WILSON v. THE STATE
S06C1689
Supreme Court of Georgia
December 15, 2006
Reconsideration denied December 15, 2006.
642 SE2d 1
Richard E. Witterman, Jr., for appellee. Gerald R. Weber, Jr., Elizabeth L. Littrell, Margaret F. Garrett, amici curiae.
Upon consideration of the Motion for Reconsideration filed in this case, it is ordered that it be hereby denied.
All the Justices concur, except Sears, C. J., who dissents.
HUNSTEIN, Presiding Justice, concurring.
Wilson was convicted of aggravated child molestation based upon an act of oral sodomy performed on him by victim T. C., which was documented on videotape and seems to show that the victim‘s participation in the act was voluntary. Wilson was 17 years old at the time of the act; the victim was 15 years old. Pursuant to the version of the aggravated child molestation statute then in effect, Wilson was sentenced to ten years imprisonment without possibility of parole. See former
FOOTSTAR, INC. et al. v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
S06G0125
Supreme Court of Georgia
November 20, 2006
Reconsideration denied December 15, 2006.
637 SE2d 692
BENHAM, Justice.
Writ of certiorari denied October 2, 2006. Brenda J. Bernstein, Celeste S. Jenks, for appellant. J. David McDade, District Attorney, James E. Baker, Christopher R. Johns, James A. Dooley, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
In 1999, Felicia Stevens was injured on the job while Travelers Insurance Company provided workers’ compensation coverage for her employer, Footstar, Inc. She continued working and received medical benefits only. After Liberty Mutual Insurance Company became the workers’ compensation carrier for Footstar in 2001, Travelers sought a ruling that Stevens had suffered a fictional new injury, a ruling which would have shifted coverage to Liberty Mutual. However, an administrative law judge entered instead an award establishing the fact of Stevens‘s 1999 injury and rejecting the claim of a new injury. When Stevens became unable to continue working in January 2002, Footstar commenced voluntary payment of income benefits. In 2003, ruling on Stevens‘s claim for a formal award of income benefits, an administrative law judge concluded that since Stevens could not have had a change in condition because income benefits had never been paid pursuant to an award, a fictional new accident was deemed to have occurred January 5, 2002, the last day Stevens was able to work. The Appellate Division of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation reversed, holding that although the change-in-condition statute does not apply to “medical only” claims unless a compensable injury had been established by award, the 2001 award denying Travelers’ contention of a new injury was an award which established a compensable injury. Thus, the Appellate Division ruled, Stevens had suffered a change in condition, not a new injury, and Travelers remained responsible for coverage. The superior court affirmed, and in Footstar, Inc. v. Stevens, 275 Ga. App. 329 (620 SE2d 588) (2006), the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the superior court, noting that an award of medical expenses was held to be an award of compensation within the meaning of the original Workmen‘s Compensation Act and applying that principle to this case