{¶ 3} In the spring of 2003, Angela Meyer began working at Rosemont as a seasonal ladies' locker room attendant. Ms. Meyer also allegedly reported that appellant acted in a sexually inappropriate manner towards her. Following Ms. Meyer's allegations, Owen suspended appellant pending an investigation. As a result of the investigation, appellant was terminated from his employment at Rosemont.
{¶ 4} Appellant subsequently filed a complaint in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas naming Rosemont and certain individual board members as defendants.1 Appellant alleged that he was terminated as a result of age discrimination and sought damages for separate claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and defamation.2 Rosemont filed a motion for summary judgment, and appellant filed a motion in opposition. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Rosemont on all counts.
{¶ 5} Appellant timely appealed, setting forth one assignment of error for review.
{¶ 6} In his sole assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding that Rosemont fired him for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. This Court disagrees.
{¶ 7} An appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard used by the trial court.Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. (1996),
"(1) No genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party." Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977),
{¶ 8} The party seeking summary judgment initially bears the burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying portions of the record demonstrating an absence of genuine issues of material fact as to the essential elements of the non-moving party's claims. Dresher v. Burt (1996),
{¶ 9} Once this burden is satisfied, the non-moving party has the burden, as set forth in Civ.R. 56(E), to offer specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. The non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations and denials in the pleadings, but must instead point to or submit some evidentiary material that shows that a genuine dispute over the material facts exists. Id. See, also, Henkle v. Henkle (1991),
{¶ 10} In order to prevail in an employment discrimination action, the plaintiff-employee must first set forth facts which constitute a prima facie case of employment discrimination. Absent direct evidence of age discrimination, in order to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination in an employment discharge action, an employee must demonstrate that he or she "(1) was a member of the statutorily protected class, (2) was discharged, (3) was qualified for the position, and (4) was replaced by, or the discharge permitted the retention of, a person of substantially younger age." Coryell v. Bank One TrustCo. (2004),
{¶ 11} If the employee is able to establish a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer-defendant to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff's discharge.Barker v. Scovill, Inc. (1983),
{¶ 12} In the present case, it is undisputed that appellant established a prima facie case. Rosemont moved for summary judgment on the basis that it had set forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for appellant's discharge and that appellant had failed to prove that the reasons stated by Rosemont were merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination.
{¶ 13} In its motion for summary judgment, Rosemont argued that it had a non-pretextual, legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing appellant, to wit: allegations of sexual harassment by two female employees who were employed as the seasonal ladies' locker room attendant at Rosemont during the time that appellant was the locker room manager. This Court agrees. It is undisputed that both Ms. Glotfelty and Ms. Meyer complained that appellant conducted himself inappropriately towards them while he was their supervisor at Rosemont. The question before this Court is whether appellant satisfied his burden of proving that Rosemont's alleged reason for his termination was merely a pretext for discrimination.
{¶ 14} In order to prove that an employer's reasons for firing were merely a pretext, an employee must show by a preponderance of evidence one of the following: "(1) that the proffered reasons had no basis in fact, (2) that the proffered reasons did not actually motivate his discharge, or (3) that they were insufficient to motivate discharge." (Internal citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Manzer v. DiamondShamrock Chem. Co. (C.A. 6, 1994),
{¶ 15} Rosemont argued in its motion for summary judgment that appellant failed to prove that the reason it gave for firing appellant was merely a pretext for discrimination. To support its argument, Rosemont relied on the depositions of appellant and William Owen, the General Manager at Rosemont. In addition, Rosemont relied on the affidavits of Angela Meyer and Lisa Glotfelty, who alleged that appellant sexually harassed them while they were employed at Rosemont, and Jennifer Laughna, a Rosemont employee.
{¶ 16} Owen and Laughna both testified that they believed that Ms. Glotfelty was telling the truth when she complained about appellant's behavior toward her when she worked as the ladies' locker room attendant at Rosemont in 2002. Owen further stated that after Ms. Glotfelty came to him, he discussed her allegations with appellant and told him that if he did not stop behaving in an inappropriate manner towards Ms. Glotfelty, he would be terminated.
{¶ 17} As a result of Ms. Meyer's complaints regarding appellant's behavior towards her in 2003, Owen suspended appellant from his position so that an investigation could be conducted. Owen conducted the investigation with the advice of certain members of Rosemont's board of directors. Owen and the board members who participated in the investigation believed Meyer's allegations. The decision was then made to terminate appellant's employment.
{¶ 18} In his motion opposing Rosemont's motion for summary judgment, appellant alleged that the allegations of sexual harassment were a pretext to terminate appellant because of his age. Specifically, appellant argued that the trial court erred by requiring him to disprove each and every possible reason for his discharge other than impermissible discrimination. Although this Court agrees with appellant that the trial court erred in its analysis, we find appellant's argument to be without merit.
{¶ 19} After reviewing appellant's motion in opposition to Rosemont's motion for summary judgment, this Court finds that appellant failed to prove that Rosemont's stated reason for his discharge — claims of sexual harassment by two former Rosemont employees which were supervised by appellant — was a pretext. It was undisputed that Meyer and Glotfelty had complained to Owen regarding appellant's behavior and that such behavior would be sufficient to warrant appellant's discharge. The question for this Court is whether appellant proved that Rosemont's proffered reason did not actually motivate his discharge. Manzer,
{¶ 20} In addition, in his brief to this Court, appellant argues that the recent United States Supreme Court case Smith v.Jackson (2005),
Judgment affirmed.
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to appellant.
Exceptions.
Slaby, P.J., Moore, J., concur.