Sаm Jerome Wilson appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Because Wilson’s motion was facially insufficient and because he may be able to cоrrect the deficiency, we reverse the order denying his motion and remand for entry of an order striking the motion, therеby affording him an opportunity to amend it if he is able to do so.
Wilson entered a no contest plea to chаrges of sale and possession of cocaine. In his sworn motion for postconviction relief, he allegеd that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to compel disclosure of the identity of the confidential informant (Cl). Wilson claimed that he did not sell cocaine to anyone, that he was not present during the drug trаnsaction, and that the Cl would have assisted in establishing a misidentifi-cation defense. He stated that he entered his no contest plea after counsel told him that there were no legal grounds to file the motion and that if he lost at trial rather than accepting the State’s plea offer of 34.5 months in prison, he would be sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment.
The postconviction court concluded that Wilson’s claim was too speculative becausе Wilson did not purport to know the identity of the Cl or the substance of the Cl’s testimony. The court observed that Wilson was speculating that the Cl possessed favorable testimony that would have prompted Wilson to proceed to trial with a misidentification defense rather than entering his plea.
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(g)(2) provides that “[d]islosurе of a confidential informant shall not be required unless the confidential informant is to be produced at a heаring or trial or a failure to disclose the informant’s identity will infringe the constitutional rights of the defendant.” In
Miller v. State,
Disclosure of a confidential informant is required if an informant’s identity or content of his сommunication is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused or is essential to a fair determinаtion of a cause. The first component necessarily centers around a specific defense asserted by the defendant in the case, as to which the informant’s testimony is material and helpful. The second component concentrates on general due process considerations and is not confined to a defense raised by the defendant.
If the defendant meets his “initial burden of showing that disclosure is necessary to a specific defense, the trial court should hold an in camera hearing to determine, in fact, whether the disclosure would be relеvant and helpful to the defense.”
State v. Roberts,
In his sworn motion for postconviction reliеf, Wilson alleged a colorable misidenti-fication defense, stating that he did not sell cocaine to anyonе and that he was not
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present during the underlying transaction.
See Miller,
Our limited record does not establish that Wilson would be unable to allege a facially sufficient claim for postconvietion relief. Wilson may be able to allege the Cl’s involvement in the drug transaction and how that involvement would assist Wilson in establishing a misidentification defense. If Wilson makes such allegаtions, the postconvietion court could then determine whether trial counsel’s failure to move for disclosure of the Cl’s identity was deficient performance and whether Wilson was prejudiced by any such deficient performance.
Because the motion was facially insufficient and because Wilson may be able to amend the motiоn to state a facially sufficient claim, the postconvietion court should have stricken the motion, thereby allowing Wilson an opportunity to amend it. See Spera v. State, 971 So.2d 754, 761 (Fla.2007). We note that the two-year time period in which Wilson may file a prоper motion for postconvietion relief has not yet expired. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b). Thus, if Wilson timely files an amended motion correcting the deficiencies, it shall not be treated as successive under rule 3.850(f) unless the postconviction court finds that Wilson’s conduct constitutes an abuse of procedure as described in that rule. 1 Accordingly, we reverse thе order denying Wilson’s motion and remand for entry of an order striking the motion.
Reversed and remanded.
Notes
. Wilson states in his motion that he previously filed a rulе 3.850 motion but that “it was returned” and “was facially insufficient.” Wilson does not refer to any order that was entered as to thаt motion, and the postconviction court made no reference to any prior filing by Wilson. Our record does not reflect what was contained in that earlier motion, and it is unclear whether that motion was actually acсepted for filing or was returned without being filed. Further, it is unclear whether Wilson has actually been afforded an opportunity to correct the deficiencies discussed in this opinion.