Alphonso S. WILSON, Petitioner v. STATE of Arkansas, Respondent
No. CR-05-870
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion Delivered October 6, 2016
2016 Ark. 327
PER CURIAM
Petitioner Alphonso S. Wilson is incarcerated in the Arkansas Department of Correction pursuant to a 2004 judgment reflecting his conviction for capital murder
Now before this court is Alphonso‘s pro se application to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for a writ of error coram nobis based on an allegation that exculpatory evidence had been withheld by the State. In support of the allegation, an affidavit is attached to the petition, executed by Denise and stating that she lied about Alphonso‘s participation in the murder. In the affidavit, Denise avers that the murder was committed by Charles at her encouragement, that Alphonso did not play a part in the murder because “it was already committed,” and that Alphonso did not have any idea that the murder was about to take place. Alphonso‘s petition and the attached affidavit fail to establish a basis for coram-nobis relief. Alphonso has also filed a motion “for a belated reply.” Because there is no provision that allows a petitioner to file a reply brief to a response to a coram-nobis petition, the motion to file a belated reply brief is also denied.
We first note that a petition filed in this court for leave to proceed in the trial court where the judgment was entered is necessary because the trial court can entertain a petition for writ of error coram nobis after a judgment has been affirmed on appeal only after we grant permission. Roberts v. State, 2013 Ark. 56, at 11, 425 S.W.3d 771, 778. A writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinarily rare remedy. Howard v. State, 2012 Ark. 177, at 4, 403 S.W.3d 38, 42-43. Coram-nobis proceedings are attended by a strong presumption that the judgment of conviction is valid. Id. The function of the writ is to secure relief from a judgment rendered while there existed some fact that would have prevented its rendition if it had been known and which, through no negligence or fault of the defendant, was not brought forward before rendition of the judgment. Id. The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a fundamental error of fact extrinsic to the record. Id.
The writ is allowed only under compelling circumstances to achieve justice and to address errors of the most fundamental nature. Id. We have held that a writ of error coram nobis is available for addressing certain errors that are found in one of four categories: (1) insanity at the time of trial, (2) a coerced guilty plea, (3) material evidence withheld by the prosecutor, or (4) a third-party confession to the crime during the time between conviction and appeal. Id.
To the extent that Alphonso contends that the affidavit represents a third-party confession that Denise was Charles‘s sole accomplice to the crime, it is a confession that was made over ten years after Alphonso‘s conviction has been affirmed on appeal and therefore does not fit within the relief afforded by the writ. We have limited claims of third-party confessions to the period before affirmance of the judgment of conviction. Wallace v. State, 2015 Ark. 349, at 9-10, 471 S.W.3d 192, 198-99. This is so because the questions of fact, which invariably accompany an allegation of a third-party confession, demand prompt scrutiny. Id. (citing Brown v. State, 330 Ark. 627, 630, 955 S.W.2d 901, 902 (1997)). We have explained that the mere fact that another person has confessed to a crime cannot, alone, be grounds for relief as such confessions are not uncommon and must be approached with some skepticism. Wallace, 2015 Ark. 349, at 10, 471 S.W.3d at 199. Assessing the merits of a third-party confession requires that all of the evidence be available and unimpaired by the passage of time so that the trial court‘s examination can be exhaustive and decisive. Id. Our requirement that a claim of a third-party confession must be raised before affirmance serves to limit such claims to the time frame in which it is most likely that the trial court can determine with certainty whether the writ should issue. Id.
Furthermore, although Denise did not testify at Alphonso‘s trial, her recent affidavit recants statements she made to police that Charles and Alphonso committed the murder. Wilson, 364 Ark. at 552, 222 S.W.3d at 174. A claim of recanted testimony, standing alone, is not cognizable in an error-coram-nobis proceeding. McArthur v. State, 2014 Ark. 367, at 5, 439 S.W.3d 681, 684 (2014) (citing Anderson v. State, 2012 Ark. 270, 423 S.W.3d 20 (per curiam)). We are not required to accept the allegations in a petition for writ of error coram nobis at face value. Goff v. State, 2012 Ark. 68, at 3, 398 S.W.3d 896, 898 (per curiam). We are likewise not required to accept at face value the allegations set forth in an affidavit executed over ten years later that recants statements made to investigators immediately following the crime.
Finally, Alphonso fails to establish that the statements set forth in Denise‘s affidavit would have resulted in a different verdict. Taylor v. State, 303 Ark. 586, 594, 799 S.W.2d 519, 524 (1990). As set forth above, Alphonso was convicted based on his own admissions of guilt wherein he described his actions after his mother and brother
Petition denied; motion denied.