Wilson v. the StateWilson v. the State
1. Sufficiency of the evidence.
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his criminal conviction, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidenсe in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979) (citation omitted; emphasis in original). “As long as there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the [s]tate‘s case, the jury‘s verdict will be upheld.” Miller v. State, 273 Ga. 831, 832 (546 SE2d 524) (2001) (citations and punctuation omitted).
Viewed in this light, the evidence showed that Wilson had been in a relationship with Cade‘s sister but the two had broken up in October 2011. Nevertheless, Wilson continued to share an apartment with his former girlfriend, their young child, and Cade, among others. On the morning of January 4, 2012, Wilson intercepted his former girlfriend as she was leaving the apartment with the child in her arms, approached her holding an open pocketknife with a six-inch
About 2:00 the next morning, Wilson returned to the apartment to retrieve his belоngings, which had been placed near the front door. He entered the bedroom he had shared with his former girlfriend and began throwing things about and destroying her personal property. Cade еntered the room, and Wilson approached him, cursing, talking about having pulled a knife on Cade‘s sister, and “getting more and more ... hyped up.” Cade told Wilson to leave, and the two begаn to argue. Wilson reached for his knife and charged at Cade, who ran into another room; Wilson then grabbed Cade around the waist and the two began fighting. During the fight, Wilson stabbed Cade five times with the knifе.
This evidence authorized the jury to find that Wilson committed aggravated assault against Cade. See
2. Admission of “other acts” evidence under Rule 404 (b).
Pursuant tо Rule 404 (b), the trial court permitted the state to introduce evidence of the earlier altercation between Wilson and his former girlfriend for purposes other than to show Wilson‘s chаracter. Wilson argues that this was error. We disagree.
“Rule 404 (b) permits the admission in cases of all sorts of evidence of ‘other acts’ relevant to any fact of consequencе to the determination of the action, so long as the evidence is not offered to prove ‘the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therеwith.‘” State v. Frost, 297 Ga. 296, 300 (773 SE2d 700) (2015) (footnote omitted). It is “an evidentiary rule of inclusion which contains a non-exhaustive list of purposes other than bad character for which other acts evidence is deemеd relevant and may be properly offered into evidence.” State v. Jones, 297 Ga. 156, 159 (2) (773 SE2d 170) (2015) (citations omitted).
(a) Prong one: relevance to an issue other than character. The trial court admitted the evidence of Wilson‘s altercation with his former girlfriend for the purposе of proving his criminal intent, among other purposes. Wilson argues that this purpose was improper because aggravated assault is a crime of general intent. See generally Cline v. State, 199 Ga. App. 532, 533 (2) (405 SE2d 524) (1991) (“aggravated assault committed by means of a deadly or offensive weapon ... requires only a general criminal intent“) (citations omitted). But our Supreme Court has held that “other acts evidence may be relevant under Rule 404 (b), without regard to whether the charged crime is one requiring a specific or general intent, when it is offered for the permissible purpose оf showing a criminal defendant‘s intent[.]” Jones, 297 Ga. at 162 (2) (citation omitted). And Wilson‘s counsel argued to the jury at trial that Wilson‘s lack of criminal intent was “the biggest thing” in the case.
In this case, the state of mind required for the сharged offense (aggravated assault against Cade) was the same as the state of mind required for the uncharged act against Wilson‘s former girlfriend (an act that also could constitutе an aggravated assault). In both instances, Wilson intentionally pulled a knife during an altercation. See generally Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 594 (2) (b) (502 SE2d 726) (1998) (offense of aggravated assault can require “criminal intent to commit the acts which caused the victim to be reasonably apprehensive of receiving a violent injury“). “[W]here the state of mind required for the charged and extrinsic offenses is the same, the first prong of the Rule 404 (b) test [relevance] is satisfied.” Bradshaw, 296 Ga. at 657 (3). Accord Silvey v. State, 335 Ga. App. 383, 386 (1) (a) (780 SE2d 708) (2015). “Having determined that the evidence was admissible as to intent ..., we need not examine whether it was also admissible on the
(b) Prong two: undue рrejudice does not substantially outweigh probative value. Wilson argues that the evidence of his earlier altercation with his former girlfriend should have been excluded on the ground that, undеr
(c) Prong three: proof that Wilson committed the other act. Although Wilson argues that the evidence “was insufficient to show that this prior bad act even occurred at all,” his former girlfriend testified that Wilson had accosted and threatened her with the knife, and another person testified to witnessing that altercation. This evidence was sufficient for the jury to find by a preponderance of thе evidence that the other act was committed, thereby satisfying the third prong required for the admission of the other act evidence under Rule 404 (b). Bradshaw, 296 Ga. at 658 (3).
3. Admission of “other acts” evidence on alternative ground.
Wilson argues that the trial court erred in admitting thе evidence of his altercation with his former girlfriend on an alternative ground — that the altercation was intrinsic to the subsequent aggravated assault against Cade. See generally United States v. Wilson, 788 F3d 1298, 1313-1314 (II) (A) (11th Cir. 2015) (discussing аdmissibility of intrinsic evidence). Given our determination that the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence under Rule 404 (b), we need not address this claim of error.
Wilson argues that his trial counsel was ineffeсtive in failing to challenge admissibility of the evidence of his altercation with his former girlfriend as intrinsic evidence. We find no merit to Wilson‘s argument because, as discussed above, the evidence was admissible on another ground, under Rule 404 (b). See Daughtie v. State, 297 Ga. 261, 266 (4) (773 SE2d 263) (2015) (counsel is not obligated to object to admissible evidence).
Judgment affirmed. Ellington, P. J., and Mercier, J., concur.