’s prior convictions, defense counsel was entitled to rely on the prosecutor’s assurance in preparing for trial and presenting a defense. Therefore, he continues, the prosecutor’s mid-trial disclosure of his intention to impeach appellant was a breach of the promise, prejudiced appellant by causing him to forego opportunities to exercise peremptory challenges and to engage in plea negoti *1020 ations, and was fundamentally unfair. The government responds that the prosecutor’s response to the trial judge’s pretrial inquiry was not a promise, but was only “a mistaken response to the trial court’s administrative inquiry,” and that appellant has failed to show any detrimental reliance. 2
A
In a series of decisions the court has concluded that a prosecutor’s pretrial representation of the government’s intention creates an obligation to inform the defense and the trial court of new information in a timely manner since the defense and the court are entitled to rely on the prosecutor’s pretrial representation. Where the prosecutor fails to honor his or her pretrial obligation, and the defendant is prejudiced, the court has reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.
Thus, in
Rosser v. United States,
Likewise in
McCall v. United States,
In
Smith v. United States,
These decisions are in accord with decisions of the Supreme Court that a promise may be implied as a result of actions by the government, and that, although implicit, such a promise still binds the government.
See Wainwright v. Greenfield,
The government’s position in the instant case, that the prosecutor’s pretrial response to the trial judge’s inquiry about impeachable convictions amounted to no more than “a mistaken understanding of the law as to whether the previously disclosed prior convictions were usable for impeachment purposes under D.C.Code § 14-305(b),” is unpersuasive for several reasons.
First, the trial judge’s inquiry occurred during a pretrial conference at which the judge was attempting to find out how the trial would proceed and what issues would arise that could be addressed prior to trial. Thus, the judge’s question about impeachable convictions was designed to promote the efficient administration of justice, avoiding mid-trial delays, such as occurred here, and other potential problems.
See Reed v. United States,
The trial judge observed that she routinely requested the information about impeachable convictions as an administrative *1022 matter, explaining that she did so in order to understand how the trial would proceed and so that she would be in a position to decide before the trial began whether the government, in fact, had proof of appellant’s prior convictions, and if so, whether they could be used to impeach appellant if he testified. The wisdom of such an inquiry is demonstrated here. While the judge ultimately concluded that it was “very clear” under the statute that the convictions could be used for impeachment, two mid-trial recesses were required, the last involving the release of the jury, so that the judge could examine the law. 8 Had the prosecutor correctly informed the judge prior to trial, the delays, as well as the confusion about the law, could have been avoided. In addition, defense counsel would have been on notice before trial that the government could, if it chose to, impeach appellant if he testified.
Second, the prosecutor’s mid-trial announcement to the trial judge that he intended to impeach appellant if he testified, indicates that the prosecutor’s pretrial response had been intended to inform the judge that the government would not impeach appellant with his prior convictions. 9 Before calling the last witness in the government’s case-in-chief, the prosecutor informed the trial judge that he had now concluded that appellant’s prior conviction in 1977 for indecent acts could be used to impeach appellant, and that the government intended to impeach appellant with them should he testify. 10 Defense counsel objected, stating that “when I originally had discovery in this case, it was the Government’s position that there were no impeachable convictions.” Defense counsel noted that the government had not used the convictions at the first trial. Claiming that the prosecutor’s last-minute change in position was prejudicial to appellant, defense counsel argued that the nature of the convictions — “sexual crimes of long ago”— made them highly prejudicial, and that had counsel known of the prosecutor’s plans counsel might have requested additional questions on voir dire and also might have “selected a different kind of juror.” Defense counsel also stated that if the government was allowed to use the convictions, then counsel would “seriously consider rethinking [her] position” about putting appellant on the witness stand. The prosecutor did not respond. Thus, the trial record indicates that both counsel and the trial judge had proceeded to trial on the basis of the assurance that appellant would not be impeached with prior convictions.
Furthermore, it is clear that defense counsel’s reliance on the prosecutor’s representation was reasonable. The prosecutor’s pre-second-trial assurances were consistent with the government’s conduct at appellant’s first trial where the government had not impeached appellant with his convictions. The fact that the first trial resulted in a mistrial, when the jury could not agree, might cause defense counsel to be wary of the possibility that the government might change its strategy at a second trial. But there was no reason here for
*1023
defense counsel to doubt that the prosecutor’s response to the judge’s question was an assurance that appellant would not be impeached if he testified.
