Case Information
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS CHRISTOPHER TODD WILSON,
Plaintiff,
v. CASE NO. 25-3061-JWL SALINE COUNTY JAIL, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Plaintiff Christopher Todd Wilson is hereby required to show good cause, in writing to the undersigned, why this action should not be dismissed due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s
Complaint that are discussed herein.
I. Nature of the Matter before the Court
Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is in custody at the Saline County Jail in Salina, Kansas (“SCJ”). The Court granted Plaintiff leave to
proceed in forma pauperis.
Plaintiff complains that he is being housed in the disciplinary pod at the SCJ when he is no longer “on disciplinary.” (Doc. 1, at 2.) He states that he came to the SCJ on October 20, 2024.
Since being at the SCJ, he has “caught 17 new misdemeanor charges for calling [his] wife for
violating a no contact order.” Id . As a facility sanction, he was given 30 days of disciplinary
segregation. On the day he was due to be released from disciplinary, Plaintiff was told by CO
Brandt that, per Captain Fruits, he was not leaving the disciplinary pod and was now on “admin
status.” Plaintiff was further told, “We are afraid if we let you out you are gonna violate your no
contact.” . at 3.
Plaintiff alleges that in disciplinary, he is restricted from using the kiosk to communicate with his attorney or anyone else. He has been told that use of the kiosk is a privilege. Plaintiff
asserts that his attorney “is a busy man who does not have time to write a letter” but will message
via the kiosk. Id . at 4. He argues that the kiosk restriction prevents him from being able to
effectively communicate with his attorney and “fight his case,” in violation of his Sixth
Amendment rights.
Plaintiff names as defendants: the Saline County Jail; (fnu) Fruits, Captain at the SCJ; and Marcia Crum, Sergeant/Classifications at the SCJ. Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of $75,000 for
the “mental anguish and anxiety” he has suffered, release from segregation, and “the grievance
procedure fixed.” . at 6.
II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are
legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that
seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–
(2).
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)
(citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson , 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court
liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts
all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake , 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th
Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise
a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550
U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
A pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106,
1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to
relief’ requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action.” Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint’s “factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did
it; how the defendant’s action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff
believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents , 492 F.3d 1158, 1163
(10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s
complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico , 113 F.3d
1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v.
Bemis , 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States ,
561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the
complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay , 500 F.3d at
1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the
line from conceivable to plausible.’” Smith , 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in
this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in
a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it
innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma , 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly , 127 S.
Ct. at 1974).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Defendants
Plaintiff names the SCJ as a defendant. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must
show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”
West v. Atkins , 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (emphasis added). Prison and jail facilities are not proper
defendants because none is a “person” subject to suit for money damages under § 1983. See Will
v. Michigan Dept. of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 66, 71 (1989); Clark v. Anderson , No. 09-3141-
SAC, 2009 WL 2355501, at *1 (D. Kan. July 29, 2009); see also Aston v. Cunningham , No. 99–
4156, 2000 WL 796086 at *4 n.3 (10th Cir. Jun. 21, 2000) (“a detention facility is not a person
or legally created entity capable of being sued”); Busekros v. Iscon , No. 95-3277-GTV, 1995 WL
462241, at *1 (D. Kan. July 18, 1995) (“[T]he Reno County Jail must be dismissed, as a jail is
not a ‘person’ within the meaning of § 1983.”). Plaintiff’s claims against the SCJ are subject to
dismissal.
Plaintiff also names Marcia Crum as a defendant but fails to mention her in the body of his Complaint. An essential element of a civil rights claim against an individual is that person’s direct
personal participation in the acts or inactions upon which the complaint is based. Kentucky v.
Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985); Henry v. Storey , 658 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir. 2011)
(“But § 1983 imposes liability for a defendant’s own actions—personal participation in the specific
constitutional violation complained of is essential.”) (citing Foote v. Spiegel , 118 F.3d 1416, 1423–
24 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Individual liability under § 1983 must be based on personal involvement in
the alleged constitutional violation.”) (citation omitted)); Trujillo v. Williams , 465 F.3d 1210, 1228
(10th Cir. 2006) (“In order for liability to arise under § 1983, a defendant’s direct personal
responsibility for the claimed deprivation . . . must be established.”) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted)). Conclusory allegations of involvement are not sufficient. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556
U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff
must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions,
has violated the Constitution.”). As a result, a plaintiff is required to name each defendant not only
in the caption of the complaint, but again in the body of the complaint and to include in the body
a description of the acts taken by each defendant that violated plaintiff’s federal constitutional
rights.
In addition, mere supervisory status is insufficient to create personal liability. Duffield v.
Jackson , 545 F.3d 1234, 1239 (10th Cir. 2008) (supervisor status is not sufficient to create § 1983
liability). An official’s liability may not be predicated solely upon a theory of respondeat superior.
Rizzo v. Goode , 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976); Gagan v. Norton , 35 F.3d 1473, 1476 FN4 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied , 513 U.S. 1183 (1995). A plaintiff alleging supervisory liability must show
“(1) the defendant promulgated, created, implemented or possessed responsibility for the
continued operation of a policy that (2) caused the complained of constitutional harm, and (3) acted
with the state of mind required to establish the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Dodds v.
Richardson , 614 F.3d 1185, 1199 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied , 563 U.S. 960 (2011). “[T]he
factors necessary to establish a [supervisor’s] § 1983 violation depend upon the constitutional
provision at issue, including the state of mind required to establish a violation of that provision.”
Id . at 1204 (citing Iqbal , 129 S. Ct. at 1949). Plaintiff’s claims against Crum are subject to
dismissal.
B. Compensatory Damages
Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of $75,000 for the “mental anguish and anxiety” he has suffered. However, the failure to allege a physical injury bars a plaintiff from receiving
compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Section 1997e(e) provides that “[n]o Federal
civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility,
for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury
or the commission of a sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of Title 18).” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
“The plain language of the statute does not permit alteration of its clear damages restrictions on the basis of the underlying rights being asserted.” Searles v. Van Bebber , 251 F.3d
869, 876 (10th Cir. 2001). “The statute limits the remedies available, regardless of the rights
asserted, if the only injuries are mental or emotional.” . (citing Robinson v. Page, 170 F.3d 747,
748 (7th Cir. 1999)).
C. Access to Attorney
Plaintiff has pending state court criminal cases and alleges that he has been denied contact with his attorney via the kiosk system. The Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. A prisoner also has a constitutional right of access to the courts.
In addition, “First Amendment rights of association and free speech extend to the right to retain
and consult with an attorney.” Poole v. Cnty. of Otero , 271 F.3d 955, 961 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing
DeLoach v. Bevers , 922 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1990)), abrogated on other grounds by Hartman
v. Moore , 547 U.S. 250 (2006).
However, Plaintiff does not allege that he has been denied all access to his attorneys but rather is prohibited from using the phone and other communication devices due to his violations
of SCJ rules and abuse of phone privileges. Plaintiff is given a chance to show good cause why
his claim regarding access to his attorney should not be denied for failure to state a claim.
D. Segregation
Plaintiff complains that he remained in disciplinary segregation after he had served his disciplinary sanction.
“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment ‘prohibits any punishment’ of a pretrial detainee without due process.” Hubbard v. Nestor , 830 F. App’x 574, 583 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (citing
Blackmon v. Sutton , 734 F.3d 1237, 1241 (10th Cir. 2013); see also Bell v. Wolfish , 441 U.S. 520,
535 – 37 (1979) (holding that the government may subject a pretrial detainee to restrictions and
conditions of confinement without triggering procedural due process protection so long as such
measures don’t amount to punishment). “[A] showing of an expressed intent to punish on the
part of detention facility officials”—standing alone—is sufficient to demonstrate “the disability
is imposed for the purpose of punishment.” . (citing see Bell , 441 U.S. at 538; see also
Blackmon , 734 F.3d at 1241).
