Wilson v. StateWilson v. State
This appeal involves the propriety of the trial court‘s denial of appellant‘s motion to sever in a criminal case.
Appellant and another defendant, Wright, were informed against in a five count information. The first three counts charged offenses against Wright only. The last two counts charged offenses against appellant only. The information did not charge each of the defendants with accountability for each of the offenses charged; it did not charge a conspiracy by the two defendants, nor did it allege that the several offenses charged were part of a common scheme or plan.
Prior to trial, at the commencement of the trial, and on several occasions during trial, appellant moved for a severance on the ground that joinder of the two defendants in the information in this case was improper under
“Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information upon which they are to be tried:
(1) when each defendant is charged with accountability for each offense charged;
(2) when each defendant is charged with conspiracy and some of the defendants are also charged with one or more offenses alleged to have been committed in furtherance of the conspiracy; or
(3) when, even if conspiracy is not charged and all defendants are not charged in each county, it is alleged that the several offenses charged were part of a common scheme or plan.”
On each occasion the court denied the motion. The jury found both defendants guilty. Appellant moved for a new trial, once again directing the court‘s attention to the improper joinder.
The sole point on appeal is whether a motion for severance must be granted when two or more defendants are joined in a multi-count indictment or information unless the charging document makes one of the following allegations: (a) each defendant is charged with accountability for
In Florida the requirements for joining several defendants in a multi-count charging document are found in
The state‘s argument that appellant has failed to show any prejudice resulting from the joint trial misses the mark. Procedural rights such as this are not to be granted or denied in the discretion of the court. They are vested rights the denial of which constitutes reversible error. Birge v. State, Fla. 1957, 92 So.2d 819; Raysor v. State, Fla.App. 1973, 272 So.2d 867. As pointed out in Metheany v. United States, 365 F.2d 90, 94-95 (9th Cir.1966):
“... any misjoined defendant who suffer[s] a conviction [is] entitled to a new trial separate from the others for the reason that `[i]t cannot be said in such case that all the defendants may not have been embarrassed and prejudiced in their defence, or that the attention of the jury may not have been distracted to their injury in passing upon distinct and independent transactions.‘”
This case was briefed and argued as though the joinder was based on the criteria set forth in
MAGER, J., and FISCHER, GENE, Associate Judge, concur.