55 Wash. 656 | Wash. | 1909
Respondent brought this action to recover damages resulting to a wagon and horses and load, by reason of a collision between the wagon and one of appellant’s cars. Plaintiff recovered a judgment for $440. Defendant appeals.
The action arises out of the same accident, and is based upon the same facts, as stated in Wilson v. Seattle, Renton & S. R. Co., ante p. 651, 104 Pac. 1112. The plaintiff in this case is the owner of the wagon, team, and load, and is a brother of the driver who was injured in that case. In addition to the points there discussed, the appellant argues
The authorities cited by the respondent, and others which we have been able to find, indicate that the measure of damages in cases of injury to domestic animals is that “the owner is entitled to recover for the diminished market value of the animals after cure, so far as a cure was effected, and, in addition thereto, such expense as he incurred in reasonable attempts to effect a cure, and a reasonable sum or compensation for the loss of the use of the horses while under treatment, provided the whole damages do not exceed the original value of the property.” Keyes v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co., 36 Minn. 290, 30 N. W. 888, and cases there cited.
See, also, Ellis v. Hilton, 78 Mich. 150, 43 N. W. 1048, 18 Am. St. 438, 6 L. R. A. 454; Telfair County v. Webb, 119 Ga. 916, 47 S. E. 218; Gillett v. Western Railroad Corporation, 90 Mass. 560.
This rule limits the recovery for an injured animal to the original value of the animal. Such recovery may not exceed that amount. Thus limited, the rule seems just. If the injured animal was worth $350 before his injury, and $50 afterwards, the direct depreciation is $300. If the owner was
The original complaint alleged the depreciation in the value of the horse at $200. The evidence tended to show such depreciation at $300. After the close of the evidence, the court permitted the plaintiff to amend the complaint so as to allege the latter amount. Appellant now bases error thereon. The evidence was in the record. There was no motion to strike it, and it was within the discretion of the court to allow the amendment. If the appellant had been misled or had demanded time to procure evidence to meet this amendment, he might now be heard to complain. In the absence of such demand, the court did not err.
It is also claimed that the verdict of the jury was excessive. The trial court made a reduction of $50 in the amount of the verdict returned by the jury, and entered a judgment for $440. There is substantially no dispute in the evidence as to any item except the reasonable use of the horse for twenty days, alleged at seven dollars per day. The evidence shows that the horse was worth $350 before the accident, and $50 afterwards; that respondent paid $25 for the services of a veterinary surgeon; that the damages to the wagon were $75; to the harness $10, and to the load $5. So that, if any amount was allowed for the use of the horse, it could not have exceeded $25, which, added to the expense for the doctor and $300 depreciation in value, did not exceed the original value of the hprse. It was, therefore, not excessive.
The judgment is therefore affirmed.
Rudkin, C. J., Dunbar, Crow, and Parker, JJ., concur.