“Restraints that are reasonably related to the institution’s interest in maintaining jail security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they are
discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee would not have experienced had he been
released while awaiting trial.” Bell , 441 U.S. at 540. “[I]n addition to ensuring the detainees’
presence at trial, the effective management of the detention facility once the individual is confined
is a valid objective that may justify imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention
and dispel any inference that such restrictions are intended as punishment.” Id . The Supreme
Court has warned that these decisions “are peculiarly within the province and professional
expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to
indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should
ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.” Id . at 540, n.23 (citations omitted).
Plaintiff states in the Complaint that he was placed in segregation because of his misuse of the kiosk or telephone system in violation of a court-imposed no contact order. Thus, even taking
all the facts alleged in the Complaint as true, Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible claim that his
placement and retention in segregation was not reasonably related to the SCJ’s interest in effective
management and security of the facility.
Plaintiff mentions the Eighth Amendment in connection with his segregation claim. A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met. [1] Farmer v.
Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). “First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively,
‘sufficiently serious.’” . To satisfy the objective component, a prisoner must allege facts
showing he or she is “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. ;
Martinez v. Garden , 430 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 2005).
The Eighth Amendment requires prison and jail officials to provide humane conditions of confinement guided by “contemporary standards of decency.” Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 103
(1976). The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the Constitution “‘does not mandate
comfortable prisons,’ and only those deprivations denying ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities’ are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Wilson v.
Seiter , 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (internal citations omitted). Indeed, prison conditions may be
“restrictive and even harsh.” Rhodes v. Chapman , 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). “Under the Eighth
Amendment, (prison) officials must provide humane conditions of confinement by ensuring
inmates receive the basic necessities of adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care and by
taking reasonable measures to guarantee the inmates’ safety.” McBride v. Deer , 240 F.3d 1287,
1291 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
The second requirement for an Eighth Amendment violation “follows from the principle that ‘only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment.’”
Farmer , 511 U.S. at 834. Prison officials must have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” and
in prison-conditions cases that state of mind is “deliberate indifference” to inmate health or safety.
Id . “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id . at 837. “The
Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions’; it outlaws cruel and unusual
‘punishments.’” Id . It is not enough to establish that the official should have known of the risk of
harm. Id .
Because the sufficiency of a conditions-of-confinement claim depends upon “the particular facts of each situation; the ‘circumstances, nature, and duration’ of the challenged conditions must
be carefully considered.” Despain v. Uphoff , 264 F.3d 965, 974 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Johnson
v. Lewis , 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000)). “While no single factor controls . . . the length of
exposure to the conditions is often of prime importance.” . As the severity of the conditions to
which an inmate is exposed increases, the length of exposure required to make out a constitutional
violation decreases. Accordingly, “minor deprivations suffered for short periods would not rise to
an Eighth Amendment violation, while ‘substantial deprivations. . .’ may meet the standard despite
a shorter duration.” . (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to allege a “sufficiently serious” deprivation or facts showing he is “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Plaintiff has also
failed to allege deliberate indifference by any defendant. Plaintiff should show good cause why
this claim should not be dismissed.
E. Grievance Procedure
Plaintiff mentions that he seeks to have the grievance procedure at the SCJ “fixed.” The Tenth Circuit has held several times that there is no constitutional right to an administrative
grievance system. Gray v. GEO Group, Inc. , No. 17–6135, 2018 WL 1181098, at *6 (10th Cir.
March 6, 2018) (citations omitted); Von Hallcy v. Clements , 519 F. App’x 521, 523–24 (10th Cir.
2013); Boyd v. Werholtz , 443 F. App’x 331, 332 (10th Cir. 2011); see also Watson v. Evans , Case
No. 13–cv–3035–EFM, 2014 WL 7246800, at *7 (D. Kan. Dec. 17, 2014) (failure to answer
grievances does not violate constitutional rights or prove injury necessary to claim denial of access
to courts); Strope v. Pettis , No. 03–3383–JAR, 2004 WL 2713084, at *7 (D. Kan. Nov. 23, 2004)
(alleged failure to investigate grievances does not amount to a constitutional violation); Baltoski v.
Pretorius , 291 F. Supp. 2d 807, 811 (N.D. Ind. 2003) (finding that “[t]he right to petition the
government for redress of grievances . . . does not guarantee a favorable response, or indeed any
response, from state officials”). Plaintiff’s possible claim regarding the grievance process at the
SCJ is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.
