199 Conn. 618 | Conn. | 1986
The plaintiff, James Wilson, brought this action to compel arbitration of his claim against the defendant, Security Insurance Group, based upon a policy of automobile insurance issued to the town of Woodbridge. His complaint alleges that this policy provides uninsured motorist coverage for his benefit with respect to injuries he received while on duty as a police officer of the town when he was struck by an unidentified automobile that fled the scene of the accident.
I
In its counterclaim the defendant sought a determination of two questions involving interpretation of the provisions of the insurance policy: (1) whether the plaintiff is permitted to stack uninsured motorist coverage in a case involving one vehicle in a fleet of thirty-one vehicles owned by the named insured, the town of Woodbridge; and (2) whether the defendant insurer, which also carries the workers’ compensation insurance
This court has previously construed a similar arbitration clause
II
The trial court appears to have relied, not on the language of the policy, in deciding that the counterclaim issues must be arbitrated, but upon General Statutes § 38-175c (a) (l).
The defendant does not dispute that we must read into the policy before us, in accordance with § 38-175c (a) (1), a provision for “final determination of insurance coverage” by arbitrators. Oliva v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 41; see General Statutes § 38-175d. It contends, however, that the term “insurance coverage” as used in the statute does not include the issues of fleet stacking and workers’ compensation setoff, which may require an interpretation of the statutes and regulations governing uninsured motorist benefits. We construe § 38-175c (a) (1) to make no distinction between coverage issues governed wholly by
The defendant insurer next raises two constitutional claims that are predicated upon our construction of § 38-175c (a) (1) as mandating arbitration of the legal questions raised in the counterclaim: (1) that to authorize arbitrators to make a final determination of these legal issues, precluding review by the courts, effectively allows them to exercise an essential judicial function allocated exclusively to judges by article second
The defendant maintains that to find that § 38-175c (a) (1) requires arbitration of disputes not encompassed by the terms of the policy transforms the character of the arbitration from voluntary to compulsory. The plaintiff points out, however, that the statute directs only that, if the policy contains a provision for binding arbitration, it must also provide for a determination of coverage by the arbitrators. Therefore, he
In mounting its constitutional attack upon § 38-175c (a) (1) the defendant implicitly assumes that the limited scope of judicial review of an arbitration award that is available where the parties have freely submitted a question to arbitrators is also applicable to an award where the submission is under legal compulsion, as in this case. Where the authority to arbitrate rests wholly upon contract, an unrestricted submission of a dispute to arbitrators carries with it the power to decide with finality all issues of fact or law relating thereto. Meyers v. Lakeridge Development Co., 173 Conn. 133, 135, 376 A.2d 1105 (1977). “Our courts will not review the evidence considered by the arbitrators . . . nor, where the submission is unrestricted, will they review the arbitrators’ decision of
Predicated upon the assumption
In support of its due process claim the defendant relies primarily upon our state constitutional provision, article first, § 10, that “[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his . . . property . . . shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.” Contending that greater rights of access to
We need not at this time, however, address the constitutional issues the defendant has raised, because the assumption on which they are based, that judicial review of the award to be made must be limited in scope to that available for voluntary arbitration, is not an inevitable conclusion. This court has suggested previously that the scope of judicial review available for compulsory arbitration awards need not be restricted to that permitted where parties have voluntarily submitted an issue to arbitrators. Carofano v. Bridgeport, 196 Conn. 623, 637, 495 A.2d 1011 (1985). “The simple and ineradicable fact is that voluntary arbitration and compulsory arbitration are fundamentally different if only because one may, under our system, consent to almost any restriction upon or deprivation of right, but similar restrictions or deprivations, if compelled by government, must accord with procedural and substantive due process.” Mount St. Mary’s Hospital v. Catherwood, 26 N.Y.2d 493, 500, 260 N.E.2d 508, 311 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1970). Courts of several states have recognized the need to broaden the scope of judicial review when arbitration is mandated by statute. Id.; Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins. Exchange v. Gavin, 416 Mich. 407, 433-34,
The issue of the appropriate scope of review of a compulsory arbitration award is not, however, properly raised by this appeal but must await the result of the arbitration that has been ordered. It would be inappropriate for this court to decide an issue upon which the trial court has yet to pass. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant has prematurely raised the constitutional issues upon which it seeks our determination, because they appear to depend entirely upon the assumption that the defendant will not be afforded in the trial court judicial review of the questions of law raised by its counterclaim.