See Rosser, supra,
It is, of course, true that both government and defense counsel are charged with knowing the law; so is the court. But the government’s suggestion that the judge’s pretrial inquiry sought a legal opinion from the prosecutor is somewhat strained. Rather, the judge’s inquiries sought counsel’s view of how the case would be tried. Depending on the prosecutor’s responses, the judge presumably would inquire further as was her general practice.
See Reed, supra,
Therefore, we hold that the prosecutor’s pretrial assurance was a promise not to impeach appellant with his prior convictions were he to testify that was breached when the prosecutor was allowed to use the convictions to impeach appellant, and that defense counsel could reasonably rely on the prosecutor’s assurance in preparing and conducting the defense.
B
The question remains whether the prosecutor’s breach of his pretrial promise prejudiced appellant.
13
The government maintains, by an analogy to the contract doctrine of promissory estoppel, that even if the prosecutor’s statement could be considered a promise, appellant has failed to show any detrimental reliance on that promise prior to the government’s revocation or any “unavoidable injustice.”
Bender v. Design Store Corporation,
404 A.2d
*1024
194, 196 (D.C.1979);
Moss v. Stockard,
There is record evidence that might well support the trial judge’s finding that, with regard to appellant’s decision about whether to testify at trial, appellant was not prejudiced by the government’s mid-trial change of position. Defense counsel had not made an opening statement and, thus, had not indicated to the jury that appellant would testify. Also, although this was apparently not a factor in the judge’s decision, the defense, in fact, had the weekend to consider whether appellant should testify.
15
Further, there is record evidence that might support the judge’s statement that she would have been unlikely to have allowed questions of the jury panel during voir dire about appellant’s prior convictions because of concern about prejudicing appellant.
16
See Jenkins v. United States,
The Supreme Court has pointed out in a series of decisions that breach of a government promise, even when it is not explicit, may be “fundamentally unfair” to the due process rights of a defendant.
See Wainwright v. Greenfield, supra,
Likewise here, appellant contends, the prosecutor’s promise not to impeach him
*1025
with his prior convictions if he waived his constitutional right to remain silent “was, in essence, an assurance that the decision to testify (and forgo his constitutional right) would ‘not be jeopardized.’ ”
Wainwright v. Greenfield, supra,
Peremptory challenges are “viewed as ‘one of the most important rights secured to the accused.’ ”
Wells v. United States,
Here, immediately after the prosecutor announced his intent to impeach appellant if he testified, defense counsel objected, stating that had she been aware of the prosecutor’s intent to impeach appellant with highly prejudicial prior convictions, she might have selected a different jury. The trial judge did not address this objection, the prosecutor did not challenge it, and thus, this court is presented with an unchallenged defense claim that a different jury might have been selected. Nor was the defense claim implausible; picking a jury has developed into an art form and different considerations might well affect jury selection for a defendant who knows he will be impeached with convictions for sex offenses. The judge’s mid-trial decision to allow the prosecutor to impeach appellant, therefore, had the effect of interfering with “the full, unrestricted exercise by the accused of that right.”
Cash, supra,
The government’s pretrial assurances placed appellant in the position of proceeding to trial on the basis of the government’s representation that could have affected the kind of a jury appellant would have wanted at this trial.
See Lewis, supra,
In addition, although appellant has “no constitutional right to plea bargain,”
Weatherford v. Bursey,
The government was aware that appellant’s defense of innocent presence rested on his testimony and, in the face of the previous mistrial, can be deemed to know that the result of the second trial would turn on his credibility. The prosecutor, by breaching his promise, in effect “caught” appellant in the position of having gone to trial with the idea that he could testify without being impeached and not learning until mid-trial that he would face impeachment with highly prejudicial prior convictions if he testified.
See Rosser, supra,
Accordingly, because defense counsel reasonably relied on the prosecutor’s pretrial assurances that appellant would not be impeached with his prior convictions if he testified at trial to the detriment of his exercise of peremptory challenges in selecting a jury and his evaluation of whether to go to trial, we reverse the judgment and remand the ease for a new trial.
Notes
. In view of our disposition, we do not reach appellant’s alternative contention that the *1019 government violated Super.Ct.Crim.R. 16 when it failed to disclose appellant's impeachable convictions prior to trial,
. After oral argument, the court requested the parties to file supplemental briefs on whether appellant’s due process rights were violated when the government was allowed to impeach appellant after stating before trial that there were no impeachable convictions, and whether the prosecutor’s statement was a promise that the government did not intend to impeach appellant if he testified. Order of October 16, 1991. We thank the parties for their supplemental briefs.
.
See Yoon
v.
United States,
. The judge indicated that counsel would also be permitted to follow up with questions on voir dire. The judge reviewed in detail the procedures she followed during voir dire, including the manner in which counsel were to exercise their ten peremptory challenges.
. At this time defense counsel indicated that the defense would call a total of two witnesses after the trial judge inquired whether the defense would have two witnesses plus appellant. Hence, at this point it was unclear whether appellant would testify. The prosecutor indicated only that the co-defendant "may" be used by the government.
.
Drew
v.
United States,
.
Toliver v. United States,
. D.C.Code § 14-305(b)(2)(B) (1989 Repl.) provides in relevant part that:
no evidence of any conviction of a witness is admissible under this section if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the later of (i) the date of the release of the witness from confinement imposed for his most recent conviction of any criminal offense, or (ii) expiration of the period of his parole, probation, or sentence granted or imposed with respect to his most recent conviction of any criminal offense.
At the time of the second trial, appellant was on parole for his convictions of sodomy and indecent acts.
.
See Reed, supra,
.The prosecutor stated:
During the preliminaries before jury selection, I represented that [appellant] didn't have any impeachable convictions. Since that time I have taken a closer look at the file and have talked to a couple of other people in the office and have come to the conclusion that he does, in fact, have a conviction of indecent acts in 1977 for which he was sentenced on — he was sentenced on January the 24th of '77 and is still on parole. It is my understanding of the law that since the sentence did extend into the 10-year time period that he can be impeached based on that conviction.
.For example, a prosecutor could reasonably decide not to impeach the defendant in order to avoid the risk of jury sympathy for the defendant where, for example, a conviction is old or the conviction relates to events that might, as here, jeopardize the defendant’s family. (There was evidence appellant’s wife was pregnant, and it was unclear whether she was aware of the 13-year old convictions). Old convictions might, at times, be difficult to verify with certified copies of the judgments of conviction, witnesses difficult to locate, and a defendant’s denial could result in a mistrial. (The trial judge was unable to locate the court jacket for the prior convictions.) Old convictions unrelated to the crime charged might also be viewed as being of questionable relevance. Some prior convictions might be more trouble than they are worth, either because they are highly inflammatory and prejudicial, as was suggested by defense counsel and as the trial judge agreed regarding the indecent acts convictions, or because they are relatively minor and would do little to advance the government’s case, as could be true with very old convictions.
.
Cf. (Archie) Lewis
v.
United States,
.
Smith, supra,
. Appellant was sentenced to a prison term of four to twelve years. See D.C.Code § 33-541(c)(1)(A) (imposing a mandatory minimum sentence of four years).
. The continuance was granted so that appellant’s wife would be available to testify, not to afford appellant time to decide whether or not to change his mind about testifying in light of the prosecutor’s statement that he would impeach appellant with his prior convictions.
. The trial judge stated:
I generally would not bring it up on an impeachable conviction where your client may or may not take the stand, and you have informed them all that he has these convictions. Even if he then decides not to do it, you have already told them. So, my inclination would have been, if he requested it, frankly not to ask it and plant an idea, particularly where it can be used only in a narrow area.... If he decides not to take the stand, they will all be speculating that is why he didn’t do it as opposed to the fact that he doesn’t have the burden.
.See generally Johnson
v.
United States,
. Where a defendant claims a violation of the procedures under Rule 24, in order to show that his effective use of peremptories was denied, "a defendant must establish how the constitution of the jury would have been any different or more preferable had the proper procedures [under Rule 24] been followed.”
Cash, supra,
. Under the circumstances presented to the trial judge, we are unpersuaded by the government’s contention that appellant waived this claim. The prosecutor’s mid-trial announcement came without forewarning to defense counsel, thereby placing counsel in the position of presenting objections for which counsel had no previous reason to prepare.
See McCall, supra,