IV. Motion
Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 3). Plaintiff argues that he is unable to afford counsel and needs help. Id.
There is no constitutional right to appointment of counsel in a civil case. Durre v. Dempsey ,
869 F.2d 543, 547 (10th Cir. 1989); Carper v. DeLand , 54 F.3d 613, 616 (10th Cir. 1995). The
decision whether to appoint counsel in a civil matter lies in the discretion of the district court.
Williams v. Meese , 926 F.2d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 1991). “The burden is on the applicant to convince
the court that there is sufficient merit to his claim to warrant the appointment of counsel.” Steffey
v. Orman , 461 F.3d 1218, 1223 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hill v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. , 393
F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2004)). It is not enough “that having counsel appointed would have
assisted [the prisoner] in presenting his strongest possible case, [as] the same could be said in any
case.” Steffey , 461 F.3d at 1223 (quoting Rucks v. Boergermann , 57 F.3d 978, 979 (10th Cir.
1995)).
In deciding whether to appoint counsel, courts must evaluate “the merits of a prisoner’s claims, the nature and complexity of the factual and legal issues, and the prisoner’s ability to
investigate the facts and present his claims.” Hill , 393 F.3d at 1115 (citing Rucks , 57 F.3d at 979).
The Court concludes in this case that (1) it is not clear at this juncture that Plaintiff has asserted a colorable claim against a named defendant; (2) the issues are not complex; and
(3) Plaintiff appears capable of adequately presenting facts and arguments. The Court denies the
motion without prejudice to refiling the motion at a later stage of the proceedings.
V. Response and/or Amended Complaint Required
Plaintiff is required to show good cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein. Plaintiff is also given the opportunity to file a complete and proper amended
complaint upon court-approved forms that cures all the deficiencies discussed herein. To add
claims, significant factual allegations, or change defendants, a plaintiff must submit a complete
amended complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. An amended complaint is not simply an addendum to
the original complaint, and instead completely supersedes it. Therefore, any claims or allegations
not included in the amended complaint are no longer before the court. It follows that a plaintiff
may not simply refer to an earlier pleading, and the amended complaint must contain all allegations
and claims that a plaintiff intends to pursue in the action, including those to be retained from the
original complaint.
Plaintiff must write the number of this case (25-3061-JWL) at the top of the first page of his amended complaint and he must name every defendant in the caption of the amended
complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Plaintiff should also refer to each defendant again in the
body of the amended complaint, where he must allege facts describing the unconstitutional acts
taken by each defendant including dates, locations, and circumstances. Plaintiff must allege
sufficient additional facts to show a federal constitutional violation. Plaintiff is given time to file a
complete and proper amended complaint in which he (1) raises only properly joined claims and
defendants; (2) alleges sufficient facts to state a claim for a federal constitutional violation and
show a cause of action in federal court; and (3) alleges sufficient facts to show personal
participation by each named defendant.
If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the prescribed time that cures all the deficiencies discussed herein, this matter may be dismissed without further notice for failure to
state a claim.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Plaintiff is granted until May 29, 2025, in which to show good cause, in writing to the undersigned, why Plaintiff’s Complaint
should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is also granted until May 29, 2025 , in which to file a complete and proper amended complaint to cure all the deficiencies discussed herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 3) is denied .
The Clerk is directed to send § 1983 forms and instructions to Plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED .
Dated April 29, 2025, in Kansas City, Kansas.
S/ John W. Lungstrum JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
[1] The Tenth Circuit has held that a pretrial detainee’s claims regarding conditions of confinement are governed by the Due Process Clause, and that “the Eighth Amendment standard provides the benchmark for such claims.” Routt v. Howard , 764 F. App’x 762, 770 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (quoting Craig v. Eberly , 164 F.3d 490, 495 (10th Cir. 1998)); see also Hooks v. Atoki , 983 F.3d 1193, 1203–04 10th Cir. 2020) (declining to extend Kingsley’s exclusively objective standard for pretrial detainees’ excessive force claims to Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claims).