IY
We agree with the defendant that the trial court should not have dismissed the counterclaim suo motu for lack of jurisdiction instead of granting the plaintiff’s motion to strike. “A court does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to entertain the action before it.” Monroe v. Monroe, 177 Conn. 173, 185, 413 A.2d 819 (1979). The Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the counterclaim for declaratory relief despite the adequacy of other legal remedies. England v. Coventry, 183 Conn. 362, 364, 439 A.2d 372 (1981). Subject matter jurisdiction is lacking only where the deficiency relied upon could not be cured by consent of the parties. Although we have construed § 38-175c (a) (1) to give either party a right to
The court concluded correctly, however, that, in the absence of consent or waiver, it would be wholly inappropriate to entertain the issues raised by the counterclaim until the arbitrators had made their award. The exercise of a sound discretion would not have permitted the defendant to proceed on its counterclaim. England v. Coventry, supra, 365; see Practice Book § 390 (c). The court, therefore, should have stricken the counterclaim in accordance with the plaintiffs motion instead of dismissing it. This procedural irregularity, however, has not prejudiced the defendant. In view of the result we have reached on the substantive issues, the defendant could not have successfully pleaded over nor has it advanced on appeal any reason for a remand to provide such an opportunity.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The arbitration clause considered in Frager v. Pennsylvania General Ins. Co., 155 Conn. 270, 274-75, 231 A.2d 531 (1967), was as follows: “If any person making claims hereunder and the company do not agree that such person is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury to the insured, or do not agree as to the amount of payment which may be owing under this part, then, upon written demand of either, the matter or matters upon which such person and the company do not agree shall be settled by arbitration . ... ”
The same case after remand was appealed once again after a trial on the merits. Frager v. Pennsylvania General Ins. Co., 161 Conn. 472, 289 A.2d 896 (1971).
“[General Statutes] Sec. 38-175c. uninsured motorist coverage. (a) (1) Every such policy shall provide insurance, herein called uninsured motorist coverage, in accordance with such regulations, with limits for bodily injury or death not less than those specified in subsection (a) of section 14-112, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and underinsured motor vehicles and insured motor vehicles, the insurer of which becomes insolvent prior to payment of such damages, because of bodily injury, including death resulting therefrom, provided each insurer licensed to write automobile liability insurance in this state shall provide such uninsured motorists coverage with limits requested by the named insured upon payment of the appropriate premium, but such insurer
Article second of our state constitution provides: “The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them confided to a separate magistracy, to wit, those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another.
Article fifth, § 1, of our state constitution provides: “The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, a superior court, and such lower courts as the general assembly shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. The powers and jurisdiction of these courts shall be defined by law.”
Article first, § 10, of our state constitution provides: “All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.”
“The grounds for vacating an award are restricted to (1) procurement of the award by ‘corruption, fraud or undue means’; (2) ‘evident partiality or corruption’ of an arbitrator; (3) misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing for sufficient cause; or (4) instances where ‘the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.’ General Statutes § 52-418. Awards may be modified only in the event of (1) a ‘material miscalculation of figures’ or ‘material mistake in the description’ of any person, thing or property referred to in the award; (2) an award upon a matter not submitted to the arbitrators unless it does not affect the merits of the decision upon the matters submitted; or (3) imperfections in matters of form not affecting the merits of the controversy. General Statutes § 52-419.” Carofano v. Bridgeport, 196 Conn. 623, 636, 495 A.2d 1011 (1985).
The defendant’s assumption that the scope of review of compulsory arbitration awards is no greater than in voluntary arbitration may be based upon our decision in Carroll v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 189 Conn. 16, 453 A.2d 1158 (1983f). In that case, however, the insurance company did not claim that the arbitration clause in the policy, which we